Using root cause analysis to handle intrusion detection alarms by Julisch, Klaus
Using Root Cause Analysis
to Handle
Intrusion Detection Alarms
Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines
Doktors der Naturwissenschaften
der Universita¨t Dortmund
am Fachbereich Informatik
von
Klaus Julisch
Dortmund
2003
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 15. Juli 2003
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Bernhard Steffen
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Joachim Biskup
Prof. Dr. Heiko Krumm
Abstract
Using Root Cause Analysis to Handle Intrusion Detection Alarms
Klaus Julisch
IBM Zurich Research Laboratory
Sa¨umerstrasse 4
8803 Ru¨schlikon, Switzerland
e-mail: kju@zurich.ibm.com
In response to attacks against enterprise networks, administrators are increas-
ingly deploying intrusion detection systems. These systems monitor hosts, net-
works, and other resources for signs of security violations. Unfortunately, the use
of intrusion detection has given rise to another difficult problem, namely the han-
dling of a generally large number of mostly false alarms. This dissertation presents
a novel paradigm for handling intrusion detection alarms more efficiently.
Central to this paradigm is the notion that each alarm occurs for a reason,
which is referred to as the alarm’s root causes. This dissertation observes that
a few dozens of root causes generally account for over 90% of the alarms in an
alarm log. Moreover, these root causes are generally persistent, i.e. they keep
triggering alarms until someone removes them. Based on these observations, we
propose a new two-step paradigm for alarm handling: Step one identifies root
causes that account for large numbers of alarms, and step two removes these root
causes and thereby reduces the future alarm load. Alternatively, alarms originating
from benign root causes can be filtered out. To support the discovery of root
causes, we propose a novel data mining technique, called alarm clustering.
To lay the foundation for alarm clustering, we show that many root causes
manifest themselves in alarm groups that have certain structural properties. We
formalize these structural properties and propose alarm clustering as a method for
extracting alarm groups that have these properties. Such alarm groups are gener-
ally indicative of root causes. We therefore present them to a human expert who
is responsible for identifying the underlying root causes. Once identified, the root
causes can be removed (or false positives can be filtered out) so as to reduce the
i
ii
future alarm load. We experimentally validate the proposed two-step alarm han-
dling paradigm with alarms from a variety of different operational environments.
These experiments show that alarm clustering makes the identification of root
causes very efficient. Moreover, the experiments demonstrate that by judiciously
responding to root causes one can reduce the future alarm load by 70%, on the
average.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over the past 10 years, the number and severity of network-based computer at-
tacks have significantly increased [6]. As a consequence, classic computer se-
curity technologies such as authentication and cryptography have gained in im-
portance. Simultaneously, intrusion detection has emerged as a new and potent
approach to protect computer systems [14, 47]. In this approach, so-called In-
trusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are used to monitor computer systems for signs
of security violations. Having detected such signs, IDSs trigger alarms to report
them. These alarms are presented to a human operator who evaluates them and
initiates an adequate response. Examples of possible responses include law suits,
firewall reconfigurations, and the fixing of discovered vulnerabilities.
Evaluating intrusion detection alarms and conceiving an appropriate response
was found to be a challenging task. In fact, practitioners [29, 141] as well as re-
searchers [13, 22, 37, 111] have observed that IDSs can easily trigger thousands
of alarms per day, up to 99% of which are false positives (i.e. alarms that were
mistakenly triggered by benign events). This flood of mostly false alarms makes
it very difficult to identify the hidden true positives (i.e. those alarms that correctly
flag attacks). For example, the manual investigation of alarms has been found to
be labor-intensive and error-prone [29, 44, 141]. Tools to automate alarm inves-
tigation are being developed [44, 48, 199], but there is currently no silver-bullet
solution to this problem.
This thesis presents a new semi-automatic approach for handling intrusion de-
tection alarms more efficiently. Central to this approach is the notion of alarm
root causes. Intuitively, the root cause of an alarm is the reason for which it oc-
curred. For example, consider a machine whose broken TCP/IP stack generates
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fragmented IP traffic. This traffic will trigger “Fragmented IP” alarms on many
IDSs. Here, the broken TCP/IP stack is the root cause of the respective alarms.
This thesis observes that for any given IDS, the majority of alarms can be at-
tributed to one out of a small number of root causes. Moreover, many of these
root causes are persistent and do not disappear unless someone removes them.
It is therefore argued that intrusion detection alarms should be handled by iden-
tifying and removing the most predominant and persistent root causes. In that
way, the future alarm load is reduced, and the human operator is freed to focus on
the remaining alarms. Applied to the above example, this means to identify and
fix the broken TCP/IP stack, which also eliminates the associated “Fragmented
IP” alarms. To make this new alarm handling paradigm practical, we introduce
a new data mining technique that — when applied to alarm logs — supports the
discovery of root causes.
1.2 Thesis Statement and Contributions
This dissertation describes the work done to validate the following three-part the-
sis statement:
(1) A small number of root causes is generally responsible for the
bulk of alarms triggered by an IDS. (2) Root causes can be discovered
efficiently by performing data mining on alarm logs. (3) Knowing
the root causes of alarms, one can — in most cases — safely and
significantly reduce the future alarm load by removing them or by
filtering out the alarms that originate from benign root causes.
Part one of this thesis statement is a general observation about the nature of
intrusion detection alarms, namely that only a few root causes account for the bulk
of alarms. Part two states that root causes can be discovered efficiently, and part
three says that knowledge of root causes is relevant because it enables countermea-
sures that are effective in reducing the future alarm load. For example, a possible
countermeasure is to fix root causes such as broken protocol stacks, compromised
machines, or configuration faults (which some IDSs confuse with attacks). Alter-
natively, one can filter out alarms that are known to result from benign (i.e. not
security relevant) root causes. Finally, reducing the future alarm load based on
one’s understanding of alarm root causes is claimed to be safe, meaning that it
incurs a small risk of discarding true positives.
Note that the thesis statement implies a new paradigm for alarm handling. Ac-
cording to this paradigm, data mining should be used to discover root causes that
account for large numbers of alarms. Subsequently, removing these root causes
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or judiciously filtering out their associated alarms will safely and significantly re-
duce the number of alarms that are triggered in the future. The thesis statement
guarantees that this approach is efficient, effective, and safe.
The proof of the thesis statement is constructive and experimental. A substan-
tial fraction of this dissertation is concerned with deriving a data mining technique
that supports the discovery of root causes. Subsequently, this data mining tech-
nique is used in experiments with real-world intrusion detection alarms to validate
the thesis statement. As Section 1.4 will point out, we are not in possession of
representative data collections from all kinds of IDSs. Therefore the scope of our
experimental validation is restricted by the available data.
The main ideas underlying this dissertation have been published in several ar-
ticles [110, 111, 112, 113, 114] and two patents [42, 43]. The novel contributions
can be summarized as follows:
The rule that a few root causes generally account for the majority of alarms
is established.
We formalize the link between data mining and root cause discovery, in-
vestigate the suitability of existing data mining techniques for root cause
discovery, and develop a new, particularly suitable data mining technique.
We use the aforementioned data mining technique to show that root causes
can be discovered in an efficient manner by analyzing alarm logs.
In extensive experiments with real-world intrusion detection alarms, it is
shown that intrusion detection alarms can be handled safely and efficiently
by identifying and responding to their root causes.
This dissertation offers the first high-level characterization of intrusion de-
tection alarms and shows how it applies to the detection of attacks (cf.
Proposition 3.1 and Section 3.5.2).
To the field of data mining, we contribute a detailed case study for the suc-
cessful application of its techniques (including episode rules, tests of cluster
tendency, cluster analysis, and cluster validation).
1.3 Overview
Intrusion detection systems trigger alarms to report attacks. This dissertation mod-
els alarms as tuples over the Cartesian product dom(A1) x . . . x dom(An), where
{A1, . . . , An} is the set of alarm attributes and dom(Ai) is the domain (i.e. the
range of possible values) of attributeAi. The alarm attributes (attributes for short)
capture intrinsic alarm properties, such as the source IP address of an alarm, its
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destination IP address, its alarm type (which encodes the observed attack), and its
time-stamp. Finally, a[Ai] denotes the value that attribute Ai assumes in alarm
a. For example, Table 1.1(a) shows a sample alarm that reports a “Fragmented
IP” attack being launched on Nov. 1st at 11:33:17 from the source 10.173.2.3 : 80
against the target 10.7.121.9 : 12318. Moreover, if a denotes the alarm of Table
1.1(a), then a[Time-stamp] = Nov. 1st, 11:33:17 holds.
At the core of this dissertation is a data mining technique called alarm clus-
tering. The motivation for alarm clustering stems from the observation that the
alarms of a given root cause are generally “similar” in a sense defined below.
Alarm clustering reverses this implication and groups similar alarms together, as-
suming that these alarms also share the same root cause. For each alarm cluster
(i.e. for each group of similar alarms), a single generalized alarm is derived. In-
tuitively, a generalized alarm is a succinct and human-understandable pattern that
an alarm must match in order to belong to the respective cluster. In practice,
knowledge of generalized alarms vastly simplifies the discovery of root causes.
We therefore use alarm clustering to identify the root causes in real-world alarm
logs. In doing so, we empirically validate the thesis statement. The following
example is instrumental for a better understanding of alarm clustering.
Example 1 Let us reconsider the root cause of the broken TCP/IP stack, which
was first introduced in Section 1.1. This time, we assume that the broken stack
belongs to a popular Web server that is primarily used on workdays. Obviously,
the resulting “Fragmented IP” alarms have the same source IP address (namely
the IP address of the Web server, which we assume to be 10.173.2.3) and the same
source port (namely 80). The target of the alarms are non-privileged ports of
various Web clients. Furthermore, given that the Web server is mostly used on
workdays, one will observe that the bulk of alarms occurs on workdays. Finally,
note that “Fragmented IP” alarms are triggered each time that the Web server
responds to a client request. Given our assumption that the Web server is popular
and therefore heavily used, it follows that we are flooded by a large number of
“Fragmented IP” alarms.
The alarm clustering method developed in this dissertation groups the “Frag-
mented IP” alarms together and reports them by saying that there are many
alarms that are subsumed by the generalized alarm of “source 10.173.2.3 : 80
launching ’Fragmented IP’ attacks on workdays against non-privileged ports of
Web clients”. Clearly, a generalized alarm like this facilitates the identification of
root causes, even though complete automation is not achieved. 
More formally, generalized alarms — just like ordinary ones — are tuples that
indicate for each attribute the corresponding attribute value. Thus, the generalized
alarm of the above example actually looks as shown in Table 1.1(b). Note that
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Table 1.1: Illustration of alarms and generalized alarms.
a) A sample alarm. b) A sample generalized alarm.
Attribute Value Attribute Value
Source IP 10.173.2.3 Source IP 10.173.2.3
Source port 80 Source port 80
Destination IP 10.7.121.9 Destination IP Web clients
Destination port 12318 Destination port Non-privileged
Alarm type Fragmented IP Alarm type Fragmented IP
Time-stamp Nov. 1st, 11:33:17 Time-stamp Workdays
different from ordinary alarms, generalized alarms can have generalized attribute
values. A generalized attribute value is an identifier that represents a set of ele-
mentary values. For example, the generalized attribute value “Workdays” of Table
1.1(b) represents the set of elementary time-stamps that fall on workdays. Sim-
ilarly, the generalized attribute value “Non-privileged” represents the set {1025,
. . . , 65535} of non-privileged ports. Generalized attribute values like these are
not allowed in ordinary alarms.
There are two important observations to be made about the above example:
First, the broken TCP/IP stack causes alarms that are similar in the sense that
they are subsumed by the same generalized alarm. Second, the broken TCP/IP
stack causes many alarms to be triggered. In other words, the broken TCP/IP
stack is a root cause that manifests itself in a large group of similar alarms. This
observation is central to the Chapters 3 and 4. More precisely, the remainder of
this dissertation (excluding the related work in Chapter 2, and the conclusion in
Chapter 7) is organized as follows:
Chapter 3 explains that data mining should ideally form alarm clusters whose
constituent alarms are guaranteed to have the same root cause. Unfortu-
nately, this goal is unattainable. Towards a weaker but feasible goal, we
generalize the example of the broken TCP/IP stack and show that there is
an important family of root causes that manifest themselves in large groups
of similar alarms. Hence, we postulate that a data mining technique that
identifies such large groups of similar alarms is likely to actually group
alarms that have the same root cause. Therefore, cluster analysis, which
per definition groups similar object, emerges as a promising data mining
technique for root cause analysis.
Chapter 4 surveys the field of cluster analysis and shows that none of the popular
clustering methods is really suitable for root cause analysis. This raises the
need for a new clustering method, which is subsequently derived by modify-
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ing the method of attribute-oriented induction. In a nutshell, the new clus-
tering method seeks to identify alarm clusters that maximize intra-cluster
similarity, while having a user-defined minimum size. Similarity is mea-
sured via generalization hierarchies, which, for example, might state that
the IP address 10.173.2.3 is a “Web server”, is a “Server”, is a “Machine”,
etc. . Then, the alarms of an alarm cluster are all the more similar the closer
their attributes are related by way of these generalization hierarchies.
Chapter 5 attempts to objectively measure the quality of alarm clusters. Objec-
tive measures of cluster quality are desirable because they reduce the risk
of a human user misinterpreting and consenting to meaningless alarm clus-
ters. Cluster quality is studied in the field of cluster validation. Chapter
5 reviews this field, discusses its rather substantial limitations, and shows
how the methods of cluster validation can nonetheless be used to increase
our confidence in the results of the alarm clustering method.
Chapter 6 uses the alarm clustering method of Chapter 4 in experiments with
real-world intrusion detection alarms. In doing so, we empirically validate
the thesis statement given in the previous section.
1.4 Datasets Used in the Expriments
A preliminary remark on intrusion detection terminology is in order: IDSs are
commonly classified into misuse detection systems and anomaly detection sys-
tems [14]. Misuse detection systems (a.k.a. signature-based systems) such as
STAT [102] use knowledge accumulated about attacks to detect instances of these
attacks. Anomaly detection systems (e.g. IDES [109]) use a reference model of
normal behavior and flag deviations from this model as anomalous and poten-
tially intrusive. Another dichotomy splits IDSs according to their audit sources.
Specifically, host-based IDSs analyze host-bound audit sources such as operating
system audit trails, system logs, or application logs, whereas network-based IDSs
analyze network packets that are captured from a network.
The experiments in this dissertation use alarms from network-based, commer-
cial misuse detection systems that were deployed in operational (i.e. “real-world”)
environments. We consider it a strength of our validation that it uses alarms from
real-world environments rather than from simulated or laboratory environments,
which can have significant limitations [144]. We are not in possession of data col-
lections from host-based or anomaly detection systems and therefore cannot offer
experiments with these IDS types.
Table 1.2 introduces the sixteen IDSs that we use in the experiments of this
dissertation. Our selection criteria was to offer a representative mix of IDSs from
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Table 1.2: Overview of IDSs used in experiments.
IDS Type Location Min Max Avg
1 A Intranet 7643 67593 39396
2 A Intranet 28585 1946200 270907
3 A DMZ 11545 777713 310672
4 A DMZ 21445 1302832 358735
5 A DMZ 2647 115585 22144
6 A Extranet 82328 719677 196079
7 A Internet 4006 43773 20178
8 A Internet 10762 266845 62289
9 A Internet 91861 257138 152904
10 B Intranet 18494 228619 90829
11 B Intranet 28768 977040 292294
12 B DMZ 2301 289040 61041
13 B DMZ 3078 201056 91260
14 B Internet 14781 1453892 174734
15 B Internet 248145 1279507 668154
16 B Internet 7563 634662 168299
different vendors in different operational environments. The sixteen IDSs are de-
ployed at eleven different Fortune 500 companies, and no two IDSs are deployed
at the same geographic site. All IDSs are configured and operated by profes-
sional IDS analysts. The “IDS” column contains a numerical identifier that we
use throughout this thesis to reference the IDSs. The “Type” column indicates the
IDS type, namely “A” or “B”, both of which are leading commercial IDSs. To
avoid unintended commercial implications, we do not reveal the product names or
vendors of “A” and “B”. For each IDS, we employ all alarms that were triggered
during the year 2001. The minimum, maximum, and average number of alarms
per month are listed for each IDS in the “Min”, “Max”, and “Avg” columns, re-
spectively. Finally, the “Location” column indicates where the IDSs are deployed:
Intranet: Denotes an IDS on an internal corporate network without Internet ac-
cess.
DMZ: Denotes an IDS on a perimeter network that is protected by a firewall, but
offers services to the Internet.
Extranet: Denotes an IDS on a network that is shared between multiple cooper-
ating companies, but is not accessible from the Internet.
Internet: Denotes an IDS that is deployed before the external firewall on a direct
link to the Internet.
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Despite continuing standardization efforts [60], there is no widely used format
for intrusion detection alarms. In particular, the alarms of different IDSs do not
necessarily have the same alarm attributes. However, the alarms of virtually all
network-based IDSs contain the following key attributes, which are the only ones
that will be used in the experiments:
1. The source IP address (source IP for short) which identifies the machine
that launced the attack.
2. The source port from which the attack originated.
3. The destination IP address (destination IP for short) of the target machine.
4. The destination port at which the attack was targeted.
5. The time-stamp indicating the date and time of the attack.
6. The alarm type, which describes the nature of the attack. The alarm type
can be a mnemonic name such as “Fragmented IP” or a number that maps
to a name like this, or to a more verbose description of the attack.
7. The diagnostic context (context for short), which stores the supposedly ma-
licious network packet. For example, the context frequently contains sup-
posedly malicious URLs, or command sequences that seem to constitute
FTP or Telnet exploits.
Attributes are commonly classified according to their type. The type of an at-
tribute characterizes the structure of its domain. For example, numerical attributes
have the real numbers R as their domain. Attribute types play an important role
in data mining because they influence the applicability of data mining techniques.
Intrusion detection alarms contain attributes of many different types:
Categorical attributes: The domain of categorical attributes is discrete and un-
ordered. Examples of categorical attributes include IP addresses and port
numbers.
Numerical attributes: Examples of numerical attributes include counters (e.g.
for the number of SYN packets in a SYN flooding alarm), and size attributes
(e.g. for the packet size in “Large ICMP Traffic” alarms [30]).
Time attributes: All alarms are time-stamped. Note that time should not be
treated as a numerical attribute because this would mean to ignore its unique
semantics (including notions such as periodicity, workdays versus week-
ends, etc.).
Free-text attributes: Free-text attributes assume arbitrary and unforeseeable text
values. The context, for example, is a free-text attribute.
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Alarms are stored in alarm logs. The experiments in this dissertation are such
that they take an alarm log as input and return an analysis of this alarm log as
output. In other words, the alarm log is our basic unit of analysis. It is therefore
necessary to split the alarms of Table 1.2 into alarm logs. This can be done in
many different ways. We have chosen to split the alarms along IDS and month
boundaries, so that we obtain a total of (16 IDSs)× (12 months) = 192 different
alarm logs. A corollary from this splitting is that alarms from different IDSs or
from different months are never analyzed together because they do not fall into
the same alarm log. Two factors were decisive for this splitting: First, analyzing
alarm logs that span a prolonged time period such as a month allows us to discover
long-term alarm patterns, such as weekly alarm patterns. Second, analyzing alarm
logs that mix alarms from different IDSs seems pointless because the IDSs of
Table 1.2 are deployed in completely independent environments. Therefore, any
correlations between the alarms of these IDSs are mostly coincidental.
The notation and conventions used in this dissertation can be summarized as
follows:
We model alarms as tuples over the n-dimensional attribute space
dom(A1) x . . . x dom(An), where dom(Ai) is the domain of attribute Ai.
The value that attribute Ai assumes in alarm a is denoted by a[Ai].
The alarms in our experiments have the following attributes: The source IP
address, the source port, the destination IP address, the destination port, the
time-stamp, the alarm type, and the diagnostic context.
Our experiments are such that they take the alarms triggered by one IDS
during one month as input and return an analysis of these alarms as output.
This text uses the following typeface conventions: Italic small letters (e.g.
x1, y2, z3, . . .) denote atomic values such as numbers or IP addresses. Bold
small letters (e.g. a, aˆ,b, . . .) denote tuples. Italic capital letters (e.g.
A1, Src−IP , L, C, . . .) stand for attribute names, sets, and partitions (i.e.
sets of sets).
In anticipation of Chapter 3, we remark that alarm logs will be modeled as
multi-sets (a.k.a. bags or collections). We use pointed brackets for multi-
sets (e.g. L1 = <a, a,b>, L2 = <b, c>) and re-define the set operators
so that they take multiple occurrences of the same element into account.
Hence, for example, |L1| = 3, |L2| = 2, L1 ∪ L2 =<a, a,b,b, c>, L1 *
L2, <a, a>⊆ L1, etc. .
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This dissertation was motivated by the fact that today’s IDSs tend to trigger an
abundance of mostly false alarms. It is therefore natural to ask for the reasons of
this alarm flood. Section 2.1 addresses this question, and surveys research towards
“better” IDSs, which trigger less false positives. Section 2.2 introduces root cause
analysis and shows how it has been used in network management. Section 2.3 sur-
veys applications of data mining to intrusion detection. In particular, it describes
earlier work that used data mining to render alarm investigation more efficient.
Section 2.4 concludes this chapter with a discussion of alarm correlation.
2.1 On the Difficulty of Intrusion Detection
This section puts the thesis work into context. Specifically, Section 2.1.1 explains
why IDSs trigger so many mostly false alarms, and Section 2.1.2 summarizes
work into “better” IDSs, which trigger less false positives.
2.1.1 Origins of the Alarm Flood
This section only considers the false alarm problem for misuse detection systems.
For these systems, the abundance of alarms in general, and of false positives in
particular, can be attributed to three main factors:
Underspecified signatures: Underspecified signatures check conditions that are
necessary, but not sufficient for attacks. As a consequence, they also trig-
ger on benign events, which causes false positives. For example, instead of
complex regular expressions that can reliably detect many attacks, it is not
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uncommon to use simple string-matching signatures. There are four reasons
for this practice: First, harsh real-time requirements generally preclude the
use of precise signatures, which are more time-consuming to match against
the audit data [103, 176]. Second, because of their higher generality, it
is attractive to use underspecified signatures that also cover variations of
attacks [37, 48]. Third, audit sources frequently lack information useful
for misuse detection [175, 176]. That can make underspecified signatures
inevitable. Fourth, writing intrusion detection signatures is inherently diffi-
cult [122, 129, 157, 163], which favors the creation of buggy and possibly
underspecified signatures.
Intent-guessing signatures: Intent-guessing signatures trigger on events that
might or might not be attacks. For example, signatures that trigger on failed
user logins, DNS zone transfers, overlapping IP fragments, or set URGENT
bits are intent-guessing because they assume that these activities are mali-
cious. It has been shown that this assumption is frequently false [19, 168].
Note that intent-guessing signatures are not underspecified as they reliably
detect the events they claim to detect. However, these events are not neces-
sarily attacks.
Lack of abstraction: Today’s IDSs tend to trigger multiple low-level alarms to
report a single conceptual-level phenomenon. For example, a single run
of the nmap scanning tool [72] triggers hundreds of alarms, namely one
alarm for each probe. Similarly, a network with a small maximum transfer
unit (MTU) [196] systematically fragments IP packets. Nevertheless, most
IDSs trigger a separate alarm for each fragmented packet. Clearly, this lack
of abstraction aggravates the alarm flood.
Axelsson has observed that the use of underspecified or intent-guessing sig-
natures easily leads to an over-proportionally high number of false positives [13].
Just observe that these signatures are prone to trigger on non-intrusive events. Un-
fortunately, non-intrusive events are so much more frequent than intrusive events
that even their occasional misclassification can easily lead to an unacceptably high
false alarm rate. This can be shown by using Bayes’ Theorem to rewrite the con-
ditional probability P (¬I|A) that an alarmA reports a non-intrusive event ¬I (i.e.
that A is a false positive):
P (¬I|A) = P (¬I) · P (A|¬I)
P (¬I) · P (A|¬I) + P (I) · P (A|I) (2.1)
Assuming that the prior probability P (¬I) of non-intrusive events is much
higher than the prior probability P (I) of intrusive events (say, P (¬I) = 100 ·
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P (I)), we obtain P (¬I|A) ≥ P (A|¬I)/(P (A|¬I)+0.01). Thus, a signature that
is inclined to trigger on non-intrusive events (say, P (A|¬I) = 0.1) will result in an
unacceptably high rate of false positives (namely P (¬I|A) ≥ 0.1/0.11 > 0.9, for
the above numerical values). Axelsson argues that a 90% probability of an alarm
being a false one is completely unacceptable as it schools the human operator to
ignore the alarms altogether [13].
2.1.2 Towards Better IDSs
The intuitively most appealing way of dealing with false positives probably is to
build “better” IDSs. This is no easy endeavor because many of the issues men-
tioned in the previous section are intrinsically difficult to address. Nevertheless,
there is a small number of research projects that have pursued this avenue. Inter-
estingly, most of the resulting IDSs share two properties: First, they have public
signatures that can be tuned to a given environment, and second they are special-
purpose. Special-purpose IDSs are tailored towards detecting one class of attacks
(e.g. Web server attacks) and they monitor audit sources that are particularly suit-
able for this task. By way of illustration, here are three examples of IDSs that are
less prone to false positives:
Embedded detectors: Zamboni [204] defines embedded detectors as host-based
IDSs that are integrated into the source code of an application or the operat-
ing system. Thus, embedded detectors are a form of source code instrumen-
tation. One of their main advantage is their ability to access any information
that they need to do their job. Moreover, embedded detectors are executed
on demand, which is economical, and frees resources to be used otherwise,
e.g. for more accurate signatures. Both advantages are expected to translate
into fewer false positives [8, 204], but a rigorous proof is still amiss.
Web IDS: Almgren et al. describe a signature-based IDS for detecting Web
server attacks in real-time [7]. The IDS is host-based and uses Web server
logs as audit source. The attack signatures are a variant of regular expres-
sions, and can easily be tuned to a particular environment. This customiz-
ability was found to be helpful for reducing the number of false positives.
Special-purpose NIDS: Sekar et al. present a network-based IDS that exclu-
sively focuses on low-level network attacks, such as reconnaissance scans
and denial-of-service attacks [183]. The presented system differs from most
other network-based IDSs in that it refrains from any attempt to detect
application-level attacks such as attacks against Web servers. Owing to its
clear focus, the IDS is reported to have a very low false alarm rate.
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Note that special-purpose IDSs such as the ones above have to be comple-
mented by additional IDSs to achieve comprehensive attack coverage. This cre-
ates the need to deploy and manage a heterogeneous collection of complementary
IDSs. Even though this is mainly an operational problem, one should not under-
estimate its practical difficulty and relevance. Moreover, none of the above IDSs
addresses the difficulty of writing correct attack signatures. This is particularly
evident for embedded detectors, which are integrated into the source code of the
monitored program. Therefore, embedded detectors are more difficult to imple-
ment, maintain, and port [204].
2.2 Root Cause Analysis
This section briefly surveys the field of root cause analysis. Specifically, Subsec-
tion 2.2.1 introduces root cause analysis basics, and Subsection 2.2.2 shows how
root cause analysis has been used in network management to identify faulty net-
work equipment. The application of root cause analysis to network management
is particularly relevant to this thesis because network management also faces the
problem of an overwhelmingly large number of alarms.
2.2.1 Introduction to Root Cause Analysis
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) has historically been used to identify the most basic
factors that contributed to an incident [128, 138, 167]. For example, after a reactor
accident, the Department of Energy would commonly use root cause analysis to
pinpoint why the accident had happened, so that similar accidents could be pre-
vented in the future. Because prevention of similar accidents is central to root
cause analysis, it has been required that root causes must be factors that one has
control over. Hence, the following definition by Paradies and Busch [167]:
Definition 2.1 A root cause is the most basic cause that can reasonably be iden-
tified and that management has control to fix. Root cause analysis is the task of
identifying root causes. 
The three key words in the definition of root causes are basic, reasonably,
and fix: Root causes must be so basic (or specific) that one can fix them. On the
other hand side, given that fixing them is the whole point, it is not reasonable to
further split root causes into more basic causes. Consequently, these more basic
causes are not root causes, and root causes lie at the “highest” level where fixing
is possible. Finally, note that a single incident can have multiple root causes.
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Several methodologies and supporting tools have been suggested for root
cause analysis [128, 138]. Common to these methodologies is the notion that
events propagate by causing other events. For example, a “poor-manufacturing-
procedure event” causes a “buggy-fuel-gauge event”, which causes precipitous
“fuel-low-warning events”, which cause an “emergency-airplane-landing event”.
The majority of root cause analysis methodologies provide systematic and struc-
tured frameworks for “walking back” such causality graphs to their roots. In
addition, there are several computer tools to support these methodologies. See
[128, 138] for details and examples.
2.2.2 Root Cause Analysis in Network Management
In network management [24, 98, 106, 107, 134, 164, 165, 202], alarms indicate
problems in a network’s operation, such as hardware or software failures, per-
formance degradations, or misconfigurations. As network components are highly
inter-dependent, a problem in one component propagates to all transitively depen-
dent components. As a consequence, a problem affecting any single component
can impair many other components, most of which report their impairment by
means of alarms. The goal of network management is to evaluate these alarms
and to pinpoint the original problem. This problem is called the root cause, and
fixing it clearly eliminates the associated impairments and alarms. Finally, the
task of identifying root causes is called root cause analysis [107, 202]. These
definitions are consistent with the ones of the previous section.
The example of Figure 2.1 illustrates the challenges of root cause analysis.
Figure 2.1(a) shows a network consisting of three routers (namely R1, R2, R3),
three LANs (namely A, B, C), and a database server DB. The database clients
are assumed to be distributed across all three LANs. Figure 2.1(b) shows how
a problem in the memory module of router R1 propagates through the network.
Specifically, suppose that in router R1, the memory cell storing the cost of link
R1 →R3 fails, and erroneously indicates an extremely high value. No alarm is
issued for this event, but the routing protocol reacts by routing all future A−−C
traffic over router R2. As a consequence, router R2 becomes congested, which
results in alarms. Moreover, the connectivity of LAN C degrades and database
transactions by remote database clients last longer. This increases the number
of transaction aborts that are issued to release database locks that were held for
too long. The increased number of transaction aborts is reported by additional
alarms. Note that all alarms in this example report symptoms of the root cause
(the failed memory cell) rather than the root cause itself. Moreover, router R2 and
the database clients are likely to raise multiple alarms to report their impairment,
which can unleash an alarm flood. This tendency to generate too many alarms
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Figure 2.1: Fault propagation and alarm generation in networks.
that are only remotely related to the actual root cause makes root cause analysis a
challenging task.
In summary, root cause analysis in network management aspires to identify
the starting point(s) of the fault propagation chain (cf. Figure 2.1(b)). This is
an instance of the general problem of abductive inference [160, 165, 169, 170].
Abductive inference is the process of reasoning from effects to causes. Many net-
work management systems do abductive inference in two steps: First, they model
the cause-effect propagation in networks, and then, they heuristically search this
model for plausible root causes that explain the observed alarms [24, 98]. Other
systems require the user to encode his or her knowledge about root cause analysis
in expert system rules [106, 107, 164]. Thereby, the problem of abductive infer-
ence is off-loaded upon the user. Yet other systems implement root cause analysis
by means of case-based reasoning [134] or codebooks [202].
Even though much research has investigated root cause analysis in network
management, this research is not directly applicable to intrusion detection. Specif-
ically, network management systems diagnose root causes by “walking back” the
fault propagation chain. In intrusion detection, this paradigm is difficult to apply
because the notions of causality and propagation are unclear. Moreover, network
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management systems can only diagnose known root causes. However, this dis-
sertation has introduced the root cause concept to intrusion detection, and at the
outset, there were no known root causes. Therefore, we decided to develop a tool
that supported the discovery of new and unexpected root causes, rather than a tool
that recognized known root causes.
2.3 Data Mining
Advances in computers and data storage technology have made it possible to col-
lect huge datasets, containing gigabytes or even terabytes of data. This wealth of
data contains potentially valuable information. The trick is to extract this (hidden)
valuable information, so that the data owners can capitalize on it. Data mining is a
relatively new discipline that seeks to do just that. More precisely, and accepting
that slightly different definitions have been proposed (e.g. [63, 90]), we adopt the
following working definition [91]:
Definition 2.2 Data mining is the analysis of (often large) observational datasets
to find unsuspected relationships and to summarize the data in novel ways that are
both understandable and useful to the data owner. 
The relationships and summaries derived through a data mining exercise are
often referred to as models or patterns. Examples include linear equations, clus-
ters, tree structures, if-then rules, and periodic patterns.
The above definition refers to “observational data”, as opposed to “experi-
mental data”. Data mining typically deals with data that has been collected for
some purpose other than data mining. Thus, the objective of the data mining
task could not influence the data collection strategy. This contrasts with statistics,
where it is quite common to design experiments so that they yield the data needed
to answer a specific question. Finally note that data mining aims at discovering
“understandable” relationships and summaries that can be interpreted as “novel”,
“unsuspected”, and “useful” knowledge. In other words, the goal of data mining
is to offer new insights that are valuable to the data owner.
The algorithms that take data as input and produce models or patterns as output
are called data mining techniques. To make this thesis self-contained, we summa-
rize several particularly popular data mining techniques in Section 2.3.1. Section
2.3.2 shows how other researchers used data mining to make alarm investigation
more efficient. The Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 summarize other, less closely related
applications of data mining to intrusion detection.
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2.3.1 Classification of Data Mining Techniques
Data mining techniques are algorithms that extract patterns or build models from
available datasets. There is no unique and universally accepted classification of
data mining techniques. However, the classification shown in Figure 2.2 is con-
sistent with most data mining texts (e.g. [90, 91]). Note that the figure is not
exhaustive, and that many more leave nodes could have been added [90, 91].
A preliminary remark on input data representations is in order: Without loss
of generality, we assume that the input data is stored in a single relational database
table [59]. The columns of this table are called attributes and the rows are called
tuples. Sets of transactions [3] and multidimensional data cubes [2] are other
common input data representations in data mining. However, to simplify the pre-
sentation, we do not consider these input data representations, here.
At the highest level, data mining techniques are split into predictive and de-
scriptive techniques. Predictive techniques use examples, called training data, to
learn a model that predicts the unknown value of one attribute (e.g. a person’s
salary) based on the known values of other attributes (e.g. the person’s education,
age, and employer). In other words, predictive techniques model the relation-
ship between one designated attribute and all the other attributes. Descriptive
techniques, by contrast, find patterns and summaries that describe a dataset in a
human-understandable manner. No training data is needed, and all attributes are
treated symmetrically (as opposed to singling out one particular attribute).
Predictive techniques are further sub-classified into regression and classifica-
tion. In regression [53, 118], the attribute being predicted is real-valued, whereas
in classification [38, 177] it is categorical, i.e. discrete and unordered. The values
predicted by classification are referred to as class labels to emphasize that they
have no numerical meaning. For example, a set of intrusion detection alarms that
have been classified into true positives and false positives, can serve as training
data to learn a classifier that predicts the class labels (“true positive” versus “false
positive”) of future, previously unseen alarms. This classifier can be represented
by means of if-then rules, decision trees, or some other structure [91, 155].
We next consider the sub-categories of descriptive techniques. Visual tech-
niques use colors, shapes, and animations to visually represent data in an easy-
to-understand manner [36, 171]. Association rules [3, 4, 190] capture implica-
tions between attribute values. More formally, association rules have the form
(∧mi=1[Ai = vi]) =⇒ (∧ni=m+1[Ai = vi]) [s, c], where the Ai (i = 1, . . . , n) are
pairwise distinct attributes, the vi are attribute values, and the numbers s, c ∈ R+
(called support and confidence) are descriptive statistics. This rule is interpreted
as: “Database tuples that satisfy the rule’s left-hand side have a c% probability to
also satisfy the right-hand side. Moreover, s% of tuples satisfy both sides.”
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Figure 2.2: A rough classification of data mining techniques.
Note that association rules capture relationships between the attributes of a
single database tuple. Episode rules [142, 143], by contrast, capture relation-
ships between successive tuples. This clearly presupposes that tuples are ordered,
e.g. by virtue of a time attribute. Assuming that an order exists, episode rules
have been defined as implication rules that predict the occurrence of certain tu-
ples based on the occurrence of other tuples. For example, assuming that tuples
represent intrusion detection alarms, an episode rule might state that in 50 percent
of all cases, an “Authentication failure” alarm is followed within 30 seconds by a
“Guest login” alarm. We will formally define episode rules in Section 3.5.
Cluster analysis (a.k.a. clustering) [81, 104, 105] seeks to group tuples so that
the tuples within a given group/cluster are similar, whereas the tuples of different
groups/clusters are dissimilar. Obviously, the notion of similarity is key to this
definition. In Euclidean spaces, similarity is relatively easy to define [105]. For
example, the inverse of the Euclidean distance is a possible similarity measure.
Moreover, this measure captures our intuition that a cluster is an isolated and
compact “cloud” in space. In non-Euclidean spaces, categorical attributes such as
IP addresses or port numbers significantly complicate the definition of similarity
[74, 84]. Chapter 4 has much more to say about cluster analysis. Finally, there
are several good textbooks that can be consulted for a broader and more detailed
treatment of data mining concepts and techniques [20, 90, 91].
2.3.2 Using Data Mining for Alarm Handling
This section surveys research projects that used data mining to support the inves-
tigation of alarms. First, however, recall the distinction between alarms and alarm
types: Alarms are the messages that an IDS triggers to report security violations.
The alarm type, by contrast, is the attribute that specifies the actual security vi-
olation (e.g. SYN flooding, host scanning, buffer overflow, etc.) reported by an
alarm. Also recall that t[Ai] denotes the value that attribute Ai assumes in tuple t.
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Manganaris et al. mine association rules to build a “second-level” anomaly de-
tection system that discards “normal” alarms and thereby reduces the work-load of
the operator [141]. Implicitly, this work assumes that “normal” alarms are always
false positives. The reference model of normal alarm behavior is learned in two
steps. First, a time-ordered stream of historical alarms is partitioned into bursts,
and second, association rules are mined from these bursts (more on this later).
The resulting association rules constitute the reference model of normal alarm be-
havior. At runtime, alarms are compared against this reference model, and alarms
that are consistent with it are considered normal/benign and get discarded.
More precisely, Manganaris et al. model alarms as tuples (t, A), where t is a
time-stamp and A is an alarm type. All other alarm attributes such as source IP
address, destination IP address, or port numbers are not considered in their model.
Alarm bursts are sets of alarms that are separated by prolonged alarm-free periods.
Internally, alarm bursts are represented as tuples that have one attribute Ai for
each possible alarm type Ai. Specifically, let B be an alarm burst, and let b be its
internal representation. Then, b[Ai] = 1 holds if and only if B contains an alarm
of type Ai, and b[Ai] = 0, otherwise. Note that this representation suppresses all
temporal information about alarms. The tuples representing the alarm bursts are
mined for association rules of the form (∧i∈I [Ai = 1]) =⇒ (∧j∈J [Aj = 1]), with
disjunct index sets I and J (i.e. I ∩ J = ∅). Association rules about non-existing
alarm types (e.g. [A1 = 1] =⇒ [A2 = 0]) are explicitly not searched for.
The set of discovered association rules is used without any inspection or mod-
ification as the reference model of normal alarm behavior. At run-time, deviations
from this model are detected as follows: The incoming alarm stream is partitioned
into alarm bursts, and each alarm burst is considered by itself. Various tests are
used to decide whether an alarm burst B is anomalous. For example, suppose the
reference model contains the association rule (∧i∈I [Ai = 1]) =⇒ (∧j∈J [Aj = 1]).
Moreover, let us assume that alarm burst B contains all the alarm types Ai (i.e.
∀i ∈ I : Ai ∈ B), but lacks some of the Aj (i.e. ∃j ∈ J : Aj 6∈ B). Then, alarm
burst B is deemed anomalous as it does not contain all Ajs, which would have
been expected based on the rule (∧i∈I [Ai = 1]) =⇒ (∧j∈J [Aj = 1]). Only ano-
malous alarm bursts are reported to the operator, while normal ones are discarded.
Note that this approach incurs a potentially high risk of discarding true posi-
tives. In fact, the set of discovered association rules is blindly used as reference
model. As a consequence, association rules that correspond to attacks can creep
into the reference model and thereby prevent future detection of these attacks. On
the other hand side, given that reference models can contain thousands of associa-
tion rules [141], it does not seem practical to manually inspect them before usage.
The alternative approach of using attack free alarm logs to learn the association
rules seems equally difficult to implement [112].
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Clifton and Gengo use data mining to find alarm patterns that a human ex-
pert can understand and act upon [37]. More precisely, they mine episode rules
from historical alarm logs, and use these episode rules to guide the construction
of custom-made filtering rules, which automatically discard well-understood false
positives. Clifton and Gengo offer hardly any experiments to validate their ap-
proach. We therefore replicate their experiments in Section 3.5 and come to the
conclusion that episode rules are not particularly suitable in this context. This
motivates our work on clustering, which is the main focus of this thesis. Nev-
ertheless, their and our work are obviously related because both mine historical
alarm logs in quest for human-understandable patterns.
In the world of telecommunication networks, Klemettinen uses association
rules and episode rules to support the development of alarm correlation systems
[119]. Hellerstein and Ma pursue the same goal by means of visualization, pe-
riodicity analysis, and m-patterns (a variant of association rules requiring mutual
implication) [94]. Garofalakis and Rastogi investigate bounded-error lossy com-
pression of network management events [75]. These research projects as well
as our own experiments [110, 114] have convinced us that visualization, episode
rules, and association rules are too demanding (in terms of time and human ex-
pertize) to be used on a larger scale. This has further motivated our work on
clustering. To the author’s knowledge, the idea of applying clustering to intrusion
detection or network management alarms was new at its time of introduction.
2.3.3 The MADAM Approach for Building IDSs
The MADAM ID project at Columbia University [129, 131, 132] is one of the
first and best-known data mining projects in intrusion detection. Therefore we
briefly survey this project, here. The contents of this section is optional and is not
required for an understanding of later chapters.
The MADAM ID project has shown how data mining techniques can be used
to construct IDSs in a more systematic and automated manner than by manual
knowledge engineering. Specifically, the approach pursued by MADAM ID is
to learn classifiers that distinguish between intrusions and normal activities. Un-
fortunately, classifiers can perform really poorly when they have to rely on at-
tributes that are not predictive of the target concept [130]. Therefore, MADAM
ID proposes association rules and episode rules as a means to construct additional,
more predictive attributes. In the terminology of MADAM ID, these additional at-
tributes are called features.
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MADAM ID has been most extensively documented for the case of building
network-based misuse detection systems. Therefore, this section also describes
MADAM ID in the context of network-based misuse detection. Note, however,
that there have been experiments in applying MADAM ID to anomaly detection
as well as to host-based misuse detection [129]. Because of space limitations,
these experiments are not described here.
Let us now consider how MADAM ID is used to construct network-based
misuse detection systems. The base version of MADAM ID that we discuss here
does not consider the packet payload of network traffic. Indeed, all network traffic
is abstracted to so-called connection records. The attributes of connection records
store intrinsic connection characteristics such as the source IP, the destination IP,
the source and destination ports, the start time, the duration, the header flags, etc. .
In the case of TCP/IP networks, connection records summarize TCP sessions.
The most notable characteristic of MADAM ID is that it learns a misuse de-
tection model from examples, called training connection records. Training con-
nection records are connection records that have been classified into normal con-
nection records and intrusion connection records. Given a set of training con-
nection records, MADAM ID proceeds in two steps: The feature-construction
step augments the connection records by additional attributes that are deemed
to be relevant for distinguishing intrusions from normal activities. For example,
this step might add a new attribute that counts the number of connections that
have been initiated during the preceding two seconds to the destination IP address
of the current connection record. The feature-construction step is followed by
the classifier-learning step, which learns a classifier from the augmented training
connection records (i.e. the original training connection records extended by the
newly constructed attributes). Figure 2.3 illustrates the process in more detail:
(1) The user of MADAM ID procures training connection records and partitions
them into normal connection records and the intrusion connection records.
MADAM ID offers no support for this step.
(2) Association rules and episode rules are mined separately from the normal
connection records and from the intrusion connection records. The resulting
patterns are compared, and all patterns that are exclusively contained in
the intrusion connection records are collected to form the intrusion-only
patterns.
(3) The intrusion-only patterns are used in a mostly automatic procedure to
derive additional attributes, which are expected to be indicative of intrusive
behavior. These additional attributes are counts, averages, and percentages
over connection records that share some attribute values with the current
connection record.
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Figure 2.3: Data mining process of building misuse detection systems.
(4) The original training connection records are augmented by the newly con-
structed attributes.
(5) A classifier is learned that distinguishes normal connection records from
intrusion connection records. This classifier — the misuse IDS — is the end
product of MADAM ID.
It is worth pointing out that the MADAM ID process of Figure 2.3 heavily
relies on intrusion detection expert knowledge. For example, expert knowledge
is used to prune the number of patterns produced during association and episode
rule mining. Also, feature construction is restricted to adding attributes that an in-
trusion detection expert would consider promising. Moreover, separate classifiers
are constructed for different attack classes, and these classifiers are subsequently
combined. Finally, domain knowledge is used to manually define suitable features
that summarize the packet payload. These more advanced aspects of MADAM ID
are described elsewhere [129, 131, 132].
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2.3.4 Further Reading
In this section, we briefly survey other related work that applied data mining to
intrusion detection. A more detailed overview of the field can be found in a recent
book edited by Barbara´ and Jajodia [17].
The vast majority of researchers have used data mining to build non-
parametric models for anomaly detection. This is very similar to early work in
intrusion detection, except that normal behavior is represented by models based
on data mining rather than statistics [109, 188]. For example, Wisdom & Sense
is an anomaly detection system that mines association rules from historical audit
data to represent normal behavior [198]. Similarly, Teng et al. use a form of au-
tomatically learned episode rules to represent normal user behavior [197]. The
idea of Lankewicz and Benard is to cluster audit log records and to represent each
cluster by a single “typical” audit log record. These typical audit log records form
the model of normal behavior against which future audit log records are com-
pared [126]. A similar idea has been pursued by Lane and Brodley, who cluster
attack-free shell command sequences and define the “cluster centers” to represent
normal behavior. Subsequently, anomalous command sequences can be detected
based on their distance to the cluster centers [125]. Portnoy et al. cluster histori-
cal connection records and label large clusters as “normal” and small clusters as
“abnormal” [173]. At run-time, new connection records are classified according
to their distance to the closest labeled cluster. Barbara´ et al. use incremental asso-
ciation rule mining to detect anomalous network traffic patterns in real-time [18].
Finally, there is a long list of research projects that have tried to model system
call sequences by a variety of different models, including neural networks, hid-
den Markov models, as well as fixed and variable length patterns. The work by
Warrender et al. [201] and Debar et al. [46] is representative of this research.
Mukkamala et al. present work that does not fall in the category “data-mining-
based anomaly detection”. Their idea is to use data mining techniques to reduce
the amount of audit data that needs to be maintained and analyzed for intrusion
detection [158]. Lam et al. report similar work in audit data reduction [123].
2.4 Alarm Correlation
Alarm Correlation Systems (ACSs) [40, 41, 44, 48, 191, 199] post-process intru-
sion detection alarms in real-time and automate part of the alarm investigation
process. More precisely, ACSs attempt to group alarms so that the alarms of the
same group pertain to the same phenomenon (e.g. the same attack). Then, only
the alarm groups are forwarded to the human operator. In that way, ACSs offer
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a more condensed view on the security issues raised by an IDS. In addition, they
make it easier to distinguish real security threats from false positives.
ACSs are clearly related to this thesis work because they address the same
problem. Moreover, they pursue a very similar approach, which could be called
“real-time clustering” (after all, ACSs group/cluster alarms in real-time). Never-
theless, the following considerations show the need for the new off-line clustering
method presented in this dissertation:
Depth of analysis: Due to harsh real-time requirements, ACSs can only perform
a limited amount of analysis. For example, consider a phenomenon that
only occurs on Saturdays (e.g. false positives due to weekly system back-
ups). Our off-line clustering method is able to correctly group and report
the resulting alarms, whereas ACSs do not have this capability because it is
difficult to implement in real-time. Moreover, to reliably identify a weekly
alarm pattern, one must observe at least several weeks of alarms. Clearly,
delaying correlation results for weeks defeats the very purpose of real-time
alarm correlation. Similarly, processing free-text alarm attributes (e.g. the
context, which stores raw audit records, cf. Section 1.4) is costly and is con-
sequently not done by real-time ACSs. By contrast, our off-line clustering
method analyzes free-text attributes and thereby improves its results.
Bias: ACSs are generally optimized to find alarm groups that result from attacks.
This attack-centric bias has far-reaching consequences. For example, some
ACSs reassess the severity of alarm groups and discard alarm groups that
are deemed benign [48, 191]. Other ACSs use complex techniques to deal
with spoofed source IP addresses, multi-stage attack scenarios, or stealthy
attacks [41, 44, 199]. Moreover, the publications on ACSs use exclusively
attacks to validate their systems. This attack-centric bias contrasts with our
goal of finding any large group of systematically generated alarms, so that
we can identify and remove its root cause. Many of these alarm groups are
not the result of attacks, and today’s ACSs are not particularly suitable for
finding them. Our off-line clustering method, by contrast, is biased in a way
that favors the discovery of such alarm groups.
Ease of use: Today’s ACSs are difficult to configure. For example, some ACSs
have dozens of configuration parameters, which take experience to set
[48, 199]. Other ACSs face a knowledge engineering bottleneck because
they require the user to specify correlation rules [40, 41]. The ACS in [44]
learns correlation rules from the user. To this end, the user has to manually
correlate alarms, so that the system can learn his or her ability. Clearly, man-
ual alarm correlation is difficult and error-prone. As will become apparent
throughout this thesis, our clustering method has none of these drawbacks,
and is easy and intuitive to use.
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The remainder of this section surveys three recent alarm correlation systems.
The presentation of these systems uses the alarm model of Section 1.3, i.e. alarms
are modeled as tuples consisting of alarm attributes and their corresponding val-
ues. Moreover, a[Ai] denotes the value that attribute Ai assumes in alarm a.
2.4.1 Tivoli Aggregation and Correlation Component
The Tivoli Aggregation and Correlation Component (TACC) [48] cascades three
processing steps, through which each alarm is pipelined in strict order. The first
step unifies different data representations, e.g. by mapping between host names
and IP addresses or between port numbers and service names. The second step
uses expert system rules to merge duplicate alarms and to pinpoint faulty IDSs.
For example, suppose a particular attack is always reported by two independent
IDSs. Then, an expert system rule can be written to merge the resulting duplicates.
Moreover, a second expert system rule can be used to issue a warning message
when only one of the two IDSs reports said attack. Clearly, this indicates that
the other IDS is probably broken. The third step of the TACC groups alarms that
agree in one or more alarm attributes. Moreover, it counts the number of alarms
per group and time window, and raises a meta-alarm if this count exceeds a user-
defined threshold value.
Let us consider the third step in more detail. To begin with, the TACC defines
three so-called aggregation axes, namely the source IP address, the destination
IP address, and the alarm class, which generalizes the alarm type into broader
categories. Each combination of aggregation axes defines one out of seven ways
of grouping alarms. For example, the combination {Src−IP ,Dst−IP} specifies
to group alarms that originate from the same source IP address and go to the same
destination IP address. Similarly, the combination {Alarm−class} specifies to
group alarms that share the same alarm class. Note that all alarms within a given
alarm group have identical values along the group’s aggregation axes.
Now let us consider how a newly triggered alarm is processed. This alarm is
simultaneously added to all seven groups, i.e. (1) to the group of alarms that have
the same source IP address as the new alarm, (2) to the group of alarms that have
the same destination IP address as the new alarm, . . . , (7) to the group of alarms
that have the same source IP address, destination IP address, and alarm class as
the new alarm. For each of these seven groups, a separate sliding time window is
maintained and the number of alarms within this time window is counted. If (and
only if) this count exceeds a user-defined threshold value, then a meta-alarm is
raised. Note that an alarm group whose count does not exceed the threshold value
is not reported to the user!
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The TACC approximates sliding time windows by means of a weighted sum
scheme, which is particularly resource-sparing. More precisely, each time a new
alarm is added to a group, the new count value is calculated according to the
formula countnew = 1 + countold × 2 τ × (told−tnew ). Here, tnew and told are the
time-stamps of the new and the preceding alarm, respectively. The parameter
τ ∈ R+ is a user-defined fading factor, also referred to as half-life. For example,
if τ is chosen to be 1/100, then the weight of the old count value fades to half its
nominal value if 100 seconds elapse before the next alarm occurs.
2.4.2 Probabilistic Alert Correlation
The Probabilistic Alert Correlation (PAC) system [199] represents alarm groups
by means of so-called meta-alarms. To understand meta-alarms, first note
that PAC supports set-valued attributes. Using this feature, a group of alarms
can be represented by a single meta-alarm that is obtained by taking at-
tribute by attribute the union of attribute values. For example, the alarm
group {(1, A, α), (2, B, α), (3, A, α)} would be represented by the meta-alarm
({1, 2, 3}, {A,B}, {α}). Clearly, the mapping of alarm groups to meta-alarms
is not injective.
The PAC system maintains a continuously updated collection of meta-alarms.
Whenever the PAC system receives a new alarm, it compares the alarm to all
existing meta-alarms and calculates the similarities between the new alarm and
the various meta-alarms. The new alarm is then merged with the most similar
meta-alarm, provided the similarity exceeds a user-defined minimum similarity
threshold. By contrast, an alarm that lacks minimum similarity to all existing
meta-alarms starts a new meta-alarm of its own.
Very roughly, the similarity between an alarm and a meta-alarm is defined as
the weighted sum of attribute-wise similarities. Towards a more precise definition,
let us assume that alarms have n attributes A1, . . . , An. Let t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, 1]
be attribute-wise minimum similarity thresholds, let w1, . . . , wn ∈ [0, 1] be
attribute-wise weights (so-called expected similarities), and let s1(·, ·), . . . , sn(·, ·)
be attribute-wise similarity functions that return a value between 0 (denoting com-
plete dissimilarity) and 1 (denoting identity). The parameters ti, wi, and si(·, ·)
will be discussed in a moment. First, however, we define the similarity sim(a,m)
between an alarm a and a meta-alarm m:
sim(a,m) :=
{
0, if si(a[Ai],m[Ai]) < ti for any i∑n
i=1 wi·si(a[Ai],m[Ai])∑n
i=1 wi
, otherwise. (2.2)
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The PAC system provides little guidance for setting the parameters ti and wi,
i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, some of these parameters are situation-specific, which
further complicates the task of finding reasonable values. For example, the min-
imum similarity threshold tSrc−IP of the source IP address is situation-specific.
Specifically, tSrc−IP should be close to 0 for alarms that are prone to source ad-
dress spoofing (e.g. SYN flooding alarms). On the other hand side, tSrc−IP should
be much higher when source address spoofing is unlikely.
The PAC system suggests intuitively appealing but ultimately ad hoc similarity
functions s1(·, ·), . . . , sn(·, ·). For example, two destination port lists are deemed
more or less similar based on their degree of overlap. For alarm types, PAC uses a
similarity matrix with values of unity along the diagonal and off-diagonal values
that heuristically express similarity between the corresponding alarm types. Time
similarity is a step function that drops after one hour from 1 to 0.5, and the simi-
larity between IP addresses considers if the two IP addresses come from the same
subnet.
The PAC system is monolithic and cannot easily be distributed. However,
distributed processing is still possible by recursively applying PAC to its own
results. Specifically, the authors of PAC use PAC to correlate individual alarms
into threads, threads into security incidents, and security incidents into attack
reports. The very same PAC system is used on all three levels of the correlation
hierarchy. However, the respective parameter values differ depending on the level
(see [199] for details). Note that the three-layered correlation hierarchy comes at
the cost of tripling the number of parameters that need to be set!
2.4.3 Alert Stream Fusion
The Alert Stream Fusion (ASF) system [44] maintains a continuously updated
collection of alarm groups, called scenarios. Whenever the ASF system receives
a new alarm from an IDS, it compares the alarm to all existing scenarios and cal-
culates the probabilities that the new alarm belongs to the respective scenarios.
The new alarm is then assigned to the scenario that produces the highest probabil-
ity score. If all probability scores are below a user-defined threshold then the new
alarm is not added to any scenario, but rather starts a new scenario of its own. The
assignment of an alarm to a scenario is final and irreversible.
The probability that a new alarm a belongs to a scenario S is a function of
only the new alarm a and the most recent alarm in S. All the other alarms in S
are not considered. The function that calculates the probability scores is learned
by means of predictive data mining techniques from labeled training data. The
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original article by Dain and Cunningham [44] compares different predictive data
mining techniques with respect to their ability to learn “good” probability func-
tions. We here focus on decision trees, which produced the best results.
The training data needed by the decision tree algorithm is obtained by man-
ually correlating historical alarms. To this end, one has to manually execute the
program of Figure 2.4. This yields positive training examples, which have the
class label merge (cf. line 5 of Figure 2.4), as well as negative training exam-
ples, which have the class label ¬merge (cf. line 6 of Figure 2.4). Using these
training examples, it is possible to learn a decision tree. This decision tree is sub-
sequently used to predict the merge and ¬merge decisions for new, previously
unseen alarms. It has been noted that the manual correlation of historical alarms
is labor-intensive and site-dependent [44].
It is instructive to compare the ASF system to the PAC system of Section 2.4.2:
First, meta-alarms in PAC clearly correspond to scenarios in ASF, and similarities
correspond to probabilities. Second, the calculation of similarities in PAC relies
on heuristics and human expertise, while ASF uses predictive data mining tech-
niques to learn a suitable probability measure. Third, meta-alarms summarize all
alarms in an alarm group. As a consequence, the similarity between a new alarm
and a meta-alarm implicitly takes all alarms in the respective alarm group into
account. ASF, by contrast, compares a new alarm only to the most recent alarm
of a scenario, while all the other alarms in the scenario are ignored.
Input: A chronologically ordered sequence a1, . . . ,an of alarms;
Output: Training data for decision tree learning;
Algorithm:
1: for i := 1 to n do { // Loop over all alarms a1, . . . ,an.
2: for each scenario S in memory do {
3: Let l be the last alarm that was added to S;
4: if, based on human judgment, ai belongs to S
5: then add ai to S and output the triple (ai, l, class label = merge);
6: else output the triple (ai, l, class label = ¬merge);
7: }
8: if ai belongs to none of the existing scenarios S
9: then create a new scenario S′ and add ai to S′;
10: }
Figure 2.4: Algorithm for manually deriving training data from historical alarms.
30 CHAPTER 2. RELATED WORK
Chapter 3
Using Data Mining for
Root Cause Analysis
As explained in the introduction, this thesis uses data mining to extract alarm pat-
terns that a skilled user can interpret in terms of root causes. The present chapter
offers a more formal treatment of this idea. Specifically, Section 3.1 revises the
definition of root causes and makes it more precise. Section 3.2 explains how data
mining can be used to support the discovery of root causes. Moreover, the limi-
tations of data mining in this context are discussed. Section 3.3 characterizes the
kind of alarm patterns that root causes typically generate, and explains that a data
mining technique should ideally discover these alarm patterns. The discussion in
this section is purely theoretical, and we therefore experimentally validate it in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5, finally, summarizes our experience with episode rules, a
data mining technique that has significant intuitive appeal for root cause analysis.
3.1 Root Causes and Root Cause Analysis
This section revises our earlier definitions of root cause and root cause analysis.
In addition, the genesis of root causes is studied.
3.1.1 Revised Definitions
Section 2.2.1 has offered a generic definition of root causes. Nonetheless, it is
desirable to find a more specific definition, which is tailored to intrusion detection
and which provides stronger guidance to the people performing the root cause
analysis. Earlier work in the dependability field [127], lays the foundation for
such a revised definition.
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Without embarking on a general discussion of dependability concepts, we
briefly show how these concepts apply to computer security [174]. To begin with,
the dependability community defines an information system as a collection of in-
teracting components such as hosts, printers, routers, LANs, etc. . A security
failure occurs when the users of the information system notice a loss of confiden-
tiality, integrity, or availability. A corrupted or compromised component that may
lead to a subsequent security failure is called an error. The adjudged or hypothe-
sized cause of an error is a fault. Note that error and security failure are distinct
concepts. Specifically, a security failure occurs when an error “passes through”
the system-user interface and affects the service as perceived by the user. Finally,
IDSs perform error detection, and false positives are alarms that incorrectly rate a
component as erroneous.
For example, consider an information system that the user perceives as a sin-
gle black box. Moreover, assume that one component of the information system
is compromised by an attacker. This compromised component is an error, and
a successful attack in combination with the exploited vulnerability are the faults
that caused this error. The error remains invisible to the user as long as the at-
tacker keeps still. On the other hand side, system failure occurs when the attacker
degrades the system’s confidentiality, integrity, or availability to the point where it
becomes apparent to the user. Intrusion detection systems detect erroneous com-
ponents when they start to behave abnormally, or when they attack other compo-
nents. Therefore, intrusion detection is a form of error detection.
The above dependability definitions are too tight for our purposes. Specifi-
cally, an error was defined as a corrupted or compromised component, and a fault
was defined as the cause of an error. This thesis, however, is particularly inter-
ested in the causes of perceived errors. A perceived error is a component that
triggers alarms, no matter whether these alarms are true or false positives. Thus,
an actually compromised component as well as a healthy component that only the
IDS believes to be compromised are both perceived errors. To avoid clashes with
dependability terminology, we use the term root cause rather than fault to refer to
the cause of a perceived error. More precisely:
Definition 3.1 A root cause is a problem that affects one or more components
and causes them to trigger alarms. Root cause analysis is the task of identifying
root causes as well as the components affected by them. 
Note that root causes are detached from the components they affect. Thus,
a root cause (e.g. a worm) affects one or more components (e.g. the hosts in a
subnet), which in turn causes these components to trigger alarms (when the worm
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spreads by attacking other machines). Similarly, a non-standard protocol can af-
fect a server and cause it to trigger “Suspicious protocol” alarms. Root cause
analysis is concerned with identifying the type and locations of root causes.
The above definitions might not be as rigorous as one had hoped. However,
by linking the definition of root causes to the dependability concept of faults,
one can justifiably argue that there probably is no better definition. In fact, the
dependability community has used the notion of faults for over a decade without
suggesting a formal definition. Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a formal
definition for the intrusion detection equivalent of faults.
3.1.2 Genesis of Root Causes
The genesis of a root cause describes how it came into existence. In other words,
the genesis of a root cause describes the forces that introduced it. Studying the
genesis of root causes is important because it promotes a better understanding
of what root causes are and how/why they come into existence. It must be em-
phasized that this section does not attempt to classify root causes. Classifying
root causes is an extremely difficult task. In fact, attacks are only one type of
root causes, but even the problem of attack classification is highly controversial
[99, 121, 124]. Therefore, no attempt to classify root causes is made.
Figure 3.1 shows that root causes can be introduced intentionally or inadver-
tently. A root cause is intentional if a human being introduces it consciously
and on purpose. By contrast, a root cause is inadvertent if it is the unconscious
byproduct of some action. The distinction between intentional and inadvertent
root causes is subtle. For example, a malicious system administrator might inten-
tionally install a Trojan horse, or a thoughtless user might inadvertently install it
along with other software that she downloaded from the Internet. In both cases,
the end effect is the same, but the genesis of the Trojan horse (which is the root
cause in this example) is different.
Intentional root causes can be introduced with malicious intent or with non-
malicious intent. Malicious intent means that somebody brought the root cause
into existence, intentionally so that it would compromise system security. Ex-
amples of malicious root causes are worms and the execution of attack scripts.
Non-malicious root causes, on the other hand side, were introduced for the desir-
able functionality they provide. Desirable functionality can consist in new proto-
cols & services that a system administrator installs to satisfy the user community.
However, some IDSs trigger alarms when they observe unknown protocols or ex-
ploitable services. Similarly, changes in the topology & architecture can cause
suspicious traffic patterns, which trigger alarms on many network-based IDSs.
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Figure 3.1: The genesis of root causes, or how root causes enter a system.
Finally, system management comprises certain highly desirable tasks such as vul-
nerability scanning, network mapping, are-you-alive messages, and the querying
of potentially sensitive MIB variables. All of these tasks can and frequently do
trigger intrusion detection alarms.
Root causes that were introduced inadvertently can result from failures & mis-
configurations or from trickery. An example of a failure is the broken TCP/IP
stack of Chapter 1. A thoughtless user that launches an e-mail attachment and
thereby infects his machine with a virus is an example of a root cause that was
inadvertently introduced by trickery. Section 3.3.1 offers more examples of root
causes. Section 3.3.2 uses the results of this section to gain some general insights
into the alarm patterns that root causes induce.
3.2 Conceptual Problem Description
The present section lays the methodological foundation of this thesis. Specifically,
Section 3.2.1 explains how data mining can be used to support root cause anal-
ysis, and Section 3.2.2 specifies the algorithmic requirements that a data mining
technique should satisfy to be of maximal value for root cause analysis.
3.2.1 The Role of Data Mining in Root Cause Analysis
In this work, the role of data mining is to group alarms that have the same
root cause so that a human expert can interpret the resulting alarm groups in
terms of root causes. The entity relationship diagram of Figure 3.2 describes
3.2. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 35
Root cause 1 1manifests
is union of
1
N
Alarm group
N M
stored inAlarm
N
1
has
Alarm log1 NtriggersIDS
D
ata m
ining (automated)
Interpretation
(manual)
Computer
world
Model
world
N
1
modeled by
Alarm
pattern
Figure 3.2: Entity relationship diagram of key concepts.
the relationship between alarms, root causes, and data mining in a more formal
manner. The dashed line in the figure separates computer world concepts (which
have an actual existence in the form of hardware components or memory state)
from model world concepts (which only exist in the world of our thinking). The
entities and relationships are as follows:
An IDS triggers zero or more alarms ai, i = 1, 2, 3, . . ..
Each alarm ai has a unique root cause rc(ai), which is the reason of its
existence. Alarms are stored in alarm logs. (Note that each alarm must
have a root cause because otherwise it would not exist. Moreover, accord-
ing to Definition 3.1, each alarm is caused by a single problem — its root
cause. Even though this problem might be the conjunction of multiple sub-
problems, we conceptually treat it as the single root cause.)
An alarm log is a multi-set (a.k.a. bag or collection) of alarms. Modeling
alarm logs as multi-sets is correct because alarms are implicitly ordered by
virtue of the time-stamp attribute. We use pointed brackets for multi-sets
(e.g. L1 = <a, a,b>, L2 = <b, c>) and re-define the set operators so
that they take multiple occurrences of the same element into account (e.g.
|L1| = 3, |L2| = 2, L1 ∪L2 =<a, a,b,b, c>, L1 * L2, <a, a>⊆ L1, etc.).
An alarm group is a multi-set of alarms that share the same root cause. The
root cause RC manifests itself in the alarm group <ai | rc(ai) = RC>.
The alarm log is the union of all alarm groups. Another way to look at this
is that the alarm groups are the result of partitioning the alarm log along the
boundaries of root causes.
36 CHAPTER 3. USING DATA MINING FOR ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
An alarm group is modeled by an alarm pattern. An alarm pattern is an
expression in some formal language that characterizes or summarizes the
alarms of an alarm group. Note that an alarm pattern is an abstraction of
the alarm group it models. Therefore, it can include alarms that are not in
the alarm group, and, conversely, it can exclude some alarms that the alarm
group actually contains. The principal requirement is that an alarm pattern
must model the main characteristics of an alarm group.
The gray arrows of Figure 3.2 specify a normative model for how root cause
analysis should be done (see below for the practical infeasibility of this model).
According to this model, data mining partitions the alarm log into alarm groups,
and derives alarm patterns for the alarm groups. The alarm groups and patterns
are subsequently presented to a human expert who is tasked to interpret them in
terms of root causes. This interpretation task is vastly simplified by the availability
of alarm patterns. In fact, Section 3.3 will show that alarm groups can be large
and difficult to comprehend. Therefore, listing their constituent alarms can easily
overwhelm the human expert with a vast amount of information that is hard to
make sense of. Alarm patterns mitigate this problem by succinctly summarizing
alarm groups.
The practical infeasibility of the data mining step of Figure 3.2 results from the
requirement that all alarms of an alarm group must share the same root cause. The
data mining step cannot enforce this constraint because root causes are a model
world construct that data mining is not aware of. To illustrate this, let us consider a
machine whose broken TCP/IP stack fragments most IP traffic. Suppose that this
machine is behind a router that itself fragments a substantial fraction of the traffic
passing through it. Now, let an IDS in front of the router trigger a “Fragmented
IP” alarm for a packet from said machine. Unless substantial knowledge about
the state of the system is available, there is no way of deciding if the alarm’s
root cause is the broken TCP/IP stack or the fragmenting router. More complex
scenarios are conceivable. In summary, if only an alarm log is given, then it is not
possible to decide whether two or more alarms have the same root cause.
Given the infeasibility of constructing alarm groups, we do not scrap the root
cause analysis framework of Figure 3.2, but instead accept that data mining can
merely approximate alarm groups and their corresponding alarm patterns. Clearly,
a data mining technique is all the more useful, the closer it comes to being correct
and complete in the following sense:
Definition 3.2 In the context of this thesis, we call a data mining technique cor-
rect if it is guaranteed to return nothing but alarm groups, i.e. multi-sets whose
constituent alarms share the same root cause. A data mining technique is called
complete if alarms of the same root cause are never assigned to separate multi-
sets. 
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Intuitively, correctness means that a data mining technique reduces redun-
dancy by grouping alarms that share the same root cause. Incorrect data mining
techniques are undesirable because they can mix alarms of different root causes.
That makes it harder and possibly even misleading to interpret the data mining
results. Completeness without correctness enforces that alarms of the same root
cause are always bundled together (but possibly with further alarms of different
root causes). Completeness in combination with correctness guarantees that max-
imal alarm groups are found, i.e. alarm groups that cannot be grown any further
without violating the correctness property. Maximal alarm groups are desirable
because they eliminate as much redundancy as possible.
A correct and complete data mining technique partitions the alarm log along
root cause boundaries. As previously explained, such a data mining technique
does not exist. A correct but totally incomplete data mining technique performs
no grouping at all, and returns a separate alarm group for each alarm. Conversely,
a complete but totally incorrect data mining technique returns a single multi-set,
namely the alarm log itself. Both alternatives are useless. In general, the more
aggressively a data mining technique groups alarms, the better its chances to be
complete, and the higher its risk to become incorrect. Finding a data mining tech-
nique that balances correctness versus completeness is the topic of Section 3.3.
3.2.2 Algorithmic Data Mining Requirements
A priori, the root cause analysis approach of the last section does not stipulate
any particular technique for the data mining step. Clearly, a prospective data
mining technique should rate high with respect to correctness and completeness.
In addition, this section identifies five requirements that a data mining technique
should satisfy to be of maximal value to root cause analysis:
Scalability: IDSs can trigger well over a million alarms per month (cf. the col-
umn “Max” of Table 1.2, which indicates for the year 2001 the maximum
number of alarms per month). Therefore, scalability in the size of the alarm
log is an important requirement.
Noise tolerance: Alarm logs can be very noisy in the sense that they contain
bizarre, spurious, and almost unexplainable alarms [19, 168]. A prospective
data mining technique must tolerate this kind of noise.
Ease of use: It has been observed that many data mining techniques require years
of experience to be used correctly and effectively [82, 189]. Moreover,
improper use was associated to meaningless or even misleading results [9,
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90, 105]. It is therefore desirable for a data mining technique to be easy and
intuitive to use. This is particularly true as the people performing root cause
analysis are most likely to be security rather than data mining experts.
Multiple attribute types: As explained in Section 1.4, intrusion detection alarms
can contain numerical attributes (e.g. counts and size attributes), categorical
attributes (e.g. port numbers and IP addresses), time attributes, and free-text
attributes (e.g. raw audit records). Ideally, a data mining technique should
support and use all of these attribute types.
Interpretability & relevance of results: The data mining step should only gen-
erate highly interpretable, relevant, and non-redundant results. This is
important because the alarm patterns are interpreted by a human expert.
Hence, to minimize the risk of misinterpretations and to limit the human
cost of working with the alarm patterns, it is essential for them to be of high
quality.
The scalability, ease of use, and multiple attribute type requirements rank
among the classic research challenges in data mining [82, 189]. Furthermore,
it has been observed that many existing data mining techniques tend to generate
large numbers of obvious or irrelevant patterns [28, 120, 137, 187]. This shows
how demanding the above requirements are, and how challenging it is to find a
data mining technique that is suitable for root cause analysis.
3.3 Approximation of Alarm Groups
The last section has shown that it is not possible to implement a correct and com-
plete data mining technique for root cause analysis. Therefore, the present section
investigates the next best alternative, namely the approximation of alarm groups.
For the time being, our goal is to specify a “good” approximation technique, with-
out regard to the algorithmic requirements of Section 3.2.2. The algorithmic re-
quirements and the issue of implementation will be considered in Chapter 4.
To find a data mining technique that is good at approximating alarm groups, it
is necessary to understand how data mining techniques work. Data mining tech-
niques assume that the dataset at hand contains certain patterns, and they search
for instances of these patterns. The patterns assumed are specific to each individ-
ual technique. For example, episode rule mining [142, 143] assumes sequential
patterns, periodicity mining [94] assumes periodic patterns, and linear regression
[53, 118] assumes that the dataset follows a linear pattern. Accordingly, these
data mining techniques search for sequential, periodic, and linear patterns, re-
spectively. Because patterns have a characteristic structure, it is relatively easy for
a data mining technique to spot their occurrences.
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In other words, data mining techniques perform pattern extraction. Applied
to Figure 3.2, this means that data mining techniques discover alarm patterns, not
alarm groups. The alarm groups must be approximated after the fact by deter-
mining for each alarm pattern the multi-set of alarms that match it. As a con-
sequence, the question of which data mining technique is best at approximating
alarm groups is ill-posed, because data mining techniques are unaware of alarm
groups. Towards a better question, let us define that a root cause induces an alarm
pattern if, in fact, the root cause manifests itself in an alarm group that can be
modeled by said alarm pattern (cf. Figure 3.2). Then, the right question is: What
are the alarm patterns that root causes typically induce, and which data mining
technique is best at finding them? The present section addresses this question.
By way of illustration, suppose that root causes induced periodic alarm pat-
terns. For the purpose of root cause analysis, we would then use a data mining
technique that extracts periodic patterns. Our implicit assumption is that such
a technique is likely to group alarms that actually share the same root cause.
Even though this assumption is not always correct, it is typical of the kind of
assumptions made in signature-based intrusion detection and, more generally, in
abductive inference (cf. Section 2.2.2). For example, attack signatures are gen-
erally derived by arguing that if an attack has the manifestation M , then detec-
tion of M implies the attack. Analogously, we argue that if root causes typi-
cally induce alarm patterns of class C, then detection of an alarm pattern from
class C is indicative of a root cause.
Section 3.3.1 studies ten representative root causes to understand the alarm
patterns that they induce, and Section 3.3.2 generalizes the results obtained. The
goal of both sections is to understand the alarm patterns that typical root causes
induce. No attempt is made to characterize the alarm patterns that any arbitrary
root cause could possibly induce. In fact, such an attempt would be futile. How-
ever, as will become apparent in later sections, there is significant practical value
in understanding the alarm patterns that typical root causes induce.
3.3.1 Some Representative Examples
This section uses examples to illustrate root causes and the alarm patterns they
induce. The sample root causes considered are:
1. A HTTP server with a broken TCP/IP stack that fragments outgoing traffic.
Clearly, “Fragmented IP” alarms ensue when the server responds to clients
requests.
2. A misconfigured secondary DNS server, which does half-hourly DNS zone
transfers from its primary DNS server. The resulting “DNS Zone Transfer”
alarms are no surprise.
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3. A Real Audio server whose traffic remotely resembles TCP hijacking at-
tacks. This caused our commercial IDS to trigger countless “TCP Hijack-
ing” alarms.
4. A firewall that has Network Address Translation (NAT) enabled funnels the
traffic of many users and thereby occasionally seems to perform host scans.
In detail, a NAT-enabled firewall acts as proxy for its users. When these
users simultaneously request external services, then the firewall proxies
these requests and the resulting SYN packets resemble SYN host sweeps.
5. A load balancing reverse proxy such as Cisco LocalDirector that dispatches
Web client requests to the least busy server. The resulting traffic patterns
resemble host scans that trigger alarms on most IDSs.
6. A network management tool querying sensitive MIB variables triggers
alarms on most IDSs. (Other network management tasks such as vulner-
ability scanning or network mapping offer further examples of root causes.)
7. Macintosh FTP clients, which issue the SYST command on every FTP con-
nection, trigger an abundance of “FTP SYST command” alarms. The FTP
SYST command is reported by some IDSs because it provides reconnais-
sance information about the FTP server.
8. An attacker running a brute-force password guessing attack against our Tel-
net server.
9. A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack [51] being launched from
an external network against a Web hosting site triggered “SYN Flooding“
alarms.
10. External Code Red infected machines [33] scanning the internal network
for vulnerable servers.
Note that the alarms of the first root cause originate from source port 80 of
the HTTP server. Moreover, all of these alarms are targeted at HTTP clients on
non-privileged ports. In addition, these alarms always have “Fragmented IP” as
alarm type. Therefore, the alarm pattern induced by the first root cause can be
represented as shown in the first row of Table 3.1. (For the sake of brevity, we
do not include time-stamps and the context attribute in Table 3.1.) Similarly, the
second row of the table shows that the second root cause induces the alarm pattern
“’DNS zone transfer’ alarms being triggered from a non-privileged port of the
secondary DNS server against port 53 of the primary DNS server“. Analogously,
the remaining rows of Table 3.1 show the alarm patterns that the other root causes
induce. The “RC” (root cause) column of the table refers to the item numbers
in the above enumeration of root causes; the entry “Non-priv.” denotes the set
{1025, . . . , 65535} of non-privileged ports, and the entry “Privileged” stands for
the set of privileged ports below 1025.
3.3. APPROXIMATION OF ALARM GROUPS 41
Table 3.1: The alarm patterns induced by ten sample root causes.
RC Source IP Src-Port Destination IP Dst-Port Alarm Type
1 HTTP server 80 HTTP clients Non-priv. Fragmented IP
2 Sec. DNS server Non-priv. Prim. DNS server 53 DNS zone transfer
3 Real Audit server 7070 Real Audio clients Non-priv. TCP hijacking
4 Firewall Non-priv. External network Privileged Host scan
5 Reverse proxy Non-priv. HTTP servers 80 Host scan
6 Mgmt. console Non-priv. SNMP clients 161 Suspicious GET
7 Mac FTP clients Non-priv. FTP server 21 FTP SYST
8 Attacker Non-priv. Telnet server 23 Password guessing
9 External network Non-priv. HTTP servers 80 SYN flood
10 External network Non-priv. Internal network 80 Code Red
The rows of Table 3.1 are called generalized alarms. Generalized alarms are
similar to ordinary alarms, with the exception that attribute values may be general-
ized. A generalized attribute value, such as “Non-priv.” or “Internal network”, is
a concept name that represents a set of elementary attribute values. For example,
“Non-priv.” represents the set {1025, . . . , 65535} of non-privileged ports. Based
on the above examples, we postulate that many root causes manifest themselves in
alarm groups that are adequately modeled by generalized alarms. By adequately,
we mean that generalized alarms are capable of capturing and representing the
main features of alarm groups. In other words, little information is lost when
modeling alarm groups by generalized alarms.
Another important observation is that most root causes of Table 3.1 are ex-
tremely persistent in the sense that they keep generating alarms until someone
removes them. As a consequence, these root causes are likely to manifest them-
selves in large alarm groups. For example, the first root cause triggers a “Frag-
mented IP” alarm whenever the HTTP server responds to a client request. Typi-
cally, HTTP servers are heavily used, and consequently, “Fragmented IP” alarms
abound. Similarly, the misconfigured secondary DNS server triggers one “DNS
zone transfer” alarm every thirty minutes. This makes 1440 alarms a month. Us-
ing analogous arguments, it becomes clear that all of the above root causes can be
expected to trigger large amounts of alarms. To summarize:
Proposition 3.1 (Alarm cluster hypothesis) Root causes frequently manifest
themselves in large alarm groups that are adequately modeled by generalized
alarms. 
As explained in Section 2.3.1, a cluster is a group of similar objects. There-
fore, an alarm group that is adequately modeled by a generalized alarm is a cluster.
42 CHAPTER 3. USING DATA MINING FOR ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
This follows because the alarms of such an alarm group are mutually similar in
the sense that they are subsumed by the same (adequate) generalized alarm. This
explains the origin of the name “alarm cluster hypothesis”.
At the beginning of this section, we have explained that data mining techniques
perform pattern extraction. Therefore, they are only capable of discovering alarm
patterns, rather than alarm groups. This rose the need to determine the alarm pat-
terns that root causes typically induce, so that one could subsequently devise a
data mining technique to extract them. The outcome of this effort is the alarm
cluster hypothesis, which can be rephrased as: “For the most part, root causes in-
duce generalized alarms that adequately model large alarm groups”. Even though
the meaning of “large” and “adequate” is still vague, it follows from our discus-
sion that a data mining technique capable of extracting this kind of generalized
alarms is suitable for root cause analysis. Chapter 4 will give the terms “large”
and “adequate” a definite meaning. Moreover, it will propose a data mining tech-
nique for extracting the resulting kind of generalized alarms. The remainder of
this chapter is dedicated to further validating the alarm cluster hypothesis.
3.3.2 Generalization and Discussion
Given that the alarm cluster hypothesis was derived by means of examples, we
now examine its generality. To this end, two separate issues need to be discussed:
First, the claim that most root causes manifest themselves in large alarm groups,
and second, the claim that these alarm groups can be adequately modeled by gen-
eralized alarms.
To get some insight into the size of alarm groups, we turn to the genesis dia-
gram of Figure 3.1. According to the third level of this diagram, root causes can
have four different origins:
Intentional & malicious: Many root causes of this origin manifest themselves in
large alarm groups. This is particularly true for worms [192] and denial of
service attacks [51]. However, reconnaissance scans can also trigger many
alarms. Moreover, any attack that needs some tweaking to work properly
(e.g. password guessing or buffer-overflow attacks) can trigger a potentially
large number of alarms. (Clearly, stealthy attacks trigger only a few alarms.
That’s why they are stealthy.)
Intentional & non-malicious: Root causes of this origin are introduced to sat-
isfy some need. As a consequence, they are not likely to remain inactive,
but, quite to the contrary, can be expected to cause many alarms. For ex-
ample, new protocols, topologies, and system management tools are root
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causes that were introduced because of the value they add to the system
users or administrators. Therefore, we expect these root causes to be used
actively, and to manifest themselves in large alarm groups.
Inadvertent failures and misconfigurations: From network management, it is
known that failures and misconfigurations tend to cause large amounts of
alarms [75, 98, 116] (see also Section 2.2.2).
Inadvertent trickery: Root causes of this origin are mostly viruses, which are
only marginally detected by IDSs. Therefore, at the time of this writing,
root causes of this origin play a minor role for intrusion detection.
From this discussion, it becomes clear that many root causes manifest them-
selves in relatively large alarm groups. The precise meaning of “large” depends on
the time-frame over which a root cause has been active. For example, the longer
a worm is active, the more alarms it obviously triggers. Finding a threshold to
define “largeness” is an important problem that the next chapter will address. For
the time being, “large” can be taken to mean thousands of alarms per month.
We now consider the second claim of the alarm cluster hypothesis, namely
that alarm groups can be adequately modeled by generalized alarms. To defend
this claim, let us consider an arbitrary root cause and let G be the alarm group, in
which this root cause manifests itself. Using the following two-step procedure, it
is possible to model G by means of a generalized alarm g:
1. Represent G by a single meta-alarm m, which is obtained by forming the
attribute-wise union of the alarms in G, i.e. set m[Ai] := ∪a∈Ga[Ai] for all
alarm attributesAi, where “∪” denotes the union of multi-sets. For example,
if G = < (1, A, β), (2, B, α), (3, B, α)> is given, then m = (<1, 2, 3>,
<A,B,B>, <α, α, β>) follows. (Recall that we use pointed brackets, i.e.
“<” and “>”, for multi-sets.)
2. For each attribute Ai, interpret the multi-set m[Ai] in terms of real-world
concepts, and find a descriptive concept name gi for it. This yields the gener-
alized alarm g = (g1, . . . , gn). In the above example, we might choose g1 =
small−integer , g2 = B, g3 = α, and hence, g = (small−integer , B, α).
Obviously, generalized alarms are capable of modeling arbitrary alarm groups.
Note, however, that in the above example, the generalized alarm g does not exactly
and unambiguously represent the original alarm group G. For example, g does
not match the alarm (1, A, β), even though it is contained in the alarm group
G. Conversely, g does match the alarm (1, B, α), despite the fact that it is not
contained in G. This raises the issue of how adequately generalized alarms model
alarm groups.
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Intuitively, a generalized alarm adequately models an alarm group if it cor-
rectly captures the key information contained in the alarm group. Unfortunately,
not all information can be captured by generalized alarms. In particular, the first of
the above two steps destroys information about the association between attribute
values. For example, given the above meta-alarm m it is not clear whether or
not G contains an alarm in which the attribute values 1 and B co-occur in the
same alarm. Our experience has shown that losing all information about the co-
occurrence of attribute values can, indeed, negatively influence model adequacy.
The amount of information lost in the second step depends on whether or not
there are good concept names to describe the multi-sets m[Ai]. Clearly, the more
descriptive the concept names, the smaller the loss of information. Fortunately,
we found the information loss due to inadequate concept names to be minor. In
general, once root causes had been understood, the concept names for the multi-
sets m[Ai] followed naturally. Nonetheless, step two does destroy information
about the frequency of attribute values. For example, the above generalized alarm
g = (small−integer , B, α) does not show whether the alarm group G contains
one, ten, or a hundred alarms with a value of 1 for the first attribute. To compensate
for this loss of information, we will later complement generalized alarms with
descriptive statistics that show the frequencies of attribute values.
In summary, this section has explained why root causes tend to manifest them-
selves in large alarm groups, and why in most cases, generalized alarms are an ad-
equate model for these alarm groups. In other words, the alarm cluster hypothesis
was shown to be plausible and rationally justifiable.
3.4 Testing the Alarm Cluster Hypothesis
According to the alarm cluster hypothesis, most root causes manifest themselves
in large alarm groups that are adequately modeled by generalized alarms. How-
ever, the reasoning that lead to this hypothesis was purely theoretical. Therefore,
it is advisable to experimentally check if the alarm cluster hypothesis is supported
by real-world intrusion detection alarms. The present section describes such an
experimental verification of the alarm cluster hypothesis.
At first glance, the experiments of Chapter 6 seem to offer sufficient experi-
mental evidence for the correctness of the alarm cluster hypothesis. However, the
experiments of Chapter 6 are not strictly objective because they involve the exper-
imenter’s judgment. One could have eliminated this subjectivity by documenting
in great detail the setup of the experiments, their results, and the evaluation of
these results. This, however, would have added an estimated 100 pages to this
3.4. TESTING THE ALARM CLUSTER HYPOTHESIS 45
thesis, which did not seem practical. The experiments presented next are objec-
tive in a formal sense, and they are simple enough to be presented in full detail.
The methodology used in the experiments is analogous to the one used in
tests of cluster tendency [23, 56, 80, 104]. Such tests decide if a given dataset
D can reasonably be assumed to contain clusters, even though the clusters them-
selves are not identified. In a nutshell, tests of cluster tendency use a test statistic
that measures in a single number the degree to which a dataset contains clusters.
Moreover, they determine the probability that a random dataset scores the same
or a better value in the test statistic. If this probability is negligible (say, smaller
than 0.001) then the dataset D is assumed to contain clusters. This, however, is
no proof for the existence of clusters. In fact, there are limits to how well a single
number can measure the existence of clusters. Moreover, even when the datasetD
scores a value in the test statistic that is highly unlikely for random datasets, this
does not exclude the possibility that D is actually random and rid of any clusters.
Thus, tests of cluster tendency are plausibility checks that offer corroborating evi-
dence for the existence of clusters. Analogously, the test presented in this section
strengthens our confidence in the alarm cluster hypothesis, but cannot prove it.
In Section 3.4.1, we describe the experiment that we designed to test the alarm
cluster hypothesis. Moreover, the results obtained are presented. Section 3.4.2
explains in more detail the mathematics that are used in the experiment.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup and Results
The goal of this section is to experimentally validate the alarm cluster hypothesis.
To this end, we first derive a test statistic φp(·) that maps alarm logs to integers.
Specifically, for a given alarm log L, the test statistic φp(L) measures how well L
supports the alarm cluster hypothesis. The proposed test statistic will return small
values to indicate strong support. Unfortunately, there is no obvious threshold
below which φp(L) is “small enough” to confirm the alarm cluster hypothesis.
Therefore, we proceed in analogy to tests of cluster tendency, and define that
φp(L) is “small enough” if a random alarm log has a negligible probability of
scoring a φp-value that is equal to or smaller than φp(L).
We desire the test statistic φp(L) to measure whether the alarm log L con-
tains — as predicted by the alarm cluster hypothesis — large alarm groups that
are adequately modeled by generalized alarms. However, as explained in Section
3.2.1, the test statistic φp(L) cannot decide if a multi-set of alarms is an alarm
group. Therefore, the best that the test statistic φp(L) can possibly measure is
the existence of “large multi-sets of alarms that are adequately modeled by gen-
eralized alarms”. The problem with this formulation is that the terms “large” and
“adequately” are too vague to be tested in a formal way.
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We begin by making the meaning of “adequate” more precise. Recall that
a generalized alarm adequately models a multi-set of alarms if it correctly cap-
tures the key features of the multi-set. Therefore, alarms themselves are the “most
adequate” generalized alarms because they are maximally specific and do not sac-
rifice any information to the generalization of attribute values. However, alarms
can only model multi-sets of identical alarms. By contrast, the alarms that arise in
the real world are generally mutually distinct. Therefore, alarms are too inflexible
to model anything but the most trivial multi-sets. More flexibility is needed.
The following observation points the way to a more flexible but still “ade-
quate” class of generalized alarms: For most alarms, moderate modifications of
the source port value, the time-stamp value, or the context value do not fundamen-
tally change the alarm’s semantic. In fact, the source port value is mostly set at
random. Time is specified in units of seconds, even though a granularity of hours
or less is generally sufficient. Finally, the context attribute stores raw network
packets, which contain a lot of noise in addition to the actual attack. On the other
hand side, the source IP address, the destination IP address, the destination port,
and the alarm type cannot be modified without substantially changing the meaning
of an alarm. This motivates the following working definition:
Definition 3.3 A generalized alarm is an adequate model of a multi-set of alarms
if it contains an exact (i.e. ungeneralized) value for the source IP address, the
destination IP address, the destination port, and the alarm type, while permitting
arbitrary values for all other attributes. 
This definition of adequacy is not the only one possible, but it certainly is a
reasonable one. For example, let G be a multi-set of alarms that can be modeled
by the generalized alarm g ≡ ([Src−IP = 10.3.2.1] ∧ [Dst−IP = 10.3.2.2] ∧
[Dst−port = 80] ∧ [Alarm−type = 10]). (Attributes that g does not specify can
assume arbitrary values.) If g is given, then we know with absolute precision the
most important attribute values for the alarms inG. For example, we know that all
alarms in G have the source IP address 10.3.2.1 rather than, say, 10.3.2.0, which
can make a big difference. It is this specificity with respect to the values of key
attributes that makes g an adequate model forG. For brevity, we call a generalized
alarm adequate if it is an adequate model for a multi-set of alarms.
To define the test statistic φp(·), let L be an alarm log of size n, i.e. n = |L|.
Let M be the set of adequate generalized alarms that is obtained by projecting L
on the four attributes source IP, destination IP, destination port, and alarm type,
which characterize an adequate generalized alarm. Note that each alarm a ∈ L
matches a g ∈ M , and conversely, each g ∈ M is matched by at least one a ∈ L.
Let m := |M | denote the size of M , let ϕ(g), g ∈ M , be the number of alarms
in L that match g, and let the indices i1, . . . , im be such that ϕ(gi1) ≥ ϕ(gi2) ≥
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. . . ≥ ϕ(gim). For any fraction p ∈]0, 1], the test statistic φp(L) is defined as the
smallest integer k for which
∑k
z=1 ϕ(giz) ≥ dp × ne holds. Intuitively, the test
statistic tells you that the φp(L) most frequently matched generalized alarms in
M match at least 100× p percent of the alarms in L.
Suppose that p is large (say, p = 0.85) and φp(L) is small in comparison to m.
Then, the majority of alarms (namely, at least dp×ne) match one out of a small set
of φp(L) generalized alarms. It follows that on the average, each of these gener-
alized alarms must be matched by dp× ne/φp(L) alarms. Given our assumptions
that p is large and φp(L) is small, we conclude that the quotient dp × ne/φp(L)
is large. As a consequence, each of the φp(L) generalized alarms models a large
multi-set of dp × ne/φp(L) alarms on the average. For the alarm log L, this im-
plies that it consists of “large multi-sets of alarms that are adequately modeled by
generalized alarms”. Hence, the alarm log L supports the alarm cluster hypothe-
sis.
This raises the need to decide in a quantitative manner when φp(L) is “small
enough” to support the alarm cluster hypothesis. In analogy to tests of clus-
ter tendency, we decide that φp(L) is “small enough” if a random alarm log L′
has a probability of at most 0.00001 to score a value φp(L′) that is equal to
or smaller than φp(L). In other words, φp(L) is “small enough” if the condi-
tion P [φp(L′) ≤ φp(L) |L′ is random] ≤ 0.00001 holds. The threshold probabil-
ity 0.00001 is arbitrary, and any other small probability could have been chosen.
Random alarm logs must satisfy |L′| = |L| = n, and each alarm a ∈ L′ must
have a g ∈ M , such that a matches g. These requirements guarantee that the
alarm logs L′ and L are comparable [23, 104]. Conceptually, random alarm logs
are obtained by repeating the following experiment n times: With all generalized
alarms in M having the same probability, randomly choose one of them, generate
an alarm that matches it, and add this alarm to L′.
By way of illustration, the first IDS of Table 1.2 triggers n = 42018 alarms
in January 2001, and the set M consists of m = 7788 generalized alarms. For
p := 0.85, we obtain φp(L) = 2238. In other words, using 2238 out of the 7788
generalized alarms in M , it is possible to model 85% of the 42018 alarms in L.
Moreover, a random alarm log L′ satisfies φp(L′) ≤ φp(L) with a probability of
less than 0.00001 (see Section 3.4.2 for a proof). Therefore, the alarm cluster
hypothesis is supported by the alarm log that IDS-1 generates in January 2001.
This is indicated by a tick in row 1 and column “Jan” of Table 3.2. The other
entries of the table can be interpreted in the same way: Each IDS and month
defines a separate alarm log, and a tick in the corresponding field indicates that
the alarm log supports the alarm cluster hypothesis. A dash, by contrast, stands
for no support. In all experiments, p is set to 0.85, and the “IDS” column of Table
3.2 refers back to Table 1.2 on page 7.
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Table 3.2: Alarm logs that support the alarm cluster hypothesis (p=0.85).
IDS Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
3
√
— — — — — — — — — — —
4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
6
√ √ √
— —-
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
—
8
√ √ √ √ √
— — —
√ √ √ √
9
√ √ √ √
—
√ √ √ √ √
— —
10
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
11
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
12
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
13
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
14 — — —
√ √
—
√
—
√
—
√
—
15
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
16
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
It follows from Table 3.2 that 165 out of 192 alarm logs confirm the alarm
cluster hypothesis. That offers strong evidence in favor of the alarm cluster hy-
pothesis. In experiments not documented here, we have shown that this result is
robust with respect to variations in the definition of adequacy. Moreover, varia-
tions in the value of p do not fundamentally change the result, either. However,
we have not experimented with other test statistics or other formalizations of the
random log concept. Both could affect the results.
3.4.2 Derivation of Probabilities
The last section considered an alarm log L to support the alarm cluster hypoth-
esis if the probability P [φp(L′) ≤ φp(L) |L′ is random] is smaller than 0.00001.
Here, we address the problem of calculating this probability. However, experience
with similar problems [23, 104] suggests that it is very difficult to determine the
exact value of the probability P [φp(L′) ≤ φp(L) |L′ is random]. We will there-
fore overestimate this probability. Note that an overestimate makes us err at the
expense of the alarm cluster hypothesis. In other words, the number of ticks in
Table 3.2 could only have increased if the exact probabilities had been used.
Let L, M , n = |L|, m = |M |, p ∈]0, 1], and φp(·) be as in Section 3.4.1, and
set k := φp(L). Recall that a random alarm log is defined as the result of iterating
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the following experiment n times: Randomly choose a generalized alarm from
M , generate an alarm that matches this generalized alarm, and add this alarm to
the random alarm log under construction. Note that all generalized alarms in M
are equally likely to be chosen. These introductory remarks set the stage for the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.2 Let n, m, p, φp(·), and k be as above. For a random alarm log
L′, and for λ := dp× ne, the following inequality holds:
P [φp(L
′) ≤ k] ≤ 1
mn
·
(
m
k
)
·
n−λ∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
kn−i(m− k)i (3.1)
Proof : Attach an imaginary dart board to each generalized alarm in M and
imagine throwing n darts at the m dart boards. Suppose that you hit each dart
board with the same probability, namely 1/m. Then, P [φp(L′) ≤ k] (which is the
left-hand side of inequality (3.1)) equals the probability that after throwing all n
darts, there are k dart boards that in total have λ or more darts sticking. We will
use this more intuitive formulation of the problem, to prove inequality (3.1).
To generate all constellations where k dart boards have at least λ darts sticking,
we can proceed as follows: Choose k dart boards and j darts, with j = λ, . . . , n.
There are
(
m
k
)×(n
j
)
ways to do this. Moreover, there are kj× (m−k)n−j ways to
throw the darts so that the selected j darts hit one out of the selected dart boards,
whereas the remaining n− j darts hit some non-selected dart board. By summing
over all j, we see that this process generates
n∑
j=λ
(
m
k
)(
n
j
)
kj(m− k)n−j (3.2)
constellations. Note, however, that some constellations are generated multiple
times. Formula (3.2) counts each constellation as many times as it is generated,
and therefore overestimates the actual number of distinct constellations. It is easy
to transform formula (3.2) into (m
k
) ·∑n−λi=0 (ni)kn−i(m−k)i (just move (mk ) before
the summation, substitute j := n − i, and observe that ( n
n−i
)
=
(
n
i
)). Finally,
formula (3.1) is obtained by dividing this quantity by mn, where mn is the total
number of ways to throw n darts at m dart boards. 
Two notes are in order. First, we researched ways to improve the bound given
by Proposition 3.2, but the resulting formulae were complex and did not make a
big difference in practice. Second, while calculating Table 3.2, there were nine
instances where we found the estimate of formula (3.1) to be too coarse. In these
instances, we used a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain a better estimate of the
probability.
50 CHAPTER 3. USING DATA MINING FOR ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
3.5 Experience with Episode Rules
If one is willing to accept the alarm cluster hypothesis, then clustering stands out
as the most adequate data mining technique for root cause analysis. Therefore,
the Chapters 4 through 6 focus on clustering as a tool for root cause analysis.
However, in network management, researchers have successfully used episode
rules in a framework similar to ours [119]. Therefore, it seems natural to mine
intrusion detection alarm logs for episode rules. Moreover, given that episode
rules and clustering search for very different alarm patterns, a success in the use
of episode rules would cast doubts on the appropriateness of clustering. Therefore,
we next define episode rules (cf. Section 3.5.1), and then report our experience in
using them for root cause analysis (cf. Section 3.5.2).
3.5.1 Definitions
To formally define episode rules, we need the following terminology [142, 143]:
An alarm predicate is a boolean expression that tests certain alarm attributes such
as the alarm type or the source IP address. A serial (parallel) episode is a se-
quence (multi-set) α =<Pi>1≤i≤n of alarm predicates. Note that the predicates
of a serial episode are ordered, whereas they have no order in parallel episodes.
Given a parallel episode α and an alarm sequence S, a time interval [ts, te] is an
occurrence of α if it contains a distinct alarm a for each Pi such that Pi(a) holds.
For occurrences of serial episodes, the alarm order must additionally match the
predicate order (i.e. the alarm a satisfying Pi must occur before the alarm a′ satis-
fying Pi+1). The interval [ts, te] is a minimal occurrence of α if there is no proper
subinterval of [ts, te] that would also be an occurrence of α. Finally, episode rules
are implication rules of the form
<P1, . . . , Pk> =⇒ <P1, . . . , Pk, . . . , Pn> [s, c,W ] , (3.3)
where <Pi>1≤i≤k is a sub-episode of <Pi>1≤i≤n, and the two episodes are either
both serial or parallel. The parameters s, c, and W are called support, confidence,
and window width and their interpretation is the following: Episode <Pi>1≤i≤n
has s minimal occurrences in sequence S. Moreover, if te− ts ≤ W and [ts, te] is
a minimal occurrence of episode <Pi>1≤i≤k, then there is a c percent probability
for the super-episode <Pi>1≤i≤n to occur in [ts, ts + W ]. Variations of these
definitions are described in [142, 143].
3.5.2 Experience
We have used episode rules to support root cause analysis. In our experiments,
we have mined the alarms from our experimental IDSs (cf. Table 1.2) for serial
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and parallel episodes and episode rules. The set of admissible alarm predicates
was restricted to predicates of the form P (a) ≡ (∧ia[Ai] = ci), where a is an
alarm, the Ai are attributes, and the ci are constants. The episodes and episode
rules discovered contained interesting patterns, including the following ones:
We discovered episodes that were characteristic of attack tools. For exam-
ple, we repeatedly found episodes that resulted from attack scenarios like
the one in Figure 3.3, where a source host triggers the same sequence of
alarm types against different target hosts. In general, the root cause of a
scenario like this is an attacker who tries out his or her attack tool against
different targets.
We discovered alarms that — for some IDS-specific reason — almost al-
ways entail other alarms. For example, on IDSs from one vendor, “TCP
FIN Host Sweep” alarms imply “Orphaned FIN Packet” alarms with a con-
fidence of 100% (but not vice versa).
We discovered episodes that resulted from legitimate system operations
such as remote file-system mounts or certain network management tasks.
In general, however, we found that episode rule mining tended to produce a
large number of irrelevant or redundant patterns. This is a well-known weakness
of episode rules [119]. Moreover, many of the discovered episodes and episode
rules were difficult to interpret in terms of root causes. Thus, given a large number
of not always easy to interpret episodes and episodes rules, locating the truly
interesting ones became a difficult and time-consuming activity. Finally, despite
our efforts, we could only identify the root causes of one to five percent of all
alarms. Given this low success rate in combination with the high effort required,
we concluded that episode rule mining is not particularly suitable for supporting
the root cause analysis of intrusion detection alarms.
Digression on attack detection: Our experience with episode rules has shown
that intrusion detection alarms are extremely monotonous and repetitive. Specifi-
cally, we noticed that almost all high-support episode rules consisted of multiple
instances of the same predicate, i.e. Pi = Pj generally held for all i and j in equa-
tion (3.3). The monotony of intrusion detection alarms is illustrated more clearly
by the following simple experiment: Let us randomly choose an IDS and a source
IP address that has triggered alarms at this IDS. This source IP address might have
triggered many alarms throughout the year 2001, but with a probability of 96%
they were all of the same alarm type! Moreover, the probability for all alarms to
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Figure 3.3: An attack tool being run against three targets.
hit the same destination port (destination IP address) is 95% (69%). These prob-
abilities were calculated using the 16 IDSs in Table 1.2, but we have confirmed
them (give or take a few percentage points) using over 90 million alarms from
more than 50 different IDSs.
The above observation inspires a simple paradigm for detecting attackers:
Source IP addresses that display diverse behavior, e.g. by triggering alarms of
many different types, are likely to perform an attack. In fact, hackers generally
have little a priori knowledge about their targets and therefore resort to trying dif-
ferent reconnaissance and attack techniques until they are successful or exhausted.
In doing so, hackers tend to trigger diverse alarm streams that involve many differ-
ent alarm types and targets. Given that this kind of diverse behavior is generally
rare, it is a rewarding heuristic to investigate it more closely when it occurs. Note,
however, that perfectly monotonous behavior (e.g. password guessing) can still
constitute an attack. Therefore, zooming in on diverse behavior helps in finding
real attacks, but not all attacks are diverse.
Chapter 4
Alarm Clustering
The present chapter describes the alarm clustering method that we have developed
for root cause analysis. To explain the need for a new clustering method, we
begin in Section 4.1 with a brief review of the field of cluster analysis. Section
4.2 uses the alarm cluster hypothesis (cf. Proposition 3.1) as a starting point to
derive an algorithmic framework for alarm clustering. The implementation of this
framework is described in Section 4.3. Possible extensions of the framework are
discussed in Section 4.4.
4.1 Introduction to Cluster Analysis
The purpose of this section is to survey the field of cluster analysis, and to explain
why we found it necessary to derive the new clustering method described in the
Sections 4.2 and 4.3. The reader not interested in this background material can
skip to Section 4.2 without loss of continuity.
Clustering seeks to group objects into categories (called clusters) so that the
objects within a given category are alike, while they are different from objects
in other categories [9, 12, 81, 104]. The degree of alikeness between a pair of
objects is measured by a proximity index. We summarize the most widely used
proximity indices in Section 4.1.1. Section 4.1.2 gives an overview of several
popular clustering methods. This overview is necessarily incomplete because the
number of known clustering methods ranges in the hundreds [11]. Unfortunately,
virtually all of these methods are largely unexplored with respect to their strengths
and limitations. This makes it a challenging task to choose a suitable clustering
method for a given applied analysis. Section 4.1.3 discusses this problem and
explains the need for the new clustering method that is presented in the remaining
sections of this chapter.
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Our notation is as follows: Let D denote the dataset to be clustered, and let n
be its size (i.e. n = |D|). The elements in D are referred to as objects. In cluster
analysis, it is common to represent the objects xi ∈ D as p-dimensional tuples,
i.e. xi = (xi1, . . . , xip), i = 1, . . . , n. The tuple dimensions are called attributes,
and the xiks are known as attribute values or measurements. The dataset D is
called numerical, binary, or categorical, if all attributes are numerical, binary, or
categorical, respectively. The dataset D is mixed if it contains attributes of at least
two different types (e.g. numerical and binary).
4.1.1 Proximity Indices
Proximity indices measure the degree of alikeness between a pair of objects. There
are two types of proximity indices, namely similarity indices and distance indices.
Similarity indices, such as correlation, return a large value to indicate a high de-
gree of alikeness, whereas distance indices (e.g. Euclidean distance) return a small
value for this case. This subsection describes the most commonly used proximity
indices. A broader and more detailed treatment of proximity indices can be found
in [9, 81, 90, 104].
For numerical datasets, the most widely used distance index is the Minkowski
metric. Specifically, for a fixed r ≥ 1, the Minkowski distance dr(xi,xj) between
the objects xi = (xi1, . . . , xip) and xj = (xj1, . . . , xjp) is defined as:
dr(xi,xj) :=
(
p∑
k=1
|xik − xjk|r
)(1/r)
(4.1)
The two most commonly used Minkowski metrics are the Euclidean distance
and the Manhattan distance, which are obtained for r = 2, and r = 1, respectively.
The squared Mahalanobis distance [5, 104] and Pearson’s correlation coefficient
[5, 81] are two further proximity indices for numerical datasets.
For binary datasets, the similarity between two objects xi = (xi1, . . . , xip) and
xj = (xj1, . . . , xjp), xik, xjk ∈ {0, 1}, is most conveniently expressed in terms
of four counts a00, a01, a10, and a11, where auv equals the number of indices
k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, for which xik = u and xjk = v holds. Note that the four auv
values sum up to p, the total number of attributes. Several similarity indices can be
defined from the four numbers a00, a01, a10, and a11. Anderberg reviews most of
them and puts them into context [9]. Two particularly common similarity indices
are the simple matching coefficient sM(xi,xj) := (a00+a11)/(a00+a01+a10+a11)
and the Jaccard coefficient sJ(xi,xj) := a11/(a01+a10+a11). Note that the simple
matching coefficient weights matches of 0’s the same as matches of 1’s, whereas
the Jaccard coefficient ignores matches of 0’s.
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Categorical datasets generalize binary ones, in that categorical attributes can
assume more than two values. Accordingly, many proximity indices for the
categorical case are straightforward generalizations of their binary counterparts
[9, 90, 100]. For example, given two objects xi and xj, the simple matching co-
efficient has been redefined as sM(xi,xj) := m/p, where m is the number of
attributes on which the two objects agree, i.e. m := |{k |xik = xjk}|. Similarly,
it has been suggested to encode categorical datasets by binary ones, so one can
directly apply the proximity indices from the binary case [9, 90].
So far, it has been assumed that all attributes of the dataset D have the same
type, where potential types are either numerical, binary, or categorical. In practice,
mixed datasets having attributes of at least two different types are very common.
Then, the distance d(xi,xj) between two objects xi = (xi1, . . . , xip) and xj =
(xj1, . . . , xjp) is generally calculated as the sum of normalized attribute-distances
[9, 117]. Hence, d(xi,xj) :=
∑p
k=1 δ(xik, xjk), where δ(xik, xjk) ∈ [0, 1] is the
normalized distance between the measurements xik and xjk. Alternatively, a prox-
imity index can be defined by explicitly enumerating the proximities pij between
all pairs (xi,xj) of objects. In this case, the proximity index is given by the n× n
proximity matrix (pij)1≤i,j≤n, whose rows and columns correspond to the objects
in D, and whose entries pij specify the proximities between the objects xi and xj.
4.1.2 Overview of Clustering Methods
Clustering methods organize a given dataset into an “adequate” number of clus-
ters. Clustering methods have been classified according to the kind of processing
they perform [90, 185, 203]. This gives rise to five classes, namely partitioning
methods, hierarchical methods, density-based methods, grid-based methods, and
model-based methods. This classification is neither mutually exclusive nor ex-
haustive [62, 104], but given its popularity in data mining, we will still use it to
organize the following discussion.
Partitioning methods take two inputs: First, a dataset D = {x1, . . . ,xn} of
n objects, and second, an integer K, indicating the desired number of clusters.
Then, a partitioning method splits the given dataset into K non-overlapping clus-
ters {C1, . . . , CK}, so that a criterion of cluster quality is optimized. A criterion of
cluster quality is a mathematical formula that captures one’s intuition that “good”
clusters should be compact and isolated. Assuming that the objects xi ∈ D are
drawn from an Euclidean space, the squared-error E2K is by far the most com-
monly used criterion of cluster quality:
E2K(C1, . . . , CK) :=
K∑
k=1
∑
x∈Ck
[d2(x,mk)]
2, (4.2)
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where d2(·, ·) denotes Euclidean distance, and mk := (1/|Ck|)×
∑
x∈Ck x is the
mean of cluster Ck. Aside from squared-error, many other criteria of cluster qual-
ity have been suggested [81, 91]. However, squared-error makes good intuitive
sense and is efficient to compute.
The problem of partitioning a given set of n objects into K clusters so as
to optimize a stated quality criterion is, in general, NP-complete [45]. This fact
precludes an exhaustive search and has encouraged the development of simple
heuristic algorithms [9, 104]. The most popular of these is the K-means method,
which locally minimizes the squared-error criterion E2K . The K-means method
(cf. Figure 4.1) starts with a randomly chosen set of cluster means (step 1) and
then repeatedly relocates objects so as to decrease the squared-error E2K (steps
2 to 7). Object relocation continues until the clusters no longer change between
consecutive iterations. The K-means method has been proven to terminate [184],
but the resulting partition is frequently a local rather than a global optimum [5,
184]. Moreover, the cluster means initially selected in step 1 of Figure 4.1 are
known to significantly impact the quality of the results [5, 25, 148, 150, 151].
Variations of the K-means methods have mainly focused on three aspects:
First, the strategy used to select the initial cluster means [9, 25], second, the or-
der in which objects are relocated and means are recomputed [9, 140], and third,
heuristic ways of automatically adjusting the number K of clusters [9, 15]. More-
over, genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, and other search methods have
been used to solve the optimization problem posed by partitional clustering [105].
Note that the K-means method is limited to numerical datasets since it requires
the ability to compute means. Huang extends the K-means paradigm to categor-
ical datasets [100]. PAM [117], CLARA [117], and CLARENS [162] are three
variants of the K-means method that operate on mixed datasets, provided an ap-
propriate proximity index (e.g. in the form of a proximity matrix) is specified.
Moreover, these methods are more robust than K-means in the presence of noise
and outliers.
Hierarchical methods transform a dataset into a hierarchically structured se-
quence of partitions. The root of this hierarchy is the set of all objects, the leaves
are the individual objects, and intermediate layers represent partitions of varying
granularities.
The most widely used class of hierarchical methods starts with the trivial par-
tition, in which each object is placed into a separate cluster. Each subsequent
step takes two clusters of the preceding step and merges them into a single one.
This yields a new partition with one cluster less. The merging continues until
all objects have been amalgamated into one big cluster. Clearly, the algorithm
terminates after n steps, where n is the number of objects in the dataset. The
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Input: A dataset D = {x1, . . . ,xn}, and an integer K;
Output: A partition of the dataset D into K clusters C1, . . . , CK ;
Algorithm:
1: for k := 1 to K do Initialize mk to be a randomly chosen point from D;
2: while the clusters Ck change do {
3: for k := 1 to K do // Relocate objects:
4: Ck := {x ∈ D | d2(x,mk) ≤ d2(x,mj), ∀j 6= k};
5: for k := 1 to K do // Compute the new cluster means:
6: mk := (1/|Ck|)×
∑
x∈Ck x;
7: }
Figure 4.1: The K-means algorithm.
resulting sequence of n hierarchically nested partitions can be represented by a
dendrogram, such as the one in Figure 4.2(a). A dendrogram is a binary tree
whose nodes have an associated height. Specifically, the node at height i shows
the two clusters that were merged by step i. Moreover, cutting the dendrogram
just above height i yields 1 + n− i subtrees, each of which represents one cluster
in the partition created by step i. For example, step 5 of Figure 4.2(a) creates the
partition { {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6, 7} }, which is shown in Figure 4.2(b).
Let us consider the merge step in more detail. In general, the merge step se-
lects two clusters Cr and Cs whose distance ∆(Cr, Cs) is minimum among any
two clusters, i.e. Cr and Cs must satisfy ∆(Cr, Cs) = mini,j{∆(Ci, Cj) }. De-
pending on the distance measure ∆(·, ·), one obtains different hierarchical meth-
ods. Specifically, let n be the number of objects in the dataset, and let d(x,y)
denote the distance between the objects x and y. Three widely used measures of
inter-clusters distance are:
∆min(Cr, Cs) := min{ d(x,y) |x ∈ Cr,y ∈ Cs } (4.3)
∆max (Cr, Cs) := max{ d(x,y) |x ∈ Cr,y ∈ Cs } (4.4)
∆avg(Cr, Cs) :=
1
|Cr||Cs| ×
∑
x∈Cr
∑
y∈Cs
d(x,y) (4.5)
Note that the distance ∆(·, ·) between two clusters is a function of the distances
d(·, ·) between individual objects. Equation (4.3) defines the well-known single-
link method, which continuously merges the two clusters containing the closest
pair of objects, one from each cluster. Equation (4.4) defines the complete-link
method, and (4.5) defines the group average method. Many other definitions for
∆(·, ·) have been suggested [78].
The above class of hierarchical methods is known as SAHN (Sequential, Ag-
glomerative, Hierarchical, Non-overlapping) methods. The general time com-
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b) The partition created by step 5.
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Figure 4.2: A sample dendrogram and a partition it encodes.
plexity of SAHN methods is O(n2), even though algorithms with a smaller time
complexity exist for special cases [45]. BIRCH [205] and CURE [83] are two
methods that achieve linear run-times in the number of objects, and moreover
have better noise-tolerance than SAHN methods. However, both methods rely
on vector operations, which restricts their applicability to numerical datasets.
CHAMELEON [115] is another hierarchical method with good noise tolerance.
ROCK [84], finally, is a hierarchical method that was particularly designed for
categorical datasets.
Density-based methods define clusters as dense regions (i.e. regions containing
“many” objects per data volume) that are separated by low-density regions. We
describe DBSCAN [61] as a representative of the class of density-based meth-
ods. For a dataset D and an associated distance index d(·, ·), the basic ideas of
DBSCAN can be summarized as follows:
1. Given the user-defined parameters ε and MinObjs, an object x ∈ D is called
a core object if there are at least MinObjs objects in its ε-neighborhood, i.e.
|{y ∈ D | d(x,y) ≤ ε}| ≥ MinObjs must hold.
2. An object y ∈ D is density reachable from an object x if and only if
there is a chain of objects z1, . . . , zk with z1 = x and zk = y, such that
z1, . . . , zk−1 are core objects and d(zi, zi+1) ≤ ε for i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
3. A cluster C is a non-empty subset ofD that is maximal (i.e. ∀x ∈ C : if y ∈
D is density reachable from x, then y ∈ C) and connected (i.e. ∀x,y ∈ C :
there is an z ∈ C such that x and y are density reachable from z).
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Using the above definition of clusters, DBSCAN finds all clusters in a dataset.
DENCLUE [95] generalizes DBSCAN and improves its run-time performance
by a factor of up to 45. CACTUS [74] is a density-based method specifically
designed for categorical datasets.
Grid-based methods quantize the data space into a finite number of cells that
form a grid structure. For example, quantization may break the 3-dimensional
cube [0, 3]× [0, 3]× [0, 3] ⊂ R3 into, say, 27 cells, namely [i, i+ 1]× [j, j + 1]×
[k, k + 1], with i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Each cell of the resulting grid structure is used
to store various statistics about the data objects it contains. The actual clustering
operations are performed on the grid structure (rather than on the original objects),
which generally results in very fast processing times. WaveCluster [185] and
CLIQUE [1] are representative grid-based methods.
Model-based methods can be further subdivided into conceptual clustering
methods and mixture models. Conceptual clustering methods were motivated by
the fact that most conventional clustering methods do not adequately address the
problem of representing clusters in an intelligible manner that supports under-
standing and decision making [81, 105, 146]. Conceptual clustering, by contrast,
puts cluster representation in the foreground and searches for clusters that have
“good” representations in a given description language [67, 146, 172]. Examples
of description languages include variants of predicate logic [21, 88, 146] as well
as probabilistic languages that lists the probabilities of attribute values [67, 195].
In addition, conceptual clustering methods are particularly strong at handling cat-
egorical datasets. CLUSTER/2 [146], COBWEB [67], and Attribute-Oriented
Induction (AOI) [88] are three well-known conceptual clustering methods.
Mixture models, the second type of model-based methods, assume that the
dataset D was generated by K multivariate distributions M1, . . . ,MK . Cluster-
ing in this context means to group the objects according to the distributions that
generated them. More formally, we want to determine the membership function
γ : D → {1, . . . , K} that assigns each object x ∈ D to the index of the clus-
ter/distributionMγ(x) that generated it. To this end, let fk(x|θk), k = 1, . . . , K, be
the density function of the k-th distributionMk, with θk being unknown model pa-
rameters. Given these definitions, and assuming that the dataset D is independent
and identically distributed, mixture models aspire to find the γ(·) and θ1, . . . , θK
that maximize the probability
L(D) =
∏
x∈D
fγ(x)(x|θγ(x)) (4.6)
of observing the dataset D. This optimization problem is typically solved by
means of the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm [49]. Mixture models
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using Gaussian density functions are described in [16]. Mixture-models with a
Bayesian twist have been used by the AUTOCLASS system [34, 93]. Finally,
note that mixture models must not be used unless the parametric density functions
fk(x|θk) can be shown to adequately model the data generation process [91].
Other clustering methods that do not fit well in the above classification include
overlapping methods [10, 50, 108, 186], fuzzy methods [97, 182], and neural net-
works [159]. We do not consider these methods any further because their limited
scalability or restriction to numerical datasets [81, 105] conflict with our require-
ments of Section 3.2.2.
4.1.3 Choosing a Clustering Methods
In this section, we consider the problem of choosing a clustering method that
is suitable for analyzing a given dataset D. This is a challenging task because
there are hundreds of methods to choose from [11], their theoretical properties are
largely unexplored [5, 104, 148], and experimental studies have shown that the
performance of most clustering methods is strongly affected by the characteristics
of the datasets at hand [5, 148, 150].
A pragmatic approach to selecting a clustering method is to choose the method
that most closely satisfies the requirements of the application domain [69, 81]. For
example, if the dataset D is suspected to be large and noisy, then a scalable and
noise-tolerant clustering method is advisable. Similarly, if the application domain
requires deterministic results, then one should avoid clustering methods that use
sampling. Motivated by these examples, we have identified six features that affect
the suitability of clustering methods for a particular dataset D:
Supported data types: The ability of a clustering method to handle numerical,
categorical, or mixed datasets strongly influences its applicability to a given
dataset. For example, methods such as K-means that require numerical
datasets are useless for mixed or categorical datasets.
Time complexity: The time complexity of a method determines its scalability.
Clearly, methods with poor scalability are unsuitable for large datasets.
Noise tolerance: Noise (a.k.a. outliers) are objects that do not cluster naturally
with any other object [61]. Noisy datasets should only be analyzed by noise-
tolerant methods.
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Number of input parameters: Many clustering methods are sensitive to their
input parameter settings, so that slightly different parameter settings can
produce markedly different clustering results [9, 90, 105, 203]. Moreover,
there are few guidelines for choosing “good” parameter values. As a conse-
quence, the usability of a clustering method decreases with the number of
input parameters [90, 203].
Input order dependence: Some clustering methods yield different results, de-
pending on the ordering of the objects in the input dataset D. In general,
input order dependence is undesirable [90].
Random sampling: Some clustering methods use random sampling to improve
their scalability [90, 117]. These methods are no longer deterministic, and
their random decisions can strongly influence their results [5, 90, 206].
Table 4.1 on the pages 62 and 63 uses these features to characterize the clus-
tering methods of Section 4.1.2. Even though this table is not exhaustive, it is
highly representative of the field as described by the widely read monographs
[9, 12, 81, 90, 104, 117]. Clearly, a survey table like this is necessarily a simpli-
fication. For example, the table does not show that DBSCAN can actually handle
mixed datasets, provided quadratic (i.e. O(n2)) run-times are accepted [90]. Sim-
ilarly, the trichotomy low / medium / high for noise tolerance is clearly simplistic.
Furthermore, some values of the table were difficult to determine. For example,
the authors of ROCK argue in favor of its noise tolerance [84]. However, Zaiane et
al. show that ROCK performs poorly in the presence of noise [203]. We found the
arguments by Zaiane et al. more convincing and gave ROCK a ranking of “low”.
This decision is certainly debatable. Finally, for clustering methods with optional
parameters, the table only indicates the minimum number of parameters that must
be set. For example, a user of BIRCH must set at least four parameters, but might
choose to tweak any of a number of additional parameters.
Table 4.1 can now be used to choose a suitable clustering method. As ex-
plained in Section 3.2.2, our application domain demands a scalable, noise-
tolerant, easy-to-use clustering method that supports mixed datasets. Additionally,
we require that the method has to be “robust”, i.e. deterministic and insensitive to
the input order. When applied to Table 4.1, these requirements attach a negative
mark to a method if (1) it scales quadratically or worse in the number of objects,
(2) if it has low noise tolerance, (3) if it burdens the user with four or more input
parameters, (4) if it cannot handle mixed datasets, (5) if it uses random sampling,
or (6) if it is input order dependent. For example, the K-means method receives
two negative marks, one because it cannot handle mixed datasets, and one be-
cause it is sensitive to noise. K-modes also receives two negative marks, one for
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not supporting mixed datasets, and one for being sensitive to the input order. In
fact, CLIQUE, AOI, and mixture models are the only three methods in Table 4.1
that receive no negative marks. Therefore, they are clear candidates for the alarm
clustering task.
A closer investigation of CLIQUE reveals that its support for mixed datasets
is rather limited [1]. Moreover, Section 4.3.3 will show that AOI is still too noise
sensitive for intrusion detection alarms. Finally, the notes column of Table 4.1
indicates some drawbacks of mixture models (see also page 59): First, mixture
models can only find local optima. Second, even though their theoretical time
complexity is attractive, they do not scale well in practice. Third, it is rather
difficult to find parametric density functions that adequately model the alarm gen-
eration process. Thus, neither CLIQUE, nor AOI, or mixture models are by them-
selves fully satisfactory. This justifies the new clustering method of the Sections
4.2 and 4.3. It is interesting to note that this method is a clone between CLIQUE
and AOI, with stronger resemblance to AOI.
4.2 A Framework for Alarm Clustering
Chapter 3 has explored the problem of finding a data mining technique that is
suitable for root cause analysis. To summarize, an alarm group was defined as
a multi-set of alarms that share the same root cause. We explained that ideally,
a data mining technique should recover alarm groups, but this was shown to be
impossible. Therefore, the problem of approximating alarm groups was raised.
This lead us to analyze the kind of alarm patterns that root causes typically in-
duce. The idea was that if we understood the manifestations of root causes (i.e.
their alarm patterns), then we could discover root causes by spotting their man-
ifestations. This kind of reasoning, called abduction (cf. Section 2.2.2), is not
mathematically correct, but very common in practice. Our investigation of root
causes and their alarm patterns culminated in the alarm cluster hypothesis (cf.
Proposition 3.1) according to which most root causes trigger many alarms, and
the multi-sets of these alarms can be adequately modeled by generalized alarms.
Therefore, the data mining problem to be solved is one of finding generalized
alarms that adequately model large multi-sets of alarms.
From a clustering point of view, this problem becomes one of defining a suit-
able proximity index. This proximity index must take two alarms as input and
return a numerical measure of how adequately these alarms can be modeled by a
single generalized alarm. In other words, the proximity index must quantify our
intuitive notion of “adequacy”. Section 4.2.1 proposes such an index, which re-
turns small values when an adequate model exists. Hence, the index is a distance
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index. Section 4.2.2 extends this distance index from pairs of alarms to multi-sets
of alarms. Moreover, it defines the alarm clustering problem according to which
we want to find multi-sets of alarms that minimize the value of the distance index
while having a user-defined minimum size. This minimum size parameter for-
malizes our hitherto intuitive concept of “largeness”. Section 4.2.3 discusses the
generality of our alarm clustering framework.
Note that this section proposes a framework for alarm clustering, rather than a
single way of clustering alarms. In particular, instead of defining a single distance
index, we introduce a principled way of defining such indices. Different instanti-
ations of this framework are possible. For example, the sense of adequacy used in
Section 3.4 is one possible instantiation of the framework.
4.2.1 A Distance Index that Measures Adequacy
Section 4.1.1 has shown that few proximity indices exist for categorical attributes.
Intrusion detection alarms contain time, numerical, and free-text attributes in ad-
dition to categorical attributes (cf. Section 1.4), which further complicates mat-
ters. The distance index presented here has its origin in the field of information
retrieval, where it has been proposed to use generalization hierarchies to define
distance [135, 178, 179, 180]. Very briefly, a generalization hierarchy (a.k.a. is-a
hierarchy) is a single-rooted directed acyclic graph that shows how concepts are
organized into more general concepts. For example, a generalization hierarchy
might state that host mickey is a Web server, and that host donald is a Web server,
as well. In this case, we define mickey and donald to have distance two because
the shortest path connecting them via a common ancestor has length two.
Towards a formal treatment of distance, recall that we model alarms as tuples
over the n-dimensional attribute space dom(A1) x . . . x dom(An), where dom(Ai)
is the domain (i.e. range of possible values) of attribute Ai. A generalized at-
tribute value is a concept name that represents a subset of the values in dom(Ai),
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For example, the generalized attribute value Web-server might
represent the set {mickey , donald} of two individual hosts. The extended do-
main Dom(Ai) of attribute Ai is the union of the domain dom(Ai) and the
set of generalized attribute values that have been defined for Ai. (The prob-
lem of defining meaningful generalized attribute values is considered in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.) Finally, given these definitions, a generalized alarm is a tuple in
[Dom(A1) x . . . x Dom(An)]r [dom(A1) x . . . x dom(An)].
For each attribute Ai, let Gi be a single-rooted directed acyclic graph (DAG)
on the elements of the extended domain Dom(Ai). The graph Gi is called a gen-
eralization hierarchy. For two elements x, xˆ ∈ Dom(Ai), we call xˆ a parent of
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x if the generalization hierarchy Gi contains an edge from xˆ to x. The element xˆ
is an ancestor of x if xˆ 6= x holds, and there is a directed path from xˆ to x (in
symbols: xC xˆ). For x = xˆ or xC xˆ, we write x E xˆ, and call xˆ a weak ancestor
of x. The distance d(x1, x2) between any two elements x1, x2 ∈ Dom(Ai) is the
length of the shortest path that connects x1 and x2 via a common weak ancestor
xˆ, i.e. d(x1, x2) := min{ δ(x1, xˆ) + δ(x2, xˆ) | xˆ ∈ Dom(Ai), x1 E xˆ, x2 E xˆ },
where δ(·, ·) measures the length of the shortest path between two nodes1.
Next, we extend these definitions from attributes to alarms. To this end, let
a, aˆ ∈ X1≤i≤nDom(Ai) denote two (possibly generalized) alarms. The alarms
a and aˆ satisfy a E aˆ if and only if a[Ai] E aˆ[Ai] holds for all attributes
Ai. If, additionally, a[Aj] C aˆ[Aj] holds for at least one attribute Aj , then we
write a C aˆ, and say that a is more specific than aˆ, while the alarm aˆ is called
more abstract or general than a. The distance d(a1, a2) between any two alarms
a1, a2 ∈ X1≤i≤nDom(Ai) is defined as the weighted sum of attribute distances,
i.e. d(a1, a2) :=
∑n
i=1 wi × d(a1[Ai], a2[Ai]), with weights wi ∈ R+.
By way of illustration, Figure 4.3 shows a network topology, a sample alarm
log, and the generalization hierarchies that one might want to use for IP addresses
and port numbers in this environment. (For the time being, please ignore the
“Count” column in Figure 4.3(b).) Let us verify that the following holds:
The extended domain Dom(IP) of IP addresses is the union of elementary
IP addresses (i.e. the set dom(IP) = {p.q.r.s | p, q, r, s ∈ {0, . . . , 255} })
and generalized IP addresses (i.e. the set {HTTP/FTP, Firewall, Net-A, . . . ,
Net-Z, DMZ, Internet, Any-IP}). Similarly, the extended domain of port
numbers is {1, . . . , 65535,Privileged,Non-privileged,Any-port}.
According to Figure 4.3(c), the IP address ip1 is a HTTP and FTP server,
which is a DMZ machine, which, more generally, is any IP address. More
succinctly, this relationship can be expressed as ip1 C HTTP/FTP C
DMZ C Any-IP. Moreover, ip1 E ip1 and d(ip1 ,Any-IP) = 3 hold.
Assuming that all weights equal one, i.e. w1 = w2 = 1, we find that
d( (ip1 , ip4 ), (ip1 , ipA1 ) ) = d(ip1 , ip1 ) + d(ip4 , ipA1 ) = 0 + 6 = 6.
Why does d(a1, a2) measure how adequately the alarms a1 and a2 can
be modeled by a generalized alarm g? To answer this question, assume that
all weights equal one, i.e. wi = 1 for i = 1, . . . , n. Moreover, let g ∈
X1≤i≤nDom(Ai) be any generalized alarm to which both alarms can be gener-
alized, i.e. a1, a2 E g. Note that di := d(g, ai), i = 1, 2, is the number of times
1Rada et al. use δ(·, ·) as their distance index [178, 179]. Our preference for d(·, ·) over δ(·, ·)
is purely methodological. In fact, we consider the index d(·, ·) more intuitive, and more consistent
with other work that uses generalization hierarchies to define distance [135, 180]. However, the
alarm clustering problem as defined in Section 4.2.2 is not affected by whether we choose d(·, ·)
or δ(·, ·) as our distance index.
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Figure 4.3: Network, alarm log, and generalization hierarchies of the running
example.
that an attribute in alarm ai must be generalized to transform ai into g. Therefore,
the smaller the sum d1 + d2 is, the smaller the number of generalization steps that
separate g from a1 and a2, and the more adequate the model g is for the alarms
a1 and a2. Conversely, if the sum d1 + d2 is large, then g is an inadequate model
because it is too abstract, and insufficiently captures the detailed information of
the alarms a1 and a2. We can therefore use the sum d1 + d2 to measure the
adequacy of g. Given that the distance d(a1, a2) equals the minimum value that
the sum d1 + d2 can possibly assume for any g, we see that d(a1, a2) measures
the adequacy of the most adequate generalized alarm. Therefore, a small distance
value d(a1, a2) implies that an adequate model exists for the alarms a1 and a2.
4.2.2 The Alarm Clustering Problem
In generalization of the distance d(·, ·), we now define the heterogeneityH(C) of a
multi-set C of alarms. Heterogeneity is a function that returns a small value when
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the multi-set C can be adequately modeled by a generalized alarm. To formally
define heterogeneity, let g be a generalized alarm to which all alarms in C can
be generalized, i.e. ∀a ∈ C : a E g must hold. The average distance d¯(g, C)
between g and C, and the heterogeneity H(C) are defined as follows:
d¯(g, C) := (1/|C|)×
∑
a∈C
d(g, a) (4.7)
H(C) := min{ d¯(g, C) |g ∈ Xni=1Dom(Ai), ∀a ∈ C : a E g } (4.8)
Intuitively, average distance measures how adequately the generalized alarm
g models the multi-set C on the average. Moreover, a small heterogeneity value
implies that there exists a generalized alarm that models C adequately. A general-
ized alarm g with ∀a ∈ C : a E g and d¯(g, C) = H(C) is called a cover of C. A
cover of C is a maximally adequate model for C. If all generalization hierarchies
are trees, rather than DAGs, then there exists exactly one cover for each multi-set
C of alarms. Finally, for C = {a1, a2}, we have H(C) = 1/2 × d(a1, a2). The
data mining problem to be solved now becomes:
Definition 4.1 Let L be an alarm log, min size ∈ N an integer, and Gi, i =
1, . . . , n, a generalization hierarchy for each attribute Ai. The alarm clustering
problem (L,min size,G1, . . . ,Gn) is to find a multi-set C ⊆ L that minimizes
the heterogeneity H(C), subject to the constraint that |C| ≥ min size holds. We
call C an alarm cluster or cluster for short. 
In other words, among all multi-sets C ⊆ L that satisfy |C| ≥ min size, a
multi-set with minimum heterogeneity has to be found. If there are several such
multi-sets, then any one of them can be picked. Note that the min size parameter
formalizes our hitherto intuitive notion of “largeness”, which was first introduced
in Proposition 3.1. Finally, once the cluster C has been found, the remaining
alarms in L r C can be searched for additional clusters. In particular, one might
decide to use a different min size value for L r C, an option that is useful in
practice.
In the terms of Chapter 3, alarm clusters approximate alarm groups. While the
alarms of an alarm group share (per definition) the same root cause, we have no
guarantee that the same holds for the alarms of an alarm cluster. Nonetheless, for
a reasonably chosen min size value, it is justified to believe that most alarms of an
alarm cluster do share the same root cause. In fact, the alarm cluster hypothesis
(Proposition 3.1) states that root causes generally manifest themselves in alarm
clusters. Thus, having found an alarm cluster, it is plausible to postulate that a root
cause was at its origin. Chapter 5 continues this discussion and examines ways of
verifying whether the alarms of an alarm cluster share the same root cause.
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It is interesting to note that from a purely practical point of view, it is prob-
ably sufficient when the majority of alarms in an alarm cluster share the same
root cause. To see why, just observe that alarm clusters are generally so large that
analysts rely on covers (rather than alarm clusters) for root cause analysis. This,
however, diminishes the influence that any individual alarm can have on the out-
come of the root cause analysis. In particular, if adding or removing an alarm to
or from an alarm cluster does not change the cover of the alarm cluster, then this
alarm cannot impact a root cause analysis that relies exclusively on the cover.
4.2.3 Definition of Generalization Hierarchies
Our alarm clustering framework assumes that meaningful generalization hierar-
chies have been defined for all alarm attributes. Figure 4.3(c) shows that such
generalization hierarchies exist for IP addresses and port numbers. This section
suggests further generalization hierarchies for numerical, time, and free-text at-
tributes. The generalization hierarchies of this section should be seen as examples
that demonstrate the usefulness and versatility of the framework. Other general-
ization hierarchies are possible and might prove useful in practice.
Numerical attributes are dealt with by discretizing them into hierarchically
nested intervals. In the simplest case, a human expert manually discretizes each
numerical attribute. In doing so, the expert might be bound by regulations, which,
for example, might stipulate that “children”, “adolescents”, “adults”, and “senior
citizens” are (per definition) people in the age ranges [1, 10[, [10, 20[, [20, 65[,
and [65,∞], respectively. In other cases, the human expert is free to exercise her
judgment. For example, suppose that the severity of an alarm is measured by a real
number in the range from 1 to 97. Assuming that all severity values in this range
are equally likely, the expert might decide that a tree of height four and fan-out
four constitutes a useful generalization hierarchy. The leaves of this tree are the
values in [1, 97[, the next higher level consists of the intervals [1+6× i, 7+6× i[,
i = 0, . . . , 15, followed by the intervals [1 + 24 × i, 25 + 24 × i[, i = 0, . . . , 3.
The interval [1, 97[ constitutes the root of the generalization hierarchy.
A drawback of user-defined generalization hierarchies is that they are static.
In fact, their inability to adjust to the actual distribution of data values can make
them a rather unnatural choice. For example, consider a case where 90% of sever-
ity values fall into the range [1, 20]. The aforementioned balanced generalization
hierarchy is not particularly suitable for this case, because it is too coarse-grained
in the range [1, 20], while being too detailed in the range ]20, 97[. Dynamic gen-
eralization hierarchies, which are constructed at run-time to fit the actual data
distribution, are a pragmatic way to mitigate this shortcoming [52, 89, 139].
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In the simplest case, algorithms for the construction of dynamic generaliza-
tion hierarchies construct hierarchies such that all intervals at a given level of the
hierarchy contain the same number of data values [89]. This type of algorithm has
the drawback that it assigns close values (e.g. 4 and 5) to distinct intervals, while
putting distant values (e.g. 22 and 87) into the same interval, if this is necessary
to equalize the number of data values per interval. The resulting generalization
hierarchies can be rather counter-intuitive. To mitigate this problem, clustering
has been used to find intervals that reflect the natural grouping of the data values
[139, 147]. Other algorithms for the construction of dynamic generalization hier-
archies are surveyed by Dougherty et al. [52]. This is not the place to explore these
algorithms further, nor is it our intention to advocate any one of them. Instead,
we conclude that the construction of generalization hierarchies for numerical at-
tributes is a well-understood problem that has many practical solutions.
For time attributes, one typically wishes to capture temporal information such
as the distinction between weekends and workdays, between business hours and
off hours, or between the beginning of the month and the end of the month. To
make the clustering method aware of concepts like these, one can use general-
ization hierarchies such as the ones in Figure 4.4. For example, the left-hand
generalization hierarchy shows that the time-stamp ts1 can be generalized to the
concepts Sat, Weekend, and ultimately, Any-day-of-week. The right-hand gener-
alization hierarchy shows how time-stamps can be generalized according to when
during a month they were generated.
It can be desirable to use the two generalization hierarchies of Figure 4.4 si-
multaneously. To this end, one could combine the two hierarchies into a single
one, in which each time-stamp has two parents — one that corresponds to its day
of the week and one that corresponds to its day of the month. A drawback of this
approach is that it makes the generation of covers more cumbersome. (Recall that
covers are the generalized alarms that model alarm clusters, see page 68.) To see
why, let C be an alarm cluster whose constituent alarms occur on Monday the
second of the month. Unfortunately, the concept “Mon 2nd” is not contained in
the combined generalization hierarchy. Therefore, it is not possible to find a cover
that has its time attribute set to “Mon 2nd”. Several solutions are conceivable:
1. One could accept the loss of information and decide that a cover indicating
either “Mon” or “2nd” is good enough.
2. One could generate multiple covers for C, but these covers are mostly re-
dundant and only differ in the values of their time-stamp attributes.
3. One could construct the “full cross-product” of the two generalization hi-
erarchies. The resulting generalization hierarchy contains all concept pairs,
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Figure 4.4: Sample generalization hierarchies for time attributes.
including “Mon 2nd”. Unfortunately, the generalization hierarchy resulting
from a full cross-product is generally very complex.
4. One could replicate the time-stamp attribute and assign each generalization
hierarchy to a separate replica. That way, one replica plays the role “day
of the week”, whereas the other plays the role “day of the month”. Further,
each replica is generalized according to its own generalization hierarchy.
In practice, alarm clusters are generally huge and cumbersome to work with.
Therefore, root cause analysis mostly relies on covers (which model the alarm
clusters) rather than on the clusters themselves. Against this background, we con-
sider the first two solutions as undesirable because information-deprived or redun-
dant covers are of reduced practical value. The solutions 3 and 4 are equivalent,
but solution 4 is easier to use because it frees the user from the potentially error-
prone task of calculating the cross-product of two generalization hierarchies. In
fact, solution 4 implicitly calculates the cross-product for the user. In our practical
work, we therefore choose solution number 4.
Free-text attributes, such as the context attribute in Section 1.4, assume arbi-
trary strings as their values. Therefore, the challenge lies in tapping the semantic
information of these strings. One way to solve this problem is to use a feature
extraction step that precedes the actual alarm clustering. Features are crisp bits
of semantic information that, once extracted, replace the original strings. Thus,
each string is replaced by the set of its features. Note that subset-inclusion de-
fines a natural generalization hierarchy on feature sets. For example, the feature
set {f1, f2, f3} can be generalized to the sets {f1, f2}, {f1, f3}, or {f2, f3}, which
in turn can be generalized to {f1}, {f2}, or {f3}. The next level is the empty
set, which corresponds to “Any-feature”. Note that the feature extraction process
constructs a generalization hierarchy at run-time. Hence, free-text attributes are
another instance where dynamic generalization hierarchies are useful.
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Ultimately, we consider it the intrusion detection analyst’s responsibility to
select features that capture as much semantic information as possible. In our
own work, we found frequent substrings to be useful features. More precisely,
let L be an alarm log, let A be a free-text attribute, and let V :=< a[A] | a ∈
L> be the multi-set of values that attribute A assumes in the alarm log L. We
run the Teiresias algorithm [181] on V in order to find all substrings that have
a user-defined minimum length and minimum frequency. These substrings are
the features and each original string s is replaced by the (single) most frequent
feature that is also a substring of s. Thus, all feature sets have size one. Finally,
each feature set can only be generalized to the “Any-feature” level. The resulting
generalization hierarchy is simple, but frequent substrings have the advantage of
being rather understandable features. Therefore, they contribute to the overall
understandability of covers.
4.3 Algorithm for Alarm Clustering
This section describes an algorithmic solution to the alarm clustering problem.
We begin in Section 4.3.1 by proving that the alarm clustering problem is NP-
complete. Given the need for a scalable solution, this constitutes an important
result. Moreover, it motivates the remainder of this sections, which describes a
heuristic method for alarm clustering. Specifically, Section 4.3.2 describes the
classic attribute-oriented induction method, which is the basis of our approach.
Section 4.3.3 explains why and how we modified the classic method to make
it more suitable for alarm clustering. Section 4.3.4, finally, discusses advanced
aspects of the modified attribute-oriented induction method.
4.3.1 NP Completeness of Alarm Clustering
This section proves that the alarm clustering problem is NP-complete. To this end,
let L be an alarm log, min size a minimum cluster size, and Gi a generalization
hierarchy for each attribute Ai in L, i = 1, . . . , n. We show the NP completeness
of (L,min size,G1, . . . ,Gn) by reducing the CLIQUE problem [166] to the alarm
clustering problem. In the CLIQUE problem, which is known to be NP-complete,
we are given a graphG and an integer k. The goal is to decide whetherG contains
a k-clique, i.e. a fully connected subgraph of size k. We assume that G contains
at least
(
k
2
)
edges because otherwise, there is trivially no k-clique in G. Now, the
following steps reduce the CLIQUE problem to the alarm clustering problem (cf.
Figure 4.5):
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Figure 4.5: Example of reducing CLIQUE to alarm clustering.
1. Assign a separate attribute Ai to each node in G. Let {A1, . . . , An} be the
resulting set of attributes. Define Dom(Ai) := {0, 1} and Gi := 1 −→ 0 for
i = 1, . . . , n.
2. For each edge e inG, add one alarm a to L. LetAi andAj (Ai 6= Aj) denote
the attributes that correspond to the endpoints of e. Then, the attributes Ai
and Aj of alarm a are set to 1, whereas all the other attributes are set to 0.
3. In the definition d(a1, a2) :=
∑n
i=1 wi × d(a1[Ai], a2[Ai]) of the distance
between two alarms a1 and a2, set all weights equal to one, i.e wi = 1,∀i.
4. Set min size :=
(
k
2
)
, which corresponds to the number of edges in a k-
clique.
5. Finally, solve the alarm clustering problem that has just been defined. Let
C ⊆ L be an optimal alarm cluster, i.e. an alarm cluster that minimizes
H(C) while satisfying |C| ≥ min size. Furthermore, let c = (c1, . . . , cn)
be the cover of C. Then, G contains a k-clique if and only if
∑n
i=1 ci = k.
To understand step 5, note that the cover c = (c1, . . . , cn) satisfies ci =
max{a[Ai] | a ∈ C} for all i. Moreover, d(c, a) =
∑n
i=1(ci − a[Ai]) =∑n
i=1 ci −
∑n
i=1 a[Ai] =
∑n
i=1 ci − 2 holds for all alarms a ∈ C, because
step 2 guarantees that each alarm has exactly two attributes set to 1. By plug-
ging d(c, a) =
∑n
i=1 ci − 2 into the equations (4.7) and (4.8), we finally obtain
H(C) =
∑n
i=1 ci − 2.
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Going back to step 5, suppose that
∑n
i=1 ci = k holds. Then, {Ai|ci = 1} de-
fines a k-clique, and the alarms in C correspond to its edges. Conversely, suppose∑n
i=1 ci > k, and hence H(C) > k − 2 (
∑n
i=1 ci < k is impossible). Then, there
exists no k-clique in G. Indeed, let us assume that G did contain a k-clique, and
let C ′ be the cluster of alarms that corresponds to the edges of this hypothetical
k-clique. Furthermore, let c′ = (c′1, . . . , c′n) be the cover of C ′. Now, the equa-
tions
∑n
i=1 c
′
i = k and ultimately H(C ′) = k − 2 follow. This contradicts the
assumption that H(C) is minimal, while, in fact, H(C) > H(C ′) holds.
4.3.2 Classic Attribute-Oriented Induction
Given the NP completeness result of the last section, we now describe a heuris-
tic method for solving the alarm clustering problem. For a given problem
(L,min size,G1, . . . ,Gn), the heuristic method finds an alarm cluster C ⊆ L
that satisfies |C| ≥ min size, but does not necessarily minimize the heterogene-
ityH(C). Obviously, the further a heuristic method pushesH(C) to its minimum,
the better it is. The heuristic method developed in this dissertation is a variant of
Attribute-Oriented Induction (AOI) [87, 88], a well-known conceptual clustering
method, which is described next.
Attribute-oriented induction operates on relational database tables and repeat-
edly replaces attribute values by more abstract values. These more abstract values
are taken from user-defined generalization hierarchies, such as the ones in the
Figures 4.3 and 4.4. Thanks to the generalization of attribute values, previously
distinct alarms become identical and can be merged. In this way, huge relational
tables can be condensed into short and highly comprehensible summary tables.
For a more formal treatment, we extend all alarms by a new integer-
valued pseudo-attribute, the so-called count (see last column in Figure 4.3(b)).
Thus, we henceforth model alarms as tuples over the Cartesian product
Dom(A1) x . . . x Dom(An) xN. The count attribute is used by the AOI algorithm
for book-keeping, only. The alarm attributes Ai are as before. The inputs of the
AOI algorithm are a relational table T over the attributes {A1, . . . , An, count},
generalization hierarchies Gi, and generalization thresholds di ∈ N for all at-
tributes Ai (i = 1, . . . , n). In our case, the table T initially stores the alarms of
the alarm log L. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that all generalization
hierarchies are trees.
Figure 4.6 shows the pseudo-code of the classic AOI algorithm. The first step
assigns a value of 1 to the count attribute of all alarms. Subsequently, the main
loop (steps 2–8) is iterated: Step 3 selects an attribute Ai and the steps 4 and 5
replace the Ai values of all alarms by their parent values in Gi. By doing so, pre-
viously distinct alarms can become identical. Two alarms a and a′ are identical
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Input: A table T , tree-structured generalization hierarchies Gi,
and generalization thresholds di;
Output: A generalized table storing generalized alarms;
Algorithm:
1: for all alarms a in T do a[count ] := 1; // Initialize counts.
2: while table T is not abstract enough do {
3: Select an alarm attribute Ai;
4: for all alarms a in T do // Generalize attribute Ai.
5: a[Ai] := parent of a[Ai] in Gi;
6: while identical alarms a,a′ exist do // Merge identical alarms.
7: Set a[count ] := a[count ] + a′[count ] and delete a′ from T ;
8: }
Figure 4.6: Pseudo-code for the classic AOI algorithm.
if a[Ai] = a′[Ai] holds for all attributes Ai, while a[count ] and a′[count ] are al-
lowed to differ. The steps 6 and 7 merge identical alarms into a single generalized
alarm whose count value equals the sum of individual counts. In this way, the
count attribute always reflects the number of original alarms that are summarized
by a given generalized alarm. Note that each generalized alarm a represents an
alarm cluster of size a[count ]. Moreover, the elements of an alarm cluster a are
the original (ungeneralized) alarms that were merged into a.
One key aspect of the classic AOI algorithm has been left open, namely, how
the attributes Ai are selected in step 3. The selection criterion is that any attribute
Ai that assumes more than di distinct values in table T can be selected. (Recall
that di, the generalization threshold, is an input parameter to the algorithm.) The
main loop terminates in step 2 if no such attribute exists. In other words, step 2
considers the table T “abstract enough” when each attribute Ai assumes at most
di distinct values.
4.3.3 Modified Attribute-Oriented Induction
To summarize, classic AOI generalizes an attribute Ai until it assumes at most
di distinct values (i = 1, . . . , n). This strategy of bounding the number of dis-
tinct attribute values guarantees that the final generalized table contains at most
Πi=1,...,ndi generalized alarms. However, this strategy can lead to excessive gen-
eralization, in which too much detail is lost (so-called over-generalization). This
section illustrates the problem of over-generalization and shows how we modified
the classic AOI algorithm to mitigate it. For the sake of simplicity, we will as-
sume that all generalization hierarchies are trees, and that all attribute weights in
the distance definition d(a1, a2) :=
∑n
i=1 wi × d(a1[Ai], a2[Ai]) equal one, i.e.
wi = 1,∀i. Section 4.3.4 relieves these constraints.
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Figure 4.3(b) on page 67 shows a sample table having the alarm attributes Src-
IP (the source IP) and Dst-IP (the destination IP). Note that the first tuple in the
table represents 1000 occurrences of the alarm (ip1 , ip4 ). We use the left-hand
generalization hierarchy of Figure 4.3(c) for both alarm attributes, and we assume
that both generalization thresholds have been set to 10 (i.e. d1 = d2 = 10). Given
that both alarm attributes assume 27 distinct values, they are both generalized
once by the classic AOI algorithm. This yields a new table whose alarm attributes
still have 27 distinct values. Therefore, both attributes are generalized again.
The resulting table, which contains the generalized alarms (DMZ ,DMZ , 1000),
(DMZ , Internet , 26), and (Internet ,DMZ , 26), is the final result of classic AOI.
Note that this result is (over-)generalized to a point where important details have
been lost. In fact, instead of the above result we had rather obtained the alarms
(ip1 , ip4 , 1000), (ip1 , Internet , 26), and (Internet , ip4 , 26), which are more
specific and informative.
A major source of over-generalization is “noise”. Indeed, noise forces
up the number of distinct attribute values and thereby controls the generaliza-
tion process. In the above example, there was one main signal (namely the
tuple (ip1 , ip4 , 1000)) and five percent of “noise” (the remaining 52 tuples).
However, the noise dominated the generalization process and caused the alarm
(ip1 , ip4 , 1000) to be generalized four times, so it became (DMZ ,DMZ , 1000).
Noise-induced over-generalization is a serious problem in intrusion detection, and
it motivates our first modification of the classic AOI algorithm.
Modification 1 We abandon the generalization thresholds di as well as the as-
sociated strategy of bounding the number of distinct attribute values. Our new
strategy is to find generalized alarms that subsume “many” of the original (un-
generalized) alarms. Formally, we search alarms a ∈ T that have a count of
min size or larger (i.e. a[count ] ≥ min size), where min size ∈ N is the user-
defined minimum cluster size. Whenever such an alarm is found, it is removed
from the table T and reported as a solution to the user. Processing continues with
the table T ′ := T r {a}. 
Recall that each alarm a represents an alarm cluster of size a[count ]. The
above modification has two effects: First, by imposing a minimum cluster size of
min size, it forces the AOI algorithm to find “large” clusters. Second, by prevent-
ing further generalization of an alarm a that satisfies a[count ] ≥ min size, it tries
to avoid over-generalization. The combined effect is to bias the algorithm towards
large clusters that nonetheless have adequate (i.e. specific) models in the form of
generalized alarms. Finally, Modification 1 also raises the need for a new attribute
selection criteria for step 3 of Figure 4.6. To counteract over-generalization, we
use the following heuristic criteria, which tries to minimize the total number of
attribute generalizations:
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Modification 2 For each alarm attributeAi, let Fi := max{fi(v)| v ∈ Dom(Ai)}
be the maximum of the function
fi(v) := SELECT sum(count) FROM T WHERE Ai = v,
which sums the counts of all alarms a ∈ T with a[Ai] = v. Step 3 of Figure 4.6
selects an attribute Ai whose Fi value is minimal, i.e. ∀j : Fi ≤ Fj must hold. 
The justification of this heuristic is that an alarm a with a[count ] ≥ min size
cannot exist unless Fi ≥ min size holds for all attributes Ai. Therefore, we use
it as a heuristic to increase the smallest Fi value by generalizing its correspond-
ing attribute Ai. This heuristic attempts to minimize the number of generalization
steps needed to find an alarm a that satisfies a[count ] ≥ min size. Other heuris-
tics are clearly possible, but our experience supports the one above.
To see what we have achieved so far, let us reconsider the example of Fig-
ure 4.3 and let min size equal 20. The alarm (ip1 , ip4 , 1000) has a count larger
than 20, and is immediately removed from the table and presented to the user.
All remaining alarms have counts of one, so that generalization starts. Because of
F1 = F2 = 26, either of the two attributes Src-IP or Dst-IP can be selected for gen-
eralization. Without loss of generality, we assume that the attribute Src-IP is cho-
sen and generalized. The resulting alarms still have counts of one, which is why
a second generalization step is initiated. Again, we assume that the Src-IP is se-
lected and generalized. The resulting table contains the alarm (Internet , ip4 , 26),
which is removed and reported to the user. Finally, the Dst-IP attribute is general-
ized twice, the alarm (DMZ , Internet , 26) is reported, and processing ends.
A problem becomes apparent. Although generalizing the attribute Src-IP
has allowed us to find the alarm (Internet , ip4 , 26), it has irrevocably over-
generalized the source IP of the 26 alarms that remain after (Internet , ip4 , 26)
was removed. As a consequence, the last alarm reported is (DMZ , Internet , 26),
rather than the more specific (ip1 , Internet , 26). The problem is that a gener-
alization step can be opportune in the short run while having undesirable late
effects. In other words, generalization steps can accumulate to the point where
over-generalization occurs. This motivates the next modification.
Modification 3 After reporting an alarm a ∈ T with a[count ] ≥ min size, we
used to continue processing with table T ′ := T r {a}. Henceforth, we first
undo all generalization steps in T ′. This involves replacing all generalized alarms
by their constituent ungeneralized alarms. Then, processing resumes with the
resulting table, in which all counts equal one. 
Now, let us reconsider the above example: Processing is unchanged up to
the point where the alarm (Internet , ip4 , 26) is removed from the table. Then,
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Input: A table T and tree-structured generalization hierarchies Gi;
Output: Generalized alarms of user-defined minimum sizes;
Algorithm:
1: for all alarms a in T do a[count ] := 1; // Initialize counts.
2: Prompt the user for a min size value;
3: while
∑
a∈T a[count ] ≥ min size do {
4: while identical alarms a,a′ exist do // Merge identical alarms.
5: Set a[count ] := a[count ] + a′[count ] and delete a′ from T ;
6: if ∃a ∈ T : a[count ] ≥ min size then { // If we found a solution.
7: Output the alarm a and set T := T r {a};
8: Replace all a′ ∈ T by their constituent ungeneralized alarms;
9: Prompt the user for a new min size value;
10: } else {
11: Select an attribute Ai as specified by Modification 2;
12: for all alarms a in T do // Generalize attribute Ai.
13: a[Ai] := parent of a[Ai] in Gi;
14: }
15: }
Figure 4.7: Pseudo-code for the modified AOI algorithm.
Modification 3 kicks in and resets the Src-IP attribute of the remaining 26 alarms
to its original value, which is ip1 . Finally, the Dst-IP attribute is generalized
twice, the alarm (ip1 , Internet , 26) is reported, and processing ends. Figure 4.7
summarizes the discussion and shows the modified AOI algorithm. Note that
the steps 2 and 9 offer tight control over the min size values that are used in
successive iterations of the main loop.
In Section 3.2.2, we have defined five algorithmic requirements that a data
mining technique should satisfy to be suitable for root cause analysis. We can
now examine how well the modified AOI algorithm meets these requirements:
Scalability: The excellent scalability of classic AOI [64] is mostly preserved by
our modifications. Chapter 6 will present concrete run-time measurements
to substantiate this claim.
Noise tolerance: By design, the modified AOI algorithm tolerates the noise typ-
ically found in alarm logs (see the discussion before Modification 1).
Ease of use: The min size parameter has a very intuitive interpretation and is the
only one to be set. Some expertise in the application domain is needed to
define meaningful generalization hierarchies. However, once defined, these
hierarchies are generally static.
Multiple attribute types: As illustrated in Section 4.2.3, AOI can take advantage
of a wide variety of attribute types, including numerical, categorical, time,
and free-text attributes.
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Interpretability & relevance of results: As Chapter 6 points out, we found the
results of the modified AOI algorithm to be relevant and easy to interpret.
4.3.4 Advanced Aspects
This section extends the modified AOI algorithm to support DAG-structured gen-
eralization hierarchies. In addition, it shows how attribute weights wi different
from one can be handled, i.e. the case d(a1, a2) :=
∑n
i=1 wi × d(a1[Ai], a2[Ai])
with wi 6= 1 is considered. Finally, we discuss the problem of setting the parame-
ter min size.
To begin with, when generalization hierarchies are DAGs rather than trees,
then any node can potentially have multiple parents. Consequently, there is no
longer a unique parent that an attribute value can be generalized to. There are two
basic strategies for resolving this issue:
Choose-one: This strategy employs user-defined rules to resolve ambiguities.
For example, consider an IP address ip1 that simultaneously runs an HTTP
server and an FTP server. Accordingly, HTTP-server or FTP-server are two
possible generalizations of ip1 . The following rule assumes that ip1 is the
destination IP of alarm a, and generalizes ip1 according to the value of the
destination port:
if (a[Dst−port ] = 80) then generalize ip1 to HTTP-server
else generalize ip1 to FTP-server;
A similar rule is conceivable for the case that ip1 is the source IP address
of an alarm.
Explore-all: This strategy pursues all possible generalizations in parallel and re-
tains the one that first leads to a generalized alarm of size min size or larger.
Both of these strategies have been studied in the context of classic AOI [35,
86], and we can directly reuse the solutions proposed there. In the choose-one
strategy, the problem of induction anomaly needs to be solved [35]. Induction
anomalies arise when a user-defined rule tries to access attribute values that have
been “abstracted away” in a previous generalization step. For example, the above
rule for the HTTP/FTP server is only applicable when the destination port number
has not previously been generalized. A solution to the induction anomaly problem
is described in [35], and we have adopted this solution in our implementation of
the modified AOI method. We have not implemented the explore-all strategy,
because the proposed exhaustive search seems incompatible with our scalability
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requirement. However, the explore-all strategy is conceptually easy to implement
[86]: First, line 13 of Figure 4.7 is replaced by:
13.1: T := T r {a};
13.2: for all parents p that a[Ai] has in Gi do {
13.3: a′ := a; a′[Ai] := p; T := T ∪ {a′};
13.4: }
In other words, the attribute Ai of alarm a is generalized in all possible ways
and the resulting alarms a′ are added to T . Now, however, the clusters modeled
by the generalized alarms in T are no longer disjunct. It is therefore incorrect to
merge generalized alarms by adding their counts as is done in line 5 of Figure
4.7. The easiest way to determine the correct count values of generalized alarms
is to rescan the original alarm log and to determine the number of original alarms
that match them. More efficient implementations are possible. Finally, because
the clusters in T might overlap, it is also necessary to implement step 8 more
carefully.
Another generalization over the previous section is to add support for attribute
weights wi 6= 1. As explained in Section 4.2, a large attribute weight wi penal-
izes the generalization of the corresponding attribute Ai, i = 1, . . . , n. The best
place to incorporate this bias into the approximation algorithm is in step no. 11 of
Figure 4.7, where an attribute is selected for generalization. Different heuristics
are possible to make this step aware of weights. We have implemented a simple
extension of the heuristic described in Modification 2. Specifically, if all attributes
Ai satisfy Fi ≥ min size, then we multiply the Fi by the weights wi, i.e. we set
Fi := Fi×wi, i = 1, . . . , n. Otherwise, we leave the Fi unchanged. Next, among
all attributes that have not yet been generalized to the root of their hierarchies, we
select an Ai with a minimal Fi value, i.e. ∀j : Fi ≤ Fj must hold. As intended,
this heuristic is biased towards selecting attributes with small associated weights.
Our last extension over the previous section concerns the min size parameter.
Currently, the user is the only authority over this parameter. If the user chooses an
excessively large min size value, then the quest for a cluster of at least this size
can force the clustering algorithm to merge alarms with different root causes. This
is undesirable because the resulting alarm clusters can be hard or even misleading
to interpret. On the other hand side, if min size is set to an overly small value,
then clustering can end prematurely and alarms that have the same root cause can
end up in different clusters. This can inflate the number of clusters and the time
needed to interpret them. To mitigate these problems, it seems desirable to give
the user some assistance in setting the min size parameter.
Before investigating ways of setting the parameter min size, it is important
to note that other clustering methods have very similar parameters (see Section
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4.1.2). For example, partitioning methods require the user to specify the num-
ber of clusters that the dataset is supposed to contain. Similarly, density-based
methods expect the user to define the minimum number of data objects that a data
volume must contain to count as “dense”. In general, most clustering methods
have parameters like these, which allow the user to control the desirable amount
of clustering. Intuitively, these parameters select an “operating point” between
the two extremes of no clustering (i.e. all objects form clusters by themselves)
and maximum clustering (i.e. all objects are grouped into a single cluster). Aside
from a few ad hoc rules [9, 104], there exist no guidelines for choosing the oper-
ating point.
We now describe the revised scheme for setting the min size parameter. As
before, the user is prompted in the lines 2 and 9 of Figure 4.7 to provide a min size
value for the next cluster. However, this value is no longer used as is, but rather
serves as the seed value of an iterative process that converges towards a robust
min size value. This robust value is finally used for clustering. Intuitively, a
min size value is robust if slightly smaller or slightly larger values still yield the
same clustering result. Robustness is an important property because it limits the
effects that spurious or arbitrary decisions can have on the clustering results.
Formally, let ε be a small fraction of 1, e.g. ε = 0.07. A given min size value
ms is ε-robust if it yields the same alarm cluster as the values (1 − ε) × ms and
(1 + ε) × ms . We can test for ε-robustness by simulating the alarm clustering
method for the values ms , (1 − ε) × ms , and (1 + ε) × ms . The value ms is ε-
robust if all three simulations yield the same alarm cluster. Note that ε-robustness
is always relative to a particular alarm log. Thus, a given min size value can be ε-
robust with respect to one alarm log, while being in-robust for another alarm log.
Let ms0 be the min size value that the user originally keyed in. This value
is used for clustering if and only if it is ε-robust (with respect to the alarm log at
hand). Otherwise, it is depreciated according to the formula ms i+1 := (1 − ε) ×
ms i. This test-and-depreciate cycle is iterated until an ε-robust min size value has
been found. In the worst case, termination occurs after O(log(ms0)) iterations.
Our decision to progressively decrease rather than increase the min size value
stems from our desire not to mix alarms of different root causes in the same alarm
cluster. Section 3.2 and Chapter 5 discuss this point in great detail.
4.4 Discourse on Background Knowledge
The classic and the modified AOI methods use background knowledge in the form
of generalization hierarchies to decide which clusters to form. This section ex-
plores the integration of other kinds of background knowledge into the clustering
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process. The expected benefit of adding more background knowledge is to obtain
potentially better clustering results. In particular, one might hope to get closer
to the ideal (but unattainable) situation where the alarms of an alarm cluster are
guaranteed to share the same root cause.
The remainder of this section describes three different types of background
knowledge, and discusses how each applies to alarm clustering. Without excep-
tion, we found that a substantial research or development effort would have been
necessary to reap the benefits from these types of background knowledge. We
have therefore not implemented and experimented with any of them. Doing so
could be the subject of future research.
4.4.1 Contextual Background Knowledge
Remember that the alarms of an alarm cluster should ideally share the same root
cause. A necessary prerequisite for obtaining such clusters is that alarms contain
enough information, so that in theory, one can decide if alarms have the same root
cause. As will be shown next, the alarms of network-based IDSs do not meet this
prerequisite.
For example, consider two alarms that have the same source IP address. Be-
cause of DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) and NAT (Network Ad-
dress Translation) firewalls, these two alarms might be triggered by completely
different machines that have nothing in common. Similarly, the dial-in routers of
ISPs (Internet Service Providers) assign IP addresses dynamically, so that an IP
address allows no conclusion to be drawn about the machine attached to it. Finally,
even when two alarms are known to originate from the same source machine, they
might still have been caused by completely independent users or processes. To
summarize, alarms do not unambiguously identify the actors (i.e. machines, users,
and processes) involved in their generation. As a consequence, it is not possible
to reliably decide if different alarms have the same root cause.
An obvious remedy is to collect contextual background knowledge, such as
DHCP logs, NAT logs, and other log files. Using this background knowledge it is
possible to unify alarms before they are processed by the alarm clustering method.
For example, unification can replace all IP addresses by unique tokens, which
unambiguously identify the respective machines. This would solve some of the
problems associated with naming ambiguity. Unfortunately, collecting, maintain-
ing, and processing the necessary contextual background knowledge constitutes a
major development endeavor, which exceeds the scope of this dissertation.
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4.4.2 Feature Construction
Feature construction is the process of extending a given dataset by adding new
attributes that are deemed to be relevant for improving the data mining results.
The new attributes can be set according to prior knowledge, an analysis of the
already existing attributes, or a combination of both. For example, the MADAM
ID of Section 2.3.3 extends connection records by new attributes that store statis-
tical summaries over chronologically close connection records. Analogously, one
can attempt to construct new attributes that differentiate alarms with supposedly
different root causes. Possible candidates are:
A new attribute that indicates if the current alarm is part of a periodic pat-
tern, in which a given source IP address triggers an alarm every so-and-so
many seconds.
A new attribute that indicates if the current alarm is part of a host scan,
in which a given source IP address probes many different destination IP
addresses.
A new attribute that indicates if the destination IP address of the current
alarm is an uncommon and supposedly suspicious target.
To understand the rationale behind the first of the above three candidate at-
tributes, let aperiod be an alarm that belongs to a periodic pattern, and let anone be
an alarm that does not. In general, one would assume that the alarms aperiod and
anone have different root causes and should therefore not be clustered. Adding a
new attribute, which is set to “1” in aperiod and to “0” in anone enforces this intu-
ition. In fact, the two alarms might still be merged into a single cluster, but only
at the expense of an additional generalization step. Depending on the weight that
is assigned to this generalization step, its cost can be so high that the algorithm
chooses not to perform it, thus leaving the two alarms in separate clusters. Similar
arguments can be made to justify the other two candidate attributes.
Feature construction is no panacea. Specifically, in addition to the above three
candidate attributes, there are many other attributes that are equally plausible.
Simply using all of them is problematic, because the quality of clustering results
has been shown to decrease when irrelevant attributes (called noise-dimensions)
are added [148, 154]. Therefore, the problem of feature selection, i.e. of selecting
the “best” attributes, arises. However, most research has focused on selecting
features for classification problems, rather than clustering problems [58, 193].
Therefore, selecting features that are beneficial to alarm clustering is difficult, and
research into feature selection is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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4.4.3 Constraint-Based Clustering
Assume we knew that certain alarms have (or have not) the same root cause.
It would be desirable to make the clustering method aware of these constraints
so that it can enforce them, and only return clusters that are consistent with
them. Constraint-based clustering methods have the ability to do exactly that
[65, 81, 194, 200]. Usually, the constraints supported by constraint-based cluster-
ing methods are relatively simple:
Wagstaff and Cardie support must-link and cannot-link constraints [200]. A
must-link constraint specifies that two data objects must end up in the same
cluster, while a cannot-link constraint enforces their separation.
Talavera and Be´jar allow the user to specify predicates, and enforce that all
data objects satisfying the same predicate end up in the same cluster [194].
A contiguity constraint is a connected graph G over the dataset under inves-
tigation. A contiguity constraint G enforces that only clusters are returned
whose constituent data objects induce a connected subgraph over G. For
example, when clustering geographic regions based on similarities in their
animal populations, one can use contiguity constraints to enforce that clus-
ters consist of geographically adjacent regions [65, 81].
We anticipate three problems when applying the constraint-based idea to alarm
clustering: First, constraints that are useful for alarm clustering need to be iden-
tified. For example, defining must-link and cannot-link constraints for pairs of
individual alarms does not seem practical given the size of alarm logs (cf. Table
1.2). Second, once a class of constraints has been identified, we are doubtful if
the background knowledge needed to instantiate it was available. Third, if the
background knowledge was available, then we hypothesize that it would be better
used by an expert system that groups alarms as it is told. This, however, carries
us away from the focus of this dissertation, which is the discovery of new and un-
expected root causes. Expert systems, by contrast, search for old and well-known
root causes.
Chapter 5
Cluster Validation
Ideally, we would like to prove our alarm clustering method to be correct and
complete in the sense of Definition 3.2. However, over the past 50 years, there has
been no precedence of a similar proof. Cluster validity is the commonly accepted
weaker alternative to proofs of correctness or completeness. Section 5.1 defines
cluster validation and further explains why it is needed. Section 5.2 surveys the
field of cluster validation. Section 5.3 explains the practical limitations of clus-
ter validation, and describes the validation approach that we have pursued in our
alarm clustering framework.
5.1 The Validation Dilemma
Clustering has traditionally been used to explore new datasets whose properties
were poorly understood. Therefore, the principal goal of clustering was to uncover
the hidden structures in a dataset, and to stimulate theories that explain them.
Accordingly, there were claims that the main criterion for assessing a clustering
result was its interpretability and usefulness. However, clustering methods have
important limitations that make such an ad hoc approach to cluster validation a
dangerous endeavor:
The random data phenomenon: Clustering methods always find clusters, no
matter whether they exist or not. In fact, even when applied to random
data, they mechanically group it into clusters. Clearly, such clusters are
meaningless at best, and misleading at worst.
Imposed structures: Clustering methods are not “neutral”, but have a tendency
to impose a structure on the dataset [5, 9, 81, 83]. For example, the K-
means method is known to favor spherical (a.k.a. globular) clusters of ap-
proximately equal sizes [81, 83, 90]. When a dataset contains clusters of
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a different kind (e.g. clusters that form parallel lines in the plane), then the
K-means method is nonetheless inclined to impose “synthetic” clusters of
globular shapes and similar sizes. Clearly, these clusters are an artifact of
the K-means method, and do not reflect the true structure of the dataset.
Method-dependent results: A corollary to the last point is that markedly differ-
ent results can be obtained when a given dataset is analyzed by different
clustering methods [5, 9, 56, 81].
Given these drawbacks, and given that the human mind is quite capable of pro-
viding post hoc justification for clusters of dubious quality, there are clear dangers
in a purely manual approach to cluster validation. Specifically, the risk of inad-
vertently justifying and approving meaningless clusters can be high [56, 81, 104].
Note that a priori, these reservations also apply to the clusters found by our alarm
clustering method. We would therefore like to prove the correctness and com-
pleteness (as defined in Definition 3.2) of our clustering method, but such proofs
do not exist [9, 104, 148, 153]. Cluster validation offers a weaker alternative ac-
cording to which a cluster structure is valid if it cannot reasonably be explained
by chance or by the idiosyncrasies of a clustering method. In practice, a cluster
structure is declared valid, if there is evidence that it correctly captures the natural
groups of the underlying dataset. The cluster structures under consideration are
hierarchies, partitions, and individual clusters (cf. Section 4.1.2).
As will become evident in the next section, cluster validation is a completely
formal endeavor, that is rid of any notions of semantics. This can lead to the situa-
tion where a cluster structure is declared “valid” even though it has no meaningful
interpretation. For example, Figure 5.1 plots for lawyers, engineers, and students
their respective wine consumptions at various wine prices. Clearly, the two ellip-
soidal clusters capture the structure of the dataset rather well. Therefore, these
clusters are valid by most validity measures, even though they have no obvious
interpretations (at least not in terms of peoples’ professions). This illustrates that
cluster validation can at best increase our confidence in a cluster structure, but it
cannot proof the structure to be correct or meaningful [5, 57, 80, 85].
5.2 Cluster Validation Background
Cluster validation can be used to validate hierarchies, partitions, or individual
clusters [54, 80, 81, 104]. To keep the presentation simple, this section only con-
siders the validation of partitions (i.e. sets of non-overlapping clusters). The deci-
sion to focus on partitions rather than hierarchies or individual clusters was taken
because our alarm clustering method produces partitions. Moreover, hierarchies
and individual clusters are validated in basically the same manner.
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Figure 5.1: Example of valid clusters that have no intuitive interpretation.
Very briefly, the validation techniques of this section can be characterized as
follows: The techniques of Section 5.2.1 declare a partition valid if it is “unusually
good” under the circumstances of the study. Section 5.2.2 argues that a partition
is valid if essentially the same partition is obtained by clustering an independently
drawn dataset that follows the same distribution. The Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4
evaluate clustering methods rather than their results. Here, the goal is to demon-
strate certain favorable properties that make a clustering method more likely to
produce valid clusters. Section 5.2.5 describes more ad hoc validation techniques
that were born out of practice. Note that this section is about cluster validation in
general. Validation of alarm clusters is addressed in Section 5.3.
5.2.1 Cluster Validation Based on Statistics
In a statistical sense, a partition is valid if it is “so good” that it is unlikely to be
the result of chance [54, 56, 80, 104]. Two different criteria have been formulated
to measure the “goodness” of a partition:
External criteria measure goodness with respect to some externally provided
ground truth. Typically, the user defines ground truth to be the partition
that she considers to be correct or desirable. Then, goodness is the degree
of match between this ideal partition and the actual one.
Internal criteria consider a partition to be good, if it fits the dataset it was de-
rived from. For example, a partition that organizes a dataset into compact
and isolated clusters fits the dataset well, and is commonly judged to be
good.
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An index is a formula that measures goodness in a quantitative manner. Exter-
nal criteria use indices that measure the degree of match between two partitions
(namely the ideal partition and the partition under evaluation). Internal criteria,
on the other hand side, use indices that measure the fit between a partition and the
dataset that the partition was derived from.
It is relatively easy to define indices, but it is very hard to interpret their return
values. Specifically, what does a return value of, say, 0.7 mean? Is that evidence
enough to declare a partition valid? Statistics offers a principled framework to
answer these questions. The basic idea is to take an index and to study its return
values when applied to random partitions. Then, a new partition is valid if the
index returns a value that was never (or seldom) observed for random partitions.
That is, a partition is valid, if the assigned index value is unlikely for random
partitions. For a more detailed discussion, we next consider external and internal
criteria separately.
External criteria: Let C and O be two partitions of the dataset D, and let n
be the size of D (i.e. n = |D|). We assume that the partition C is the result
of a clustering method, while the partition O comes from an oracle that knows
the “right” way to partition the dataset D. External criteria declare the partition
C valid if C and O match unusually well. The practical question of where the
partition O comes from is not considered by external criteria.
Formally, the validity of C with respect to O is tested in several steps. The
first step is to choose an index that measures the degree of match between the two
partitions. Many indices have been suggested for this purpose [104]. For example,
the Rand index measures the fraction of object pairs that are classified consistently
by both partitions [101]:
R(C,O) := |{ (x,y) ∈ D×D |x 6= y ∧ IC(x,y) = IO(x,y) }| /
(
n
2
)
(5.1)
where IC(x,y) is the indicator function for partition C (i.e. IC(x,y) := 1 if x and
y belong to the same cluster of C, and IC(x,y) := 0, otherwise), and IO(x,y) is
defined analogously. Details are given elsewhere [101, 104].
Once an index has been selected, it is used to compare the partitions C and O.
The index returns a numeric measure of match. We will assume without loss of
generality that large index values indicate good matches. As previously explained,
external criteria declare the partition C valid if it matches O “unusually well”, i.e.
if the index value for C and O is “unusually large”. To be “unusually large”, the
index value must at least be significantly larger than the index values achieved by
random partitions of the same dataset.
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The notion of “random partition” is formally defined by means of a random-
ness or null hypothesis. Different randomness hypothesis are possible [104]. For
example, the random label hypothesis [104] states that random partitions R are
obtained by randomly relabeling the objects of O. For example, if O equals
{ {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}, {6} } and pi(·) is a permutation of the numbers 1 to 6, then
R := { {pi(1), pi(2), pi(3)}, {pi(4), pi(5)}, {pi(6)} } is a valid random partition un-
der the random label hypothesis. Note that there are n! possible random partitions.
Having selected an index I(·, ·) and a randomness hypothesis H0, we deter-
mine the distribution of I(C, ·) under H0 (known as baseline distribution). This
distribution shows for all x in the range of I(·, ·) the probability that I(C,R)
equals x, when R is a random partition as defined by H0. In general, it is not pos-
sible to determine the distribution of I(C, ·) underH0 analytically. Therefore, one
might have to approximate it by evaluating I(C,R) for a large number of random
partitions R. Given the distribution of I(C, ·) under H0, we are ready to decide
whether the value I(C,O) is “unusually large” (or, equivalently, whether the par-
tition C is valid): Let α be a small number, such as 0.01. The value I(C,O) is
“unusually large” if I(C, ·) under H0 has a probability of α or less to be larger
than I(C,O). In this case, the partition C is called valid at significance level α.
Internal criteria: Internal criteria measure if a partition is intrinsically appro-
priate for the dataset it was derived from. No external comparative measure such
as the above partition O is used. Formally, internal criteria use indices that mea-
sure the degree of fit between a partition and the dataset itself. If this fit is “unusu-
ally good”, then the partition is declared valid. As above, the notion of “unusually
good” is defined in a statistical sense: The fit is “unusually good”, if it is signifi-
cantly better than the fit between random data and its best partitioning.
Many indices have been suggested to measure the goodness of fit between a
partition and its underlying dataset [149]. For example, let D be a dataset, d(·, ·) a
distance index on the objects ofD, and C a partition ofD. The Goodman-Kruskal
γ statistic [77, 149] is defined as γ := (S+ − S−)/(S+ + S−), where S+ (S−)
counts the number of quadruples (x,y,u,v) ∈ D 4 for which x and y belong to
the same cluster of C, u and v belong to different clusters, and d(x,y) < d(u,v)
(d(x,y)>d(u,v), respectively). Note that γ ∈ [−1, 1], with γ = 1 for perfect fit.
For the further discussion we assume an index I(·, ·) that returns large values
for good fit. Then, a partition C of the dataset D is valid if the value I(C,D) is
“unusually large”, i.e. if it is significantly larger than the index values typically
obtained for partitions of random data. As before, “random data” is defined by
specifying a randomness hypothesis. For example, random data can be the result
of garbling the dataset D. Alternatively, objects that were randomly placed in a
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region of p-dimensional space can serve as random data. Many other randomness
hypotheses are possible, and choosing an adequate one is a difficult and poorly
understood problem [79, 80].
The value I(C,D) is “unusually large” (and the partition C is valid) if the
following holds for a small user-defined number α ∈ [0, 1]: Let DR be a random
dataset that conforms to the adopted randomness hypothesis, and let CR be the
result of partitioning this dataset with the same clustering method that produced
C. The partition C is valid, if the probability of I(CR, DR) being larger than
I(C,D) is smaller than α. As before, few theoretical results exist, and simulation
studies are necessary to estimate the probability P (I(CR, DR) > I(C,D)).
5.2.2 Replication Analysis
Replication analysis [27, 145, 156] is based on the logic of cross-validation [96]
as used in regression studies. Specifically, a cluster structure is declared valid if it
is consistently discovered across different samples that are independently drawn
from the same general population. Replication analyses comprise five major steps:
1. Two samples are required to conduct a replication analysis. Perhaps the
most direct way to accomplish this is to randomly divide one larger dataset
into two samples.
2. A clustering method is chosen, and the first sample is partitioned using this
method.
3. The second sample is partitioned using the same clustering method as in
step 2.
4. The second sample is re-partitioned by assigning each of its data objects to
the most similar (according to some measure) cluster in the partition of the
first sample. This yields another partition of the second sample.
5. The Rand index (cf. equation (5.1)) or some other measure of partition
agreement is used to compare the two partitions of the second sample. The
greater the level of agreement between the two partitions, the more confi-
dence one may have in their validity.
Replication analysis assesses the stability of a clustering result with respect
to sampling-related changes in the dataset. Stability is an important property,
because it gives us some confidence that a cluster structure is robust and not
an artifact of chance or an idiosyncrasies in the experimental setup. Other ap-
proaches for testing stability exist. For example, Gnanadesikan et al. assess the
stability of a clustering structure when noise is added and when data objects are
removed [76].
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5.2.3 Simulation Studies
While the last two sections have shown how to validate the results of a clustering
method, we now try to validate clustering methods themselves. The basic idea is
to determine the intrinsic properties of clustering methods. Then, given a specific
clustering problem, the hope is that one can choose an intrinsically suitable clus-
tering method, i.e. a method that yields valid results by construction. Obviously,
this approach hinges on our ability to determine the intrinsic properties of a clus-
tering method. Simulation studies are one way of ascertaining these properties.
Simulation studies (a.k.a. Monte Carlo studies) [148, 150, 151, 154] as-
sess clustering methods by their ability to correctly cluster artificially generated
datasets. More precisely, a simulation study comprises three major steps. First,
artificial datasets with known cluster structures are generated. Second, these
datasets are analyzed by the clustering methods of interest to the study. Third,
the level of agreement between the known cluster structures and the structures re-
covered by the various methods is determined by means of one or more recovery
indices, such as the Rand index of equation (5.1). Clustering methods that recover
the “correct” cluster structures (i.e. the cluster structures that were intentionally
embedded in the artificial datasets) are deemed valid for the kind of datasets used
in the study.
As simulation studies generate their own datasets, there is no doubt as to the
true cluster structure, or the extent to which any given clustering method has re-
covered this structure. Because of the use of computers to generate the datasets,
the results of simulation studies can be based on hundreds or even thousands of
analyses. One of the most important results of simulation studies is that the perfor-
mance of most clustering methods is strongly dependent on the characteristics of
the datasets they are applied to [5, 148, 150, 154]. In fact, the number of clusters
in the dataset, their absolute and relative sizes, the degree of cluster overlap, as
well as various noise conditions are only a few factors that are known to influence
the comparative performance of clustering methods. This clearly shows that there
is no single “uniformly best” clustering method.
The main disadvantage of simulation studies is their limited generalizability
[151, 154]. That is, the clustering method that ranked best in a simulation study is
only optimal for the very specific kind of datasets used in the study. In particular,
said clustering method might not be optimal for a dataset that contains a different
type of noise or a different number of clusters. As a consequence, if one intends
to choose a clustering method based on its ranking in a simulation study, then
one needs to know the precise characteristics of the dataset to be analyzed. In
practice, these characteristics are hardly ever known, which limits the practical
value of simulation studies.
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5.2.4 Analytic Cluster Validation
Aside from using simulation studies, researchers have also tried to analytically
explore the characteristics of various clustering methods. As in Section 5.2.3,
the motivation for this work was to better understand clustering methods, and to
offer well-founded guidelines for the choice of a method that performs well (i.e.
is “valid”) in a given applied cluster analysis.
Fisher and Van Ness [69, 161] evaluate clustering methods with respect to a
list of intuitively appealing properties, called admissibility criteria. The idea is
that admissibility criteria should be such that any “reasonable” clustering method
satisfies them. Examples of admissibility criteria are given below:
A clustering method is convex admissible if it is guaranteed to find clusters
that have non-intersecting convex hulls.
A K-group clustering consists of K clusters such that all within-cluster
distances are smaller than all between-cluster distances. A method is K-
group admissible if it finds K-group clusterings whenever they exist.
A clustering method M is cluster omission admissible if the following is
guaranteed for all datasets D: The partitionM(D) obtained by clustering
the dataset D with methodM satisfiesM(D) =M(DrC)∪{C} for any
cluster C ∈ M(D), i.e. the objects in D r C are clustered in exactly the
same way, whether the objects in C are present or not.
A method is point proportion admissible if the x-fold duplication of any
object of the input dataset does not affect the clustering result (x∈N).
Fisher and Van Ness present tables that evaluate nine clustering methods with re-
spect to eleven admissibility criteria. To see how such tables are used, consider a
dataset that resulted from a flawed sampling process, in which objects are inadver-
tently replicated. In this case, a point proportion admissible method is advisable
because it is unaffected by potential duplicates. Note that admissibility criteria can
only eliminate unsuitable methods, but they cannot indicate a single best method.
Other theoretical work comes from Jardine and Sibson [108] who propose an
elegant axiomatic framework for defining an acceptable clustering method. For
example, they require that permutation of the objects or multiplication with a con-
stant scale factor should not change the clustering in an essential way. Taken
together, their axioms are only satisfied by the single-link method (see p. 57).
The major criticism of this work has centered on the axiom that requires classifi-
cations to be (in a mathematical sense) continuous functions of the dataset [39].
References on further work in analytic cluster validation are given in [57, 153].
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5.2.5 Other Validation Approaches
This section briefly surveys several somewhat ad hoc approaches to cluster val-
idation. Most of these approaches were born out of practice and have not been
systematically studied in the academic literature.
Dubes and Jain point out that rather than searching for a rigorously objective
measure of cluster validity, it is more practical to validate a cluster structure by
applying several different clustering methods and checking if the results agree
[56, 57]. Anderberg [9] and Gordon [81] also recommend to analyze a given
dataset using more that one clustering method. Moreover, Gordon shows how the
results obtained from different methods can be synthesized into a single consensus
result. Relative criteria [81, 104], by contrast, keep the clustering method fixed,
but vary the values of its parameters. Then, heuristic arguments [152] are used to
determine the parameter values that produced the comparatively best result.
A variant of external criteria as presented in Section 5.2.1 leaves some at-
tributes out during clustering and uses them subsequently for validation [5, 66,
151]. According to this approach, clusters are valid if they differ significantly
on the attributes that were not used during the cluster analysis. One reason this
approach is not used frequently is that most researchers find it difficult to omit
potentially relevant attributes from the cluster analysis.
Probably the most common validation strategy has been to verify clustering
methods on artificial datasets, usually two-dimensional, for which the goodness
of the method can be judged visually. Typical examples of such analyses are found
in [61, 83, 115, 203].
5.3 Validation of Alarm Clusters
Section 5.1 explained that human beings can be careless and subjective when in-
terpreting alarm clusters, or any other kind of clusters for that matter. Conse-
quently, the importance of objective measures of cluster quality was emphasized.
Such measures are studied in the field of cluster validation, which was the topic
of Section 5.2. The present section investigates how cluster validation can be ap-
plied to the alarm clustering method of Chapter 4. In a first step, Section 5.3.1
highlights the limitations of cluster validation techniques. Section 5.3.2 presents
the validation techniques that we adopted, and Section 5.3.3 contains some con-
cluding remarks.
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5.3.1 Limitations of Cluster Validation
After Section 5.2, it should be no surprise that cluster validation is no panacea. In
fact, cluster validation has hardly been used in practice [5, 80] and over the past
20 years, researchers have continuously emphasized the need for more research
in cluster validation [5, 56, 57, 80, 104]. The specific limitations of the various
approaches to cluster validation can be summarized as follows:
External criteria: (i) In general, computer simulations are needed to approxi-
mate the distribution of the index under the randomness hypothesis. Such
simulations have high computational costs [104]. (ii) External criteria es-
tablish validity by measuring the fit between the clustering found by a clus-
tering method and the “correct” clustering as provided by an oracle. In prac-
tice, there are no oracles, and the correct clustering is hard to obtain. (iii)
External criteria only check if one specific dataset was clustered correctly.
This offers no insight into how well other datasets are clustered. Thus, the
results obtained by an external criterion are of little generality.
Internal criteria: (i) Internal criteria necessitate computer simulations, as well.
Therefore, they also have high computational costs [104]. (ii) The index and
randomness hypothesis chosen are known to significantly influence valida-
tion results [23, 79, 149]. However, few guidelines exist, so that these key
parameters are generally selected in an ad hoc manner. This is deeply un-
satisfying given the importance of these parameters. (iii) Internal criteria
offer weak evidence for the validity for a cluster structure. For example,
a cluster structure that imposes four clusters on a dataset having six true
clusters, is likely to be rated as valid by internal criteria [104].
Replication analysis: Replication analysis is certainly one of the most poorly re-
searched validation methods. In fact, the meaningfulness of a replication
analysis depends on characteristics of the dataset at hand, as well as on de-
sign decisions made during the replication analysis [5, 27, 145]. However,
none of these factors has been studied in a systematic fashion.
Simulation studies: Most simulation studies confirm that the characteristics of
the dataset at hand have a strong influence on the relative performance of
the various clustering methods. Therefore, one has to know the character-
istics of the dataset at hand in order to choose a clustering method that is
suitable for it. However, the data characteristics are generally unknown, so
that simulation studies offer little guidance in choosing a clustering method
[148, 150, 151]. Moreover, it has been observed that simulated datasets
are somehow well-behaved, whereas real-world datasets are generally not
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[55, 144]. This raises the question whether simulation studies can possi-
bly offer any insight into how clustering methods perform on real-world
datasets.
Analytic cluster validation: (i) Some theoretical results were observed to con-
tradict empirical evidence. For example, the admissibility and the axiomatic
approaches of Section 5.2.4 both rate the single-link method first. However,
virtually all simulation studies show that the single-link method performs
rather poorly even on error-free datasets [148, 150, 151]. (ii) Kaufman and
Rousseeuw point out that it is relatively easy to conceive a formal frame-
work that makes any arbitrary clustering method look best [117]. (iii) An-
alytic validation approaches systematically ignore the effect of all kinds of
heuristics, which are so fundamental to most clustering methods [55].
Other validation approaches, such as those described in Section 5.2.5, are
mostly limited by their heuristic and ad hoc nature, which makes their ob-
jectivity questionable.
Aside from the above very concrete criticism, there is the more philosophical
concern that cluster validity is an ill-defined concept. In fact, there is not even a
generally accepted definition of what a cluster is. For example, partitioning meth-
ods (cf. Section 4.1.2) define a cluster as a group of objects that optimize a quality
criterion. Density-based methods, by contrast, define a cluster as a dense region
in data space. Hierarchical methods have yet another definition. So, relative to
which definition should validity be measured?
Figure 5.2 illustrates this dilemma. Clearly, the cluster structures A and B are
both meaningful, but fundamentally different. In fact, they reflect different aspects
of the same dataset. Thus, the notion of a single “right” or “valid” cluster structure
seems unnecessarily narrow [9]. Moreover, none of the two cluster structures A
or B identifies the embedded sub-clusters shown in Figure 5.2(d). Does this mean
that the structures A and B are invalid? The answer lies in the eye of the beholder.
5.3.2 Towards the Validation of Alarm Clusters
Based on the discussion of the previous section, we decided to use none of the
classic validation techniques. In fact, external criteria are the only methods that
establish a strong and truly objective sense of validity. All the other methods can
only increase our comfort with a cluster structure, which is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from what manual validation can do. However, the problem with external
criteria is that they need the “correct” cluster structure, which is hard to obtain
in practice. One might try to obtain the correct cluster structure by manually
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d) Sub−clusters.b) Clustering A. c) Clustering B.a) Sample dataset.
Figure 5.2: A sample dataset, two cluster structures, and their sub-clusters.
clustering alarm logs. However, manual clustering is error-prone, which makes
it questionable whether the correct cluster structure can be identified in this way.
Moreover, manual clustering does not scale, which is problematic because there
is little value in showing that our alarm clustering method is correct for one, two,
or five alarm logs. Alternatively, one could try to set up a controlled laboratory
experiment, where all the root causes and their corresponding alarm clusters are
known. However, the value of such an experiment is very limited unless the lab-
oratory environment is representative of real environments, a requirement that is
very hard to meet [144]. Moreover, it is unclear how many laboratory experiments
are needed to validate the alarm clustering method.
To summarize, external criteria are very difficult to apply, but they are the
only way to establish validity in a truly objective way. Given this situation, we
approached the validation problem in two ways: First, we incorporated the idea
of replication analysis into the alarm clustering method and thereby improved
its robustness. Second, we developed two techniques that support the manual
investigation of alarm clusters. Using these techniques, it becomes easier for the
human analyst to identify and reject clusters of questionable quality.
Improving robustness: We like the idea of replication analysis according to
which a cluster structure is more trustworthy if it is not affected by spurious or
arbitrary decisions that were involved in its generation (cf. Section 5.2.2). How-
ever, summarizing the results of a replication analysis in a single number seems
overly formal given that this number is interpreted in a qualitative way, where
“larger is better”. Moreover, the fourth step in a replication analysis partitions the
second sample according to its resemblance to the clusters in the first sample. The
details of this step are open to interpretation, and few guidelines exist. However,
the choices made here are known to influence the final results [27]. Therefore,
we modified the replication analysis of Section 5.2.2 in a way that addresses these
concerns.
Let L be an alarm log and let L0 ⊆ L be a randomly chosen sub-log of L. We
randomly partition the alarm log Lr L0 into two equal-sized sub-logs L1 and L2
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(i.e. |L1| = |L2| and L1 unionmulti L2 = L r L0). Then, we apply the alarm clustering
method separately to the logs L0∪L1 and L0∪L2 and compare the resulting gener-
alized alarms. One could mark generalized alarms that are not discovered in both
alarm logs as questionable, so that they are investigated more carefully. However,
generalized alarms that do not replicate are very rare so that we decided to discard
them without mention. The advantage of this approach is that it improves the ro-
bustness of the alarm clustering method while being completely transparent to the
user. The user only sees “robust” alarm clusters.
Determining the size of the alarm log L0 is an important decision. The larger
L0 is, the more alarms the two alarm logs L0 ∪ L1 and L0 ∪ L2 share, and the
weaker the form of robustness that we enforce by means of replication. In the
experiments of Chapter 6, we chose L0 to contain 60% of the alarms in L. This
value is based on informal experiments with different sizes of L0.
Supporting the manual investigation of alarm clusters: After alarm clusters
have been extracted, we rely on a human expert to investigate them and to decide
whether they are valid or not. To support this manual validation process, we have
implemented descriptive statistics and the technique of drill-down. Descriptive
statistics make generalized alarms more informative by associating histograms
with their attribute values. For example, consider a generalized alarm that models
an alarm cluster of 5000 alarms, and assume that the source IP of this generalized
alarm has the value “Web server”. The histogram associated with the value “Web
server” shows on the x-axis all Web servers that are subsumed by the concept
“Web server”. The y-axis of the histogram shows for each individual Web server
how many out of the 5000 alarms it has triggered. In that way, it is possible to
expose the elementary attribute values that are subsumed by a generalized one. In
practice, we found that descriptive statistics significantly facilitate the understand-
ing of generalized alarms.
Finally, drill-down is a well-known technique in data mining [90]. Drill-down
allows the user of the alarm clustering method to reversely traverse the merge
steps that lead to an alarm cluster. Hence, if an alarm cluster looks questionable,
then the user can look at the alarm clusters that were merged to obtain it. If
needed, drill-down can recursively continue down to the level of individual alarms.
We found that drill-down offers a very practical method for investigating alarm
clusters, and for establishing or refuting their validity.
5.3.3 Concluding Remarks
It is worth pointing out that our alarm clustering method has a control flow that
is favorable for the creation of valid alarm clusters. In fact, beginning with the
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most apparent cluster, it repeatedly finds and removes clusters from the dataset. In
doing so, the most clear-cut clusters are found and removed first, and the search for
additional clusters continues with the left-over alarms. Anderberg recommends
this strategy as one that is likely to find meaningful clusters [9]. Moreover, up
to min size alarms that did not fit well into any cluster might be left over at the
end of clustering. This, it has been argued [92], is more natural than assigning all
alarms (noise and outliers included) to clusters.
Chapter 6
Validation of Thesis Statement
This chapter is dedicated to the experimental validation of the thesis statement,
which was given in Section 1.2. Section 6.1 presents a detailed example of how
alarm clustering and root cause analysis work in practice. The remaining sections
address the individual claims of the thesis statement. Specifically, Section 6.2
contains summary statistics from a large number of experiments to show that a
few root causes account for the majority of alarms, and that these root causes can
be discovered efficiently by means of alarm clustering. Section 6.3 shows that the
future alarm load decreases quite significantly if root causes are removed or their
associated alarms are filtered out. Section 6.4, finally, shows that filtering can be
made safe so that there is a small risk of discarding true positives.
6.1 An Illustrative Example
This section illustrates how alarm clustering and root cause analysis work in prac-
tice. To this end, we consider the alarm log consisting of the 156380 alarms that
IDS 7 of Table 1.2 triggered in April 2001. IDS 7 is deployed at a large com-
mercial site whose network topology is sketched in Figure 4.3(a). To obtain a
more accurate picture of the network topology, please replace the subnets Net-A,
. . . , Net-Z of Figure 4.3(a) by the 224 subnets 0.0.0.*, 0.0.1.*, . . . , 255.255.255.*,
which are defined by the top three bytes of an IP address.
We configured the alarm clustering method with the following generalization
hierarchies: For IP addresses and port numbers, we used the generalization hier-
archies of Figure 4.3(c). As before, we ask you to mentally replace the subnets
Net-A, . . . , Net-Z by the subnets 0.0.0.*, . . . , 255.255.255.*. For time-stamps,
we employed the generalization hierarchies of Figure 4.4, with the time-stamp
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attribute being replicated as described in Section 4.2.3. For the context attribute,
we chose to use generalization hierarchies based on frequent substrings, which is
also described in Section 4.2.3. No generalization hierarchy was defined for the
alarm type. Hence, the alarm type cannot be generalized and alarm clusters can
never mix alarms of different alarm types. We found this to be a useful heuristic
to obtain more understandable alarm clusters.
We consider the above generalization hierarchies to be simple and intuitive.
Moreover, the experiments in Section 6.2 confirm that generalization hierarchies
like these work generally well in practice. Finally, an important reason for choos-
ing the aforementioned generalization hierarchy for IP addresses is that we were
in possession of the necessary background knowledge to build it. For example,
even if we had wanted to, we could not have used generalization hierarchies that
structure IP addresses by their administrative domains; we simply did not have the
necessary background knowledge. Thus, the availability of background knowl-
edge affects the kind of generalization hierarchies that one can use in practice.
Table 6.1 shows the generalized alarms of the thirteen largest alarm clusters
that we found. Each line of the table represents one alarm cluster and the “Size”
column indicates the cluster’s size. Throughout the table, “any” is generically
written for attributes that have been generalized to the root of their generalization
hierarchies. The value “undefined” in the “Context” column indicates that the IDS
did not store any value for the context attribute. Similarly, the port attributes are
occasionally undefined. For example, the ICMP protocol has no notion of ports
[196]. As a consequence, the port attributes of “Fragmented ICMP Traffic” alarms
are undefined. Finally, recall that the names ip1 , ip2 , . . . refer to the machines in
Figure 4.3.
Note that the generalized alarms of Table 6.1 summarize 95% of all alarms.
We have therefore found a very crisp summary of almost the entire alarm log.
Moreover, using this summary for root cause analysis is a huge simplification over
using the original alarm log. Nevertheless, generalized alarms can only suggest
root causes. Additional work is needed to validate them. This validation generally
requires access to the alarm log, good security skills, and an understanding of the
computing environment. Below we present the validated root causes that we found
for the generalized alarms of Table 6.1. The discussion proceeds by alarm type:
WWW IIS View Source Attack: The first two generalized alarms of Table 6.1
contain the following (sanitized) substring in their context attributes:
GET /search cgi/cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=
http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Exyz%2Ecom
This request is completely legal and, based on Table 6.1, it has been issued
more than 100000 times. Our analysis has shown that “WWW IIS View
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Source Attack” alarms occur when a URL contains “%2E”, as is the case for
the above URL. The root cause lies in the search engine that the Web servers
ip1 and ip2 offer. In fact, all the URLs that the search engine returns in
response to client requests have their dots replaced by “%2E”, which is the
hex-encoding for a dot. When a client clicks on one of the returned search
results, then the above alarm is triggered. Finally, the third generalized
alarm in Table 6.1 turned out to be the reverse problem: Internal clients
requesting external Web pages, the URL of which contains “%2E”. Note
that the internal clients are proxied by the firewall.
FTP SYST Command Attempt: These generalized alarms simply highlight the
fact that many FTP clients issue the SYST command — a legal command
that returns information about the FTP server. The root cause is the config-
uration of the FTP clients that tells them to issue the SYST command at the
beginning of each FTP session.
IP Fragment Attack: Either ipA1 is maliciously sending fragmented packets to
the firewalls or there is a router that fragments the packets between ipA1
and the firewalls. Our investigation has convinced us that the fragmenting
router is the actual root cause.
TCP SYN Host Sweep: Here, the IDS thinks that the firewalls are running host
sweeps. In reality, however, the firewalls proxy the HTTP (port 80) and
SMTP (port 25) requests of their clients. While exercising this function, the
firewalls occasionally contact many external machines at virtually the same
time. The resulting traffic resembles host sweeps.
Fragmented ICMP Traffic: After investigating the source IPs, we realized that
they all belong to various Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Therefore, we
conjectured that there is some link between fragmented ICMP traffic and
modem access to the Internet, i.e. the root cause is some particularity of
certain modems.
Unknown Protocol Field in IP Packet: At the end of the month, a machine on
the Internet starts using an unknown transport layer protocol to communi-
cate with the firewall. As many security tools ignore protocols that they do
not understand, attackers occasionally use unknown protocols to establish
covert channels. A closer investigation of this generalized alarm seems to
indicate that, indeed, ipZ1 is using a covert channel.
Note that for the last two alarm types, we had some difficulty in pinpointing
the actual root causes. This, however, is no limitation of our alarm clustering
method. In fact, even when we looked at the raw intrusion detection alarms, we
could not ascertain the root causes. Too much information was missing. For
example, what modems do the ISP clients use, and what hardware do the ISPs
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deploy? Who is ipZ1, and what is the “unknown protocol” that has been observed?
These questions are hard to answer, partially because the IDS provides too little
information about the “unknown protocol”, partially because certain components
such as the modems or the machine attached to ipZ1 are out of our control. Hence,
with or without alarm clustering, there are cases where we do not have enough
information to identify root causes with certainty.
Recall that we are experimenting with historical (N.B. real-world) alarm logs.
Therefore, we cannot simply remove the previously identified root causes. As an
alternative, we used filtering to estimate the alarm load reduction that we could
expect. Specifically, we wrote filtering rules that discarded all alarms matching
one of the generalized alarms in Table 6.1. We then applied these filters to the
alarms of the following month. The result was that 82 percent of all alarms in May
were automatically discarded by the filtering rules. Thus, if the root causes had
been resolved, then 82 percent less work would have been the estimated payoff in
May 2001. Section 6.4 discusses the risk that filtering discards true positives.
6.2 Experience with Alarm Clustering
The first and second claim of the thesis statement say that a few root causes gen-
erally account for the majority of alarms, and that these root causes can be dis-
covered efficiently by means of alarm clustering (cf. Section 1.2). This section
contains summary statistics from a large number of experiments to substantiate
these claims. Section 6.2.1 describes the experimental setup, and Section 6.2.2
presents the results obtained.
6.2.1 Experimental Setup
The experimental setup is very similar to the one of the last section. Specifically,
for each IDS of Table 1.2 and each month of the year 2001, we take all alarms
of this IDS and month, and store them into a separate alarm log. This yields
(16 IDSs) × (12 months) = 192 pairwise disjunct alarm logs. We run the alarm
clustering method individually on each of these alarm logs and record the results.
As above, we use the generalization hierarchies of Figure 4.3(c), Figure 4.4,
and Section 4.2.3 for port numbers, the time-stamp, and the context attribute,
respectively. No generalization hierarchy is defined for the alarm type. For IP
addresses we adapt the generalization hierarchy of Figure 4.3(c) to the specific
environments of the different IDSs. This is done as follows: The root concept
of the adapted hierarchy is called Any-IP and represents the set of all possible IP
addresses. The concept “Any-IP” is split into the categories Protected IPs and
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External IPs. The protected IPs, which correspond to the DMZ of Figure 4.3(c),
are those IPs that the IDS-operator is responsible for. External IPs are all the
other IPs that belong to someone else. We further sub-classify the protected IPs
according to the services (e.g. HTTP, FTP, Telnet, etc.) they offer. External IPs
are further classified by subnet.
The alarm clustering method is configured to enforce ε-robustness (cf. Section
4.3.4) with ε = 0.05. Moreover, as described in Section 5.3.2, the alarm cluster-
ing method performs replication analysis, and only returns alarm clusters that are
robust in the sense that they are independently discovered in two different sample
logs that overlap in 60% of their alarms. Instead of manually setting the min size
values as required in the lines 2 and 9 of Figure 4.7, we mechanically set min size
to one tenths of the number of alarms in table T (i.e. min size := |T |/10). We run
the alarm clustering method for all 192 alarm logs during the night, and manually
review the results. The purpose of this review is not to actually identify the root
causes, but rather to convince ourselves that the clustering results are informative
and interpretable. When we find generalized alarms that are overly general or
hard to interpret, then we repeat the alarm clustering process, but this time with
manually set min size values. The alarm clusters that we find this way are substi-
tuted for the mechanically generated ones. This yields the final set of generalized
alarms, to which the results of the next section refer.
Two remarks are in order. First, we found that the default value for min size
works well in most cases, but occasionally, it is important to manually tweak the
min size value to the alarm log at hand. However, manually reviewing and revis-
ing the mechanically generated clustering results is very time consuming, which
is why we had not done it in our earlier work [114]. In hindsight, we observed
that this extra effort has improved the quality of the results reported here. The
second remark concerns the replicability of the experiments reported here. The
alarms used in our experiments originate from Fortune 500 companies, and — for
confidentiality reasons — cannot be made public. However, the thesis statement
of this dissertation concern intrusion detection alarms in general, not the specific
alarms of our experiments. Therefore, anybody in possession of intrusion detec-
tion alarms should be able to verify the results reported here. Moreover, because
of the limitations of simulated or laboratory environments [144], we consider it
essential to use real-world alarms for the evaluation.
6.2.2 Alarm Clustering Results
The purpose of this section is to validate the first two claims of the thesis state-
ment. This is done by means of summary statistics that we derived from an analy-
sis of the previously mentioned 192 alarm logs. We first address the second claim
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of the thesis statement, according to which alarm clustering is a practical method
for identifying root causes. One aspect of practicability is the run-time of the
clustering method. The histogram of Figure 6.1 is based on time measurements
taken on a 700 MHz Pentium III CPU with 1 GB RAM. All run-times include
the time for reading and processing an alarm log. For example, Figure 6.1 shows
that 24 out of the 192 alarm logs were analyzed in less than one minute. For 60
alarm logs, the analysis took between one and two minutes. Run-times of more
than nine minutes were observed for only 22 alarm logs. Figure 6.2 shows that
the average run-time is approximately linear in the log size. The peak for logs be-
tween 280000 and 320000 alarms is caused by an exceptionally large number of
iterations in process that implements ε-robustness (cf. Section 4.3.4). In general,
however, run-times are relatively low.
Another aspect of practicability is the number and interpretability of general-
ized alarms. In fact, if the alarm clustering method generated an excessive number
of generalized alarms, or if generalized alarms were hard to interpret, then alarm
clustering would be of minor help for root cause analysis (contrary to the second
claim of the thesis statement). Figure 6.3 shows the average number of general-
ized alarms per IDS, with the averages being taken over all months of the year
2001. It becomes apparent that on the average over all 192 alarm logs, there are
18 generalized alarms per alarm log. It is clearly practicable to perform a manual
root cause analysis for an average of 18 generalized alarms per alarm log. As a
matter of fact, for 48 of the 192 alarm logs we have used the respective general-
ized alarms to perform the root cause analysis (see Section 6.3 for the selection of
alarm logs.) For the sake of objectivity, we asked colleagues to perform indepen-
dently from us the root cause analysis for 10 of the 48 alarm logs. Their and our
results were consistent. Moreover, we and our colleagues agreed that generalized
alarms were intuitive and easy to interpret. Finally, interpreting the generalized
alarms took us between one and two hours per alarm log. Taken together, these
findings support the second claim of the thesis statement.
By way of illustration, we next list some of the more interesting root causes
that have not yet been reported in this dissertation:
In one Windows network, we observed a large number of “Anonymous ses-
sion” alarms. In the present case, this was part of the normal system opera-
tion. IDSs report anonymous sessions, because an attacker can use them to
enumerate users, shares, and under Windows NT even registry information.
Between April and September 2001, the number of DNS-related scans and
attacks increased one-hundred-fold on most IDSs that monitored Internet
traffic. We conjecture that this spike is related to a January 2001 CERT
advisory that warned of multiple vulnerabilities in BIND, which is a widely
used implementation of the DNS service [32].
106 CHAPTER 6. VALIDATION OF THESIS STATEMENT
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
]0,1] ]1,2] ]2,3] ]3,4] ]4,5] ]5,6] ]6,7] ]7,8] ]8,9] >9
Run-time per alarm log (in minutes)
F r
e q
u e
n c
y
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A broken router triggered an abundance of “TCP overlap” alarms. IDSs
report overlapping TCP traffic because it has been used to evade attack de-
tection [176].
Some IP addresses systematically scanned the default ports of well-known
Trojan horses.
Consider a DNS client that sends a batch of DNS requests to a DNS server.
When the DNS server returns its replies, it returns a series of UDP packets
to various ports of the DNS client. This traffic pattern looks as if the DNS
server was UDP port-scanning the DNS client, which triggers alarms on
most IDSs.
Some IDSs trigger on URLs containing “/exec/” because this substring is
associated to a vulnerability in the Cisco Catalyst 3500 XL switch (cf. CVE-
2000-0945). The users at one site were eager on shopping at amazon.com.
However, virtually all URLs at amazon.com contain the substring “/exec/”,
which resulted in a correspondingly large number of false positives.
Some sites had large amounts of Napster traffic, which some IDSs report
because companies generally prohibit the use of Napster, and similar file-
swapping applications.
Socksified FTP clients always trigger an abundance of “FTP bounce”
alarms. In detail, FTP clients can instruct FTP servers to send their data
to any IP address and port of the client’s choice. This ability can be abused
for the FTP bounce attack [31], in which the FTP client specifies an IP ad-
dress different from its own. However, socksified FTP clients are proxied
by a SOCKS server [133], and have to specify the IP address of the SOCKS
server, rather than their own. This triggers “FTP bounce” alarms.
We now turn to the first claim of the thesis statement, according to which
a few root causes generally account for the majority of alarms. This claim is
confirmed by our experience that a few predominant and persistent root causes
systematically trigger large amounts of mostly false alarms. Chapter 3 has made
this point in great detail, and it is further supported by the above sample root
causes. To defend this claim in a quantitative manner, we have to identify a small
number of root causes, and show that these root causes triggered the majority of
alarms. Using the alarm clustering method, it is relatively easy to identify root
causes, but it is very difficult to count the number of alarms that these root causes
have triggered. In fact, Section 3.2 has shown that it is generally not possible to
decide with certainty whether a given root cause has triggered a particular alarm.
Hence, it is equally impossible (at least in the general case) to count the number of
alarms that a root cause has triggered. For these reasons, we opted to approximate
the number of alarms per root cause.
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Figure 6.3: Average number of generalized alarms per IDS.
For the purpose of this approximation, we assume that our alarm clustering
method is correct in the sense of Definition 3.2. In other words, let L be an alarm
log, and let C1, . . . , Cn be the alarm clusters that the alarm clustering method has
found for L. Then, we assume that all alarms in cluster Ci share the same root
cause, i = 1, . . . , n. Two conclusions are immediate:
1. Because each alarm cluster corresponds to a root cause, we have established
the existence of k ≤ n root causes, with k = n if the alarm clusters have
pairwise distinct root causes. Note that the min size parameter controls the
number n of alarm clusters, and hence, the number k of root causes. Clearly,
this control is weakened by the effect that ε-robustness (cf. Section 4.3.4)
has on the clustering results. Nonetheless, it might seem that the above
correctness assumption (from which we concluded the existence of k ≤ n
root causes) is a strong one.
2. These k root causes account for (100/|L|)×∑ni=1 |Ci| percent of the alarms
in L. This percentage is called the coverage.
To show that a few root causes account for the majority of alarms, we next
show that k is generally small in our experiments, while the coverage is large.
In fact, Figure 6.3 shows that the number n of alarm clusters per alarm log is
relatively small, namely 18 on the average. Consequently, the number k of root
causes is small, as well. The histogram of Figure 6.4 shows the number of times
the different degrees of coverage are obtained in our experiments. For example,
between 95% and 100% of coverage is obtained for 59 of the 192 alarm logs.
For 51 alarm logs, the coverage is between 90% and 95%, and on the average,
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Figure 6.4: Histogram showing the frequency of different degrees of coverage.
an alarm log has 90% coverage. Hence, an average of less than 18 root causes
typically accounts for 90% of the alarms in an alarm log. This confirms the first
claim of the thesis statement.
6.3 Alarm Load Reduction
According to the third claim of the thesis statement, one can significantly reduce
the future alarm load by removing root causes, or by filtering out the alarms that
originate from benign root causes. To verify this claim, one has to measure the
effect of root cause removal and alarm filtering. However, given that we are exper-
imenting with historical (N.B. real-world) alarm logs, it is not possible to actually
remove root causes. Therefore, we use only filtering in our experiments. Note that
the use of filtering is born of necessity, and does not endorse filtering over root
cause removal. In a nutshell, we choose a month m in the year 2001 and an IDS
I from Table 1.2. Then, we perform a root cause analysis for the alarm log corre-
sponding to IDS I and monthm. Based on the results obtained, we derive filtering
rules and apply them to the alarms that IDS I triggers in monthm+1. In doing so,
we calculate the percentage of alarms that are discarded by the rules. The higher
this percentage, the stronger the evidence in favor of the thesis statement.
To perform a root cause analysis for a given IDS, one needs a detailed under-
standing of the site at which the IDS is deployed. Gaining such an understanding
is time-consuming and requires the close cooperation of the IDS owner. For lack
of time and resources we were not able to gain a sufficiently deep understanding
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for all IDSs. Therefore, we decided to focus on the IDSs 3, 6, 10, and 14, which
are representative in the following ways: First, the IDSs 3 and 6 are of type A,
while the IDSs 10 and 14 are of type B, where A and B are pseudonyms for the
IDS vendors (cf. Section 1.4). Second, IDS 3 is located in a DMZ, IDS 6 is on an
extranet, IDS 10 is on an intranet, and IDS 14 is on a link to the Internet. Third,
according to Table 3.2 on page 48, IDS 3 seems to contradict the alarm cluster
hypothesis, IDS 14 offers some evidence in favor of the alarm cluster hypothesis,
and the IDSs 6 and 10 offer strong evidence in favor of the alarm cluster hypoth-
esis. Finally, for each of the IDSs 3, 6, 10, and 14 we consider all months of the
year 2001, i.e. m = Jan, . . . ,Dec. This results in the 4 IDSs × 12 months = 48
alarm logs mentioned in the previous section.
After completing the root cause analysis for IDS I , I ∈ {3, 6, 10, 14}, and
month m, m ∈ {Jan, . . . ,Dec}, we wrote filtering rules that discarded all alarms
belonging to the identified root causes. In most cases, the filtering rules were iden-
tical to the generalized alarms. Occasionally, we adapted the generalized alarms
according to our understanding of the root causes to obtain more adequate filtering
rules. Because root cause removal was no option, we wrote filtering rules for be-
nign and malicious root causes alike. In the real world, one might choose to filter
out true positives if their targets are not vulnerable [136], but other responses such
as firewall reconfigurations are more typical. Either way, the end effect is that in
the future, one no longer has to manually handle the alarms of well-understood
root causes. In our experiments, we imitate this automation by means of filter-
ing rules. We applied the derived filtering rules to the alarms that the same IDS
triggered in the following month. We measured the alarm load reduction, i.e. the
percentage of alarms that were discarded by the filtering rules, and plotted it in
the Figures 6.5 through 6.8.
For example, Figure 6.5 shows that the filtering rules that we derived from
the January alarms of IDS 3 discard 93% of the alarms that IDS 3 triggers in
February 2001. In other words, the number of alarms that the IDS operator had
to investigate in February could have been reduced by 93% if root cause analysis
in combination with filtering had been done at the end of January. Note that the
alarm load reduction for January 2001 is not available, because we do not use
the alarms from December 2000 in our experiments. Further, the rules derived
from the February alarms of IDS 3 discard 92% of the March alarms, and so on.
It becomes evident from the Figures 6.5 and 6.7 that the IDSs 3 and 10 have a
relatively high alarm load reduction of approximately 95% on the average. On
the other hand side, the alarm load reduction of the IDSs 6 and 14 is much more
modest. This variability can be explained as follows:
IDS 3 is deployed in a Web hosting environment. In this environment, the bulk
of alarms are TCP SYN host-sweeps, which result from external hosts
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Figure 6.5: Alarm load reduction for IDS 3.
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Figure 6.6: Alarm load reduction for IDS 6.
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Figure 6.7: Alarm load reduction for IDS 10.
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Figure 6.8: Alarm load reduction for IDS 14.
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contacting in short succession a series of distinct Web servers. The result-
ing scan-like traffic patterns are extremely repetitive and predictable. This
makes filtering very effective and results in an average alarm load reduction
of approximately 95%.
IDS 6 features an over-proportionally low alarm load reduction in February,
April, September, and October. Based on our investigation, a temporary
networking problem on the 5th and 6th of February has triggered 563205
”Fragmented IP” alarms. Clearly, the filtering rules derived from the Jan-
uary alarms cannot anticipate this temporary networking problem. As a
consequence, they are ineffective, and the alarm load reduction in Febru-
ary drops to 18%. In April, the already mentioned spike in the number of
DNS scans and attacks renders the filtering rules from March ineffective.
The advent of NIMDA in mid-September, as well as other unpredictable
attacks explain the alarm load reduction of only 48% in September. By
mid-October, NIMDA has spread to the point where the filtering rules from
September are too specific to be effective. Hence the alarm load reduction
of 43% in October.
IDS 10 is deployed on an internal network. Our investigation has shown that the
vast majority of alarms result from a network management system. More-
over, these alarms are extremely repetitive, so that root cause analysis fol-
lowed by filtering achieves the very high alarm load reductions shown in
Figure 6.7.
IDS 14 is deployed before the firewall of a large company. Based on our anal-
ysis, the majority of alarms triggered by IDS 14 report real attacks. How-
ever, most real attacks are ephemeral, and do not progress for months in
a row. This explains why the filtering rules derived in one month yield a
generally low alarm load reduction in the following month. The 90% alarm
load reduction in December is an exception, which is due to a significant
amount of port scanning during the months of November and December.
The alarm load reductions of nearly 0% in April and May are due to a
temporary networking problem that triggers 1415167 ”TCP Overlap Data”
alarms in April. Clearly, the filtering rules from March cannot anticipate
this networking problem, and are consequently ineffective in April. On the
other hand side, the filtering rules from April deal mostly with ”TCP Over-
lap Data” alarms, which do no longer occur in May. Hence the poor alarm
load reduction in May.
The average alarm load reduction over the 48 months of the Figures 6.5
through 6.8 is 70%. Even though this percentage is relatively high, we believe
that it actually underestimates the attainable alarm load reduction. In fact, the
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above examples show that the sudden advent of a new root cause (e.g. a network-
ing problem or a worm) can trigger a sharp drop in the alarm load reduction.
After all, the filtering rules were derived from alarms that contained no trace of
these new root causes. Consequently, the rules are ineffective at handling the new
alarms, and the alarm load reduction drops. This situation is unaltered when root
cause removal is used instead of filtering, because one cannot remove root causes
that do not yet exist. However, one can attempt to detect and respond as fast as
possible to new root causes. To this end, one can monitor the average number of
alarms per time unit. When this number rises sharply, it is a strong indication that
new root causes have set in. Then, one can immediately re-do the root cause anal-
ysis and respond to the root causes discovered. This approach is clearly superior
to our high-latency approach, where root cause analysis is done once a month.
Moreover, the new approach is likely to result in an average alarm load reduction
that is even higher than the 70% reported above.
While running the above experiments, we observed that the alarm clustering
method tended to produce generalized alarms that — according to our root cause
analysis — could be used as filtering rules. We therefore hypothesize that gen-
eralized alarms are generally good filtering rules. If one is willing to accept this
hypothesis, then it is not necessary to actually perform a root cause analysis to
derive filtering rules. Rather, one can simply use the generalized alarms as default
filtering rules. Using this idea, we have calculated the average alarm load reduc-
tions for all 16 IDSs of Table 1.2. Figure 6.9 shows the resulting averages. For
example, in the year 2001, the default filtering rules for IDS 1 achieve an average
alarm load reduction of 90% per month. The average alarm load reduction for
IDS 2 is 82%. Not surprisingly, the averages for the IDSs 3, 6, 10, and 14 are
very close to the average alarm load reductions of the manually derived filtering
rules. These latter averages can be calculated from the Figures 6.5 through 6.8.
The average alarm load reduction in Figure 6.9 is 70% per IDS and month. This
is consistent with the claimed effectiveness of filtering.
6.4 On the Risks of Filtering
The thesis statement of Section 1.2 claims that it is safe to filter out alarms that
have benign root causes, where safe means that the risk of discarding true positives
is small. This section defends this claim. Doing so is no easy endeavor because
there are many factors that influence how safe the use of filtering rules actually is.
Three particularly noteworthy factors are:
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Figure 6.9: Average alarm load reduction per IDS.
The author: Recall that filtering rules are written based on one’s understanding
of alarm root causes. Hence, whether a filtering rule is safe or not depends
to a good part on the author who wrote it.
The attacker: The safety of filtering rules is also contingent on how knowledge-
able attackers are. In fact, knowledge of filtering rules makes it easier for
an attacker to design an attack so that the resulting alarms match a filtering
rule and get discarded.
The environment: In a very dynamic environment there is a higher risk that a
formerly safe filtering rule becomes obsolete and starts discarding true pos-
itives. Conversely, the more static and the more tightly controlled an envi-
ronment is, the safer it is to use filtering.
In summary, if the author is skilled, the environment does not change in ways
that the author could not anticipate, and the attacker does not know the filtering
rules, then filtering is safe. Clearly, to quantify safety in an objective manner,
one first has to quantify these three factors. However, it is not clear how to quan-
titatively measure the author’s skills, the stability of the environment, and the
attacker’s knowledge. This suggests that there probably is no simple solution to
the problem of quantifying safety.
Moreover, we believe that a quantitative statement such as “any given true
positive has a probability of 10−3 to be filtered out” is meaningless because safety
must be seen in comparison to alternative ways of handling alarms. For example,
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if a part-time employee had a probability of 10−6 to miss a true positive, then fil-
tering would be rather unsafe, given the above (hypothetical) probability of 10−3.
But what if it took 10 security specialists using correlation systems such as those
of Section 2.4 to miss as few as one out of 106 true positives? At first sight, this
seems to imply that filtering is comparatively unsafe. However, 10 well-equipped
security experts are much more expensive than root cause analysis and filtering.
It is therefore unfair to compare said security experts to our filtering technology.
This raises another problem, namely the problem of deciding what to compare
filtering to. At this point, it should have become evident that quantifying safety
is a difficult research problem, which exceeds the scope of this dissertation. As
an alternative to a quantitative analysis, the next section proposes four pragmatic
ways to make filtering safer.
6.4.1 Guidelines for Safe Filtering
Users concerned about the safety of filtering are advised to abide by the following
guidelines:
Write specific rules: The more specific a filtering rule is, the less likely it is to
discard true positives. Ideally, filtering rules should always inspect the con-
text attribute, which — as explained in Section 1.4 — stores the raw audit
data that the IDS believes to contain an attack. In that way, filtering rules
can double-check the analysis of the IDS and thereby guarantee that only
false positives are discarded. Unfortunately, not all IDSs set the context
attribute in all alarms.
Keep rules secret: Keeping filtering rules secret makes it more difficult for an
attacker to “hijack” them.
Remove outdated rules: Computing environments are dynamic. Hosts, net-
works, and services come and go, and IDS software gets updated or even
replaced. As a consequence, alarms that were predominant in the past may
vanish, which renders their associated filtering rules obsolete. Obsolete fil-
tering rules should be removed because they do not noticeably reduce the
alarm load, while still bearing the danger to discard true positives.
Filter when not vulnerable: This recommendation does not make filtering safer,
but it limits the harm done when a true positive is actually discarded. The
idea is to filter alarms only when they report attacks that the target is not
vulnerable to. In fact, some authors recommend to systematically filter out
all alarms that affect non-vulnerable targets [136].
Chapter 7
Summary and Outlook
This chapter summarizes the work presented in this dissertation and reviews the
main contributions made. Possible directions for future research are suggested.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
This thesis proposes a new solution to the problem that intrusion detection systems
overload their human operators by triggering thousands of mostly false alarms per
day. Central to our solution is the notion of a root cause, which is the reason for
which an alarm was triggered. The foundation of our solution is laid by three key
contributions:
1. It is shown that, in general, a small number of root causes is responsible for
the majority of alarms that an IDS triggers.
2. A new data mining technique is developed, and it is shown that applying
this data mining technique to alarm logs constitutes an efficient approach
for identifying root causes.
3. It is shown that once root causes have been identified, one can safely and
significantly reduce the future alarm load by fixing them or by filtering out
alarms that are associated to benign root causes.
Based on these contributions, we have introduced the following new alarm
handling paradigm: Firstly, the proposed new data mining technique is used to
identify root causes that account for large numbers of alarms, and secondly, these
root causes are fixed or their associated alarms are judiciously filtered out (pro-
vided they are false positives). We have validated this alarm handling paradigm in
extensive experiments with real-world intrusion detection alarms. On the average,
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we found that a few hours of time spent on the identification and removal of root
causes would pay off by reducing the future alarm load by 70%.
Further contributions of this dissertation include a description of the link be-
tween data mining and root cause analysis (cf. Section 3.2), a high-level charac-
terization of intrusion detection alarms (cf. Proposition 3.1), the development of
heuristic rules for attack detection (cf. Section 3.5.2), and a case study for the ap-
plication of data mining techniques to a real-world problem. Three conclusions
can be drawn when comparing this work to previous work in alarm handling:
Console versus source: Most previous work has focused on building monitoring
consoles that handle alarms as effectively as possible. This dissertation has
shown that many alarms originate from persistent root causes. Further, it
has been demonstrated that these alarms are best handled at their source
(i.e. by eliminating their root causes) rather than at the console.
Online versus off-line: Most previous work has focused on online systems that
analyze alarms in real-time. This dissertation has shown that there is sub-
stantial value in the off-line analysis of historical alarms.
True positives versus false positives: While most previous work has attempted
to single out and escalate true positives, our work has shown the feasibility
and usefulness of eliminating false positives. (Note that our alarm han-
dling paradigm mainly eliminates false positives because most attacks are
too ephemeral to be properly addressed by a high-latency approach like
ours, which involves off-line data mining followed by some response.)
7.2 Future Work
This thesis work can be further pursued in one or more of the following directions:
At present, interpreting alarm clusters in terms of root causes is still man-
ual. However, one could envision to build an expert-system that automates
the interpretation of alarm clusters. In this way, root cause analysis would
become fully automatic.
As discussed in Section 4.4, future work could investigate the integration of
further forms of background knowledge into the alarm clustering method.
Future work could continue the work of Section 6.4 and develop methods
to quantitatively assess the risk of filtering.
One could build an IDS that supports root cause analysis. At a minimum,
such an IDS should have public (rather than proprietary) signatures and a
verbose-mode, in which the traffic matching certain signatures is logged.
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